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SYNOPSIS 
This dissertation investigates the application of Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
methodologies to the area of scenario based policy planning. We examine how the tools of MCDM 
can be used to develop a Decision Support System (DSS) that would allow management or policy 
planners to resolve conflicting goals and interests. Ideally, the resolution would be obtained by the 
various decision makers (DMs) in such a manner, that it satisfies all the relevant interest groupings 
at a maximum level of achievement for all concerned.'This is not always possible and compromises 
need to made that are fare and equitable to all the relevant interests. 
Stewart et al. (1993), in a report entitled: "Scenario Based Multicriteria Policy Planning for Water 
Management in South AfriCa", develop the principles of a procedure for implementing scenario 
based multicriteria policy planning. Their iterative procedure is illustrated in figure 2.1, chapter 2, 
of this paper. In this dissertation, we refine certain parts of this procedure and the two areas in 
particular that we have looked at are: 
(1) filtering a large set of policy scenarios (Background Set), that could be a continuum, to 
form a smaller set (Foreground Set), and 
(2) further reducing the smaller set to form a solution set of policy scenarios. 
(The generic terms "Background Set" and "Foreground Set" are defined in section 2.1 of chapter 
2.) 
The main objectives of this study were therefore mainly twofold and are as follows: 
(1) to determine what MCDM methods are relevant to natural resources management (using 
water as a case study), and 
(2) to investigate how these methods need to be adopted for use in an interactive DSS. 
We address the first objective by surveying the literature in an attempt to identify potential MCDM 
approaches that are suitable to (i) reduce a large set of alternatives, analogous to the Background 
Set, to a more manageable smaller set, analogous to the Foreground Set of alternatives, and (ii) 
refine this Foreground Set in order to present the DMs with a solution set of al.ternatives from which 
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they will make their final selection. The literature has until now not dealt explicitly with these two 
issues and we had to adapt certain MCDM approaches, many of which have been developed in a 
linear programming context, to suit our purposes. 
, Chapter 1 of this dissertation therefore sketches the background to this study, by providing the 
motivation for this work and setting out the manner in which the rest of this dissertation will follow. 
Chapter 2 deals with the literature review that was undertaken. Here we provide the detailed 
procedure developed by Stewart et al. (1993). The chapter also explains some of the nomenclature 
that has been or will be used in the remainder of this dissertation. The two remaining (main) 
sections of this chapter concentrate on reviewing the appropriate MCDM approaches that could be 
applied to firstly, the Background Set, and secondly, the Foreground Set of alternatives. 
Chapter 3 provides the r~ader with a description of the approach that was adopted for the simulation 
studies in this dissertation. These studies were used to analyze selected MCDM approaches in an 
attempt to evaluate the overall quality of the solutions that they produce. The chapter provides the 
reader with summaries of both data sets that were used in the simulation studies and includes the 
experimental design technique that was used to generate the second data set. Chapter 3 further 
outlines the various stages of the simulation algorithm, with the algorithm itself being illustrated, 
for a particular iteration of a simulation run, diagrammatically in figure 3.1. The simulation 
algorithm was applied separately to each of the two data sets and the results obtained from these 
simulation runs were reported in chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 4 reports the results that were obtained from the first data set, and includes the sensitivity 
runs that were conducted on the various MCDM appro~ches. Chapter 5 reports the results that were 
obtained from the analysis conducted on the second data set, including the sensitivity analysis 
conducted on the various MCDM approaches, and the effects that external factors such as the 
number of policy elements, derived attributes or interest groups, have on these results. 
The conclusions that were reached, based on the findings of the analysis as reported in chapters 4 
and 5, regarding 
(1) which methods provided the most consistent and reliable solutions, as well as 
(2) the general value of MCDM methods to multicriteria policy planning in water resources 
management 
(ix) 
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are then finally reported on in chapter 6. This chapter therefore serves as a concluding chapter to 
this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Problem 
Where one finds humans, one is bound to come across problems. This is not necessarily a bad 
reflection on the human race as such, but serves as a reminder of the realities that have, and will 
continue to, characterize the history of humanity. These realities are embodied in the numerous 
problems people face today, some of which are latent, others have been present since time 
immemorial. However, the human race has not only become synonymous with problems. 
Accompanying these problems, humans have, or at least are attempting to, find solutions. It can of 
course, quite justifiably, be argued that certain (complete) solutions still remain latent. An opposing 
and perhaps more optimistic view can, however, be taken. It would state the following: Where qne 
encounters the human race, one is bound to come across solutions. These solutions are merely 
waiting to find the problems to which they can be applied. 
One of the problem areas people face today, is that of managing their scarce natural resources. But 
why bother? The answer to this is quite simply, that in order to survive as a species, humans need 
to preserve and effectively manage their environment. The manner in which this can be achieved, 
remains a much debated argument. However, humanity is faced with depleting natural resources on 
the one hand, and competing users of these scarce resources on the other. Humans have to make 
informed decisions on how adequately to manage these resources and thereby satisfy all the 
competing users thereof. 
The problem or scenario described in the paragraph above, is one that involves a decision maker 
(DM), or group of decision makers, contemplating a choice of action. This choice has to be made 
from a number of alternatives, where each alternative produces one or more, possibly uncertain, 
outcomes. For certain problems, the alternatives are relatively easily defined whilst for others they 
still have to be generated. It is, however, apparent that this problem will have multiple objectives 
associated with it, these objectives stemming from the competing users of the natural resource(s). 
Often these objectives are in conflict with one another. This conflict has to be resolved in a way 
that satisfies the requirements of all the competing users, both fairly and equitably. The science of 
decision analysis deals with the resolution of this type of conflict, although it must be said that it 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
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does not always provide an explicit solution to the problem being investigated. As Keeney (1982) 
puts it: 
"Decision analysis will not solve a decision problem, nor is it intended to. Its purpose is to 
produce insight and promote creativity to help decision makers make better decisions." 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
We have recognized in section 1.1 that where decisions need to be taken that involve multiple, non-
commensurate, conflicting objectives, a fair and equitable solution satisfying all parties concerned 
becomes a primary aim. Furthermore, planning and managing the use of natural resources becomes 
a complex process, that requires taking decisions inevitably involving several objectives of an 
economic, environmental and social nature. 
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques can play an important role in analysing such 
problems involving several objectives. Human value judgements, conflicting interests and 
considerations other than economic efficiency can and should be integrated within a single model. 
This permits the DM(s) to better understand the possible trade-offs among the various objectives, 
and then to apply value judgements in arriving at a conclusion. 
The issue that now needs to be addressed is, to determine which MCDM methods are relevant to 
particular situations, i.e. situations involving the management of natural resources. In addition to 
their relevancy, the issue of how adaptable and implementable these MCDM methods are to various 
situations, also needs to be addressed. 
1.3 Motivation of the Problem 
Most water resources planning and management problems are so complex as to preclude the 
possibility that any individual, or group of DMs and analysts, can assess the implications of the 
decisions to be made, especially with multiple conflicting objectives. This is why models and 
multiobjective decision making methodologies are needed. The same difficulties are encountered, 
and solutions applied, to all other natural resources planning and management problems. 
However, the process of analysing the problem also does not guarantee an explicit solution(s) - see 
Keeney's comment in section 1.1. What is true, is that the analysis enables the DM(s) to gain an 
Chapter 1: Introduction 2 
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increased understanding of the decision problem. The insights gained may suggest other approaches 
to solving the problem or lead to a greater common understanding amongst a heterogeneous group 
of DMs. 
As stated earlier in this chapter, considerations other than economic efficiency need to be addressed 
when dealing with resource allocation problems. Kindler (1982) states the following: 
" ... there is a common tendency to pursue economic optimality alone in water-resources 
allocation, as though there were some inherent nobility in this goal." 
He continues to say that not only is the pursuit of the goal of economic optimality often not 
attainable, but that it is also quite often inadvisable. Kindler, however, never completely discards 
the pursuit of economic efficiency, as is clear from the trade-off he makes between economic 
factors and other factors. He further states: 
" .. .It does not mean, however, that there is something inherently wrong with the economic 
efficiency objective. . .. The solution of allocation problems in real life, must focus on 
institutional and other objectives in addition to that of economic efficiency." 
Multiobjective or multicriteria decision making methodologies can and do address these concerns. 
1.4 Objecth·es of the Study 
In a report entitled: "Scenario Based Multicriteria Poli~y Planning for Water Management in South 
Africa" (Stewart et al.: 1993), the principles of a procedure for implementing scenario based 
multicriteria policy planning has been developed. However, certain areas of this procedure need 
further refining and it is these areas upon which this paper will focus. The two areas in particular 
that were looked at are: 
(1) filtering a large set of policy scenarios (analogous to the Background Set we define in 
chapter 2), that could be a continuum, to form a smaller set (analogous to the Foreground 
Set we define in chapter 2), and 
(2) further reducing the smaller set to form a solution set of policy scenarios. 
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The main objectives of this study are therefore: 
(1) to determine what MCDM methods are relevant to natural resources (particularly water) 
management (in South Africa), and 
(2) to investigate how these methods need to be adopted for use in interactive decision support 
systems (DSS). 
Concerning the first objective above, the study will focus on how a large set (that could essentially 
be a continuum) of policy options (equivalent to the "Background Set" of policy options as defined 
by Stewart et al. (1993) - for the definition of this generic term, see section 2.1 of chapter 2) is 
reduced to a more manageable smaller set. The reasons for doing so would be that it is more 
practical, and from a cognitive perspective, less stressful and therefore easier to perform direct value 
judgements on such a reduced number of policy options. This is further discussed in the literature 
survey of this report. Furthermore, once the smaller set has been obtained, direct value judgements 
still have to be carried out on the policy options in order to select a solution set of alternatives. The 
MCDM methods facilitating this process will also be investigated. 
This paper will also report on some of the limitations of the methods that were encountered as well 
as how they need to be adapted for use in an interactive DSS. 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
Due to the large costs involved in reconstructing a dec:ision event such as, say, the management of 
a river system or catchment area, the approach adopted in this study is that of utilising a simulation 
study. There are decided advantages to using such an approach, for example, the minimal costs this 
approach would incur. However, there are also decided disadvantages that could stem from this type 
of approach. Some are referred to below. 
First, for practical reasons, it was decided that the manner in which the conflict between the 
divergent views, as represented by the different DMs, was resolved, would only be simulated as 
follows: We would allow for one attempt at reducing the large set of policy alternatives to a smaller 
set and then allow for only one further attempt to find a solution set consisting of one or more 
alternatives from this smaller set. The first attempt therefore involved the extraction of a smaller set 
of policy alternatives, termed the "Foreground Set" by Stewart et al. (1993) (this generic term is 
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defined in section 2.1 of chapter 2). The second attempt allowed for a revision of this smaller set 
before choosing a solution set consisting of one or more alternatives. Practical constraints had to 
be considered when m~king this decision and these will be discussed later in this paper. However, 
by limiting the re-evaluations conducted on both the large and the small sets, we in a sense fail to 
capture the true essence of what the consensus seeking process, an essentially iterative process, fully 
entails, when solutions to divergent objectives are being sought. 
A second limitation faced with the simulation approach was that of time. This was not as great a 
limitation as it would have been, had an actual real life case study been reconstructed. Time was 
only an issue because we did not limit our study to only one MCDM or related method. We 
included many, and also investigated combinations of methods. This of course enabled us to form 
a much better picture of how effective the methods were. We will deal with this in more detail once 
the results of the analysis have been reported on. 
1.6 Plan of Development of Report 
Chapter 2 (a literature review) of this paper begins by providing one with a brief background to the 
simulation study and explains how it evolved from the report by Stewart et al. (1993). In this 
chapter we discuss which MCDM and related methods are used for finding solutions to the two 
main problem areas focused on in this paper. These problem areas as stated before are (i) that of 
reducing a large set of policy options to a more manageable smaller set, and (ii) that of refining the 
smaller set of options (using full or partial rank orderings) to find the best policy(s). 
Chapter 3 provides a full description of the simulatioµ approach adopted for this study. This will 
include the actual methods used, the manner in which final policy options were evaluated as well 
as the technique of using "thermometer" type scales to resolve conflict between various interests 
with divergent objectives. This chapter will also discuss the two data sets used and provides full 
details of the first of these data sets. The second set varied from one iteration in the simulation 
process to the next and therefore the experimental design procedure, used to generate this varying 
set, is dealt with at length. 
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the overall results of the analysis conducted on the two data sets. Both 
chapters include the results that the different methods or combination of methods yield, as well the . 
results from the sensitivity runs conducted on the different methods or combination of methods. 
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Chapter 5 also examines the effects that external factors, for example the number of policy elements, 
have on the results produced by the different methods. 
The conclusions that were reached, based on the findings of the analysis, regarding 
(1) which methods provided the most consistent and reliable solutions, as well as 
(2) the general value of MCDM methods to multicriteria policy planning in water resources 
management 
are then finally reported on in chapter 6, thereby serving as a concluding chapter to this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Background to the Study 
MCDM, as a formal approach to problem solving, involves human judgement, and can never be 
automated as a process by means of strictly adhered to algorithms or problem solving techniques. 
Human judgement, is of course what all decisions depend upon. This includes judgement about 
uncertainty, judgement about which alternative courses of action are available, judgement about the 
possible outcome(s) of a course of action and judgement about preferences. MCDM methodologies 
will not replace or automate these judgements; instead it will "provide a framework which will help 
decision makers to clarify and articulate them", as stated by Goodwin and Wright (1991). This 
framework will, according to French (1989), provide for the modification and, indeed, evolution of 
beliefs and preferences of DMs. French also states that the central role of decision-analytic models, 
in structuring discussion and helping group communication, remains largely unrecognized. 
Having recognized the role that MCDM methodologies can play in facilitating decision making 
processes, we still need to develop a framework for incorporating these methods into planning 
procedures. We also have to evaluate the appropriateness of a variety of methods to certain decision 
situations. In the report by Stewart et al. (1993), entitled: "Scenario Based Multicriteria Policy 
Planning for Water Management in South Africa", the authors define a procedure for implementing 
scenario based, multicriteria policy planning in order to accommodate the needs of water 
management in South Africa. They do, however, point out that this procedure is not limited only 
to water management and state: 
" ... the results would be generally applicable to a wide variety of other resource management 
problems, wherever there exists the need to take cognizance of conflicting and sometimes 
intangible interests of society." 
The full scenario based planning procedure, as developed by Stewart et al. (1993), is illustrated 
diagrammatically in figure 2.1 on the following page (in their report it was figure 4.1). A key part 
of the procedure is that it is an iterative process involving a continual refinement of the solution, 
before the final recommendations can be made. 
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Figure 2.1: A diagrammatic illustration of the scenario based policy planning procedure 
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Shamir (1983) states that practical methods for multiobjective decision making must be both 
"interactive and iterative". He adds that they should provide results at each stage of the iterative 
analysis. These results must be provided in a form that will enable the DMs to "formulate their 
responses to these outcomes, and to incorporate their instructions into the next phase of the 
analysis". 
In the remaining sections of this chapter (and for the remainder of the report) we will use the 
generic terms "Background Set" and "Foreground Set" in the manner that they have been defined 
by Stewart et al. (1993). These definitions are basically as follows: 
Background Set: A pool (or set) of scenarios that is sufficiently rich so that all interested 
parties can find a reasonably satisfactory alternative, perhaps by interpolation between 
alternatives. This may simply be the full decision space, but in cases where implications of 
alternatives require extensive modelling or analysis, it may be necessary to work only with 
a representative but discrete set of options. The latter is typical of resource planning 
problems, for example water. 
Foreground Set: A selection of scenarios (typically 5 to 9) from the Background Set on which 
direct value judgements are made by interested parties. These value judgements are 
expressed in terms of comparisons between the scenarios in the Foreground Set. 
Furthermore, to clarify some of the more frequently used terms in this report and for the purposes 
of exposition, we present some definitions below. 
Attribute (System Attribute): A measurable property of a system that can serve as a basis 
for comparing outcomes of different policy actions, and which can in principle be predicted 
for any proposed policy. It is a measure that evaluates the achievement of goals · and 
objectives. 
Criterion: A basis (or tool) for comparing or evaluating different decision or policy options 
according to a particular significance axis or point of view. 
Objective (Goal): An operational definition of a particular criterion, expressed either as a direction 
of increasing preference (objective), or as a desired level of achievement (goal), in terms 
of the appropriate system attribute or performance measure. 
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Surrogate Planning Objective: Objectives representing the types of aspirations that can be expected 
to be found amongst interest groups. They could consist of selected policy elements, or 
attributes, or simple functions of these. 
Policy Element: Individual instrument or component of a resource management policy (eg. water) 
that might be considered. 
It is generally assumed that each criterion can be represented by a surrogate measure of 
performance, represented by some measurable attribute of the consequences arising from the 
implementation of any particular decision alternative (or policy scenario). We therefore specify that 
for each alternative a, we can associate a vector of attributes za = (z1 a, z.t, .. ., ~a) for k criteria. Z;. a 
will then be the attribute representing the outcome of decision alternative a as it affects criterion i. 
We will also assume that the OM prefers larger to smaller values of each attribute Z;_, all other things 
being equal. 
Before continuing, we assume for the purposes of our discussion, that all policy elements and 
ranges, as well as attributes used to evaluate the policy scenarios (decision alternatives), already 
exist. The terms "decision alternatives" and "policy scenarios" will be used interchangeably in the 
report. The process of identification of policy elements and ranges is best achieved by means of 
brainstorming techniques involving relevant policy makers and interest groups. As an example the 
reader is referred to Delbecq et al. (1975), wherein the Nominal Group Technique (NGT) which is 
well suited for this purpose, is defined. 
The identification of system attributes, that measure goal (objective) achievement by means of 
evaluating the policy scenarios, is also well documented in the literature. The common assumption 
in MCDM is that a hierarchy of criteria can be constructed, so that at the lowest level, the objectives 
(or goals) are expressed as maximising or minimising some well defined system attribute. There are 
desirable properties that such a set of criteria should satisfy. According to Keeney and Raiffa (1976), 
the criteria should be: 
Complete: i.e. they should cover all aspects of the problem. 
Operational: i.e. they can be meaningfully used in the analysis. 
Decomposable: i.e. they can be broken into parts to simplify the process. 
Nonredundant: i.e. they avoid problems of double counting. 
Minimal: i.e. the number of attributes should be kept as small as possible. 
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The reader is, however, referred to Keeney and Raiffa (1976), for a more detailed discussion on 
these desirable properties. 
The generation of policy scenarios or decision alternatives is a non-trivial task. It is not even clear 
as to whether the set of policy scenarios can be pre-defined before the start of an analysis. 
However, this set could in effect be a continuum of policy alternatives. This may make it an 
impractical set to work with since its size is so large, and this is why we might work with a 
representative discrete set of alternatives, such as the Background Set (as defined earlier in this 
section). In this study, an adapted form of an experimental design procedure was used to generate 
a Background Set from an effectively continuous decision space. The experimental design procedure 
will be further reported on in chapter 3. 
Our discussion for the remaining two sections of this chapter will focus on reviewing MCDM and 
related approaches that are relevant to large decision spaces (section 2.2), analogous to the 
Background Set of alternatives, as well as those approaches that could be used to analyze a reduced 
set of alternatives (section 2.3), analogous to the Foreground Set. 
2.2 A Review of MCDM Approaches Relevant to Large Decision Spaces 
In this section we will be reviewing some MCDM and related approaches that can be applied to a 
' 
set of policy scenarios under consideration. This set will typically be a large, but finite set of 
alternatives forming our decision space, analogous to the Background Set we have defined in the 
previous section. We discuss the relevant MCDM approaches under their broad headings below. 
(a) Utility or Value Functions 
In multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), also termed multiattribute value theory (MA VT), 
a global utility or value function (as developed in, say, Keeney and Raiffa (1976)) is 
established that represents the overall strengths of preference of the DM between outcomes. 
According to Duckstein et al. (1982), utility is defined,. within the context of planning, as 
the subjective benefit(s) derived by the DM from the achievement of the stated goals or 
objectives. The utility function can be specified numerically by eliciting the DM's utility for 
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each criterion (marginal utilities u1,u2, ..• , uk for k criteria), and then combining these into 
a global utility function U(u1, Uz, ... , uJ. Typical forms of the utility function are: 
(1) the additive form: 
(2) the multiplicative form: 
k 
U(upu2, ••• ,uk) = L wiui 
i =1 
and 
k 
1 + KU ( ul' u2' ... , uk) = II [ 1 + K wi ui] 
i =1 
for some parameter K. 
For the additive form to be able to model the DM's strengths of preference consistently, the 
assumption of additive difference independence must hold. This assumption states that 
absolute strengths of preference between two outcomes differing only on one criterion, do 
not depend on the levels of achievement on the other criteria. For the multiplicative form 
to hold, the assumption of preferential or weak difference independence must hold. It 
requires that relative strengths of preference between scenarios differing on one criterion 
only, are independent of levels of achievement on the other criteria. 
The marginal utilities (aj can be evaluated indirectly by the standard decision analysis 
technique of ascertaining certainty equivalents for two-point lotteries, or by direct scoring. 
The reader is referred to Keeney and Raiffa (1976), for a detailed discussion. The weights 
(wJ can be determined directly by various weighting techniques. Some techniques, together 
with the references that describe them are: the ratio method in Edwards (1977), the swing-
weights method in von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986), and the tradeoff and pricing out 
methods both in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
The process of assessing both the marginal and the global utility functions can be tedious 
and time consuming when these functions are assessed, as is done in classical MAUT, by 
means of (DMs) evaluating sequences of hypothetical alternatives to find points of 
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indifference. The policy scenario that provides the highest global utility value is defined to 
be the preferred solution. The remaining scenarios are ranked according to their global 
utility values, and these rankings would indicate which scenarios could form part of a short-
list of "good" alternatives. The process of going through the exercise of assessing the value 
functions and the weights creates considerable insight into the problem. This insight can be 
far more important than the mechanical ordering of the policy scenarios, and may also play 
an important role in the process of further reducing the list of alternatives. 
(b) Value Functions in Interactive Mode 
Value functions require of the DM to specify preferences over wide _ranges (of criteria). 
These preferences must be specified a priori. By placing a restriction on the ranges for 
which preferences must be specified, we make it easier for the OM. There are various 
techniques that adopt this approach. Within the context of multiple objective linear 
programming (MOLP), we will discuss some of these interactive techniques, based on the 
"addition of scores" approach. These scores represent some goal (objective) achievement in 
terms of a level of performance for a particular criterion. 
The first set of techniques can be divided into three broad algorithms. In the Zionts' 
algorithm (1976), the problem is discrete and the underlying utility function is linear. In the 
Zionts and Wallenius approach (1976, 1983), the problem is continuous and the underlying 
utility function is linear. This method is extended to allow for a concave utility function. 
Finally, in the Korhonen, Wallenius and Zionts approach (1984), the problem is discrete and 
the underlying utility function is assumed to b~ quasi-concave. All three methods generate 
a composite linear function of the form shown below: 
The weights '-i, are generated arbitrarily to start with, and the solution (or alternative) that 
maximizes this function is found. The DM is then asked to choose between the maximizing 
(or reference) solution and a sequence of solutions, one at a time. Based on the DM's 
responses, a consistent set of weights is chosen and a new maximizing alternative is found 
in the Zionts' algorithm (1976). If the DM prefers this new alternative to the reference 
alternative, it becomes the reference alternative. Otherwise, an alternative preferred to the 
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old reference alternative becomes the reference alternative. The process continues until no 
alternative is preferred to the current reference alternative. At that time, some limits on the 
optimal solution are constructed, and any new alternatives not satisfying these limits are 
discarded from further consideration. If the number of remaining alternatives is sufficiently 
small, the procedure terminates and the remaining scenarios will form our Foreground Set. 
If not, the method is repeated. The Zionts' algorithm (1976), attempts to determine a "most 
preferred" subset of scenarios from a larger set, but not to generate a full preference 
ordering of alternatives, according to Khairallah and Zionts {1980). 
In the approach of Zionts and Wallenius (1976, 1983), the DM is offered some trades from 
the original reference solution. These trades take the form: "Are you willing to reduce 
objective 1 by so much in return for an increase in objective 2 of a certain amount, an 
increase in objective 3 of a certain amount, and so on?" The DM is asked to respond either 
yes, no, or I don't know to the proposed trade. The method then develops a new set of 
weights consistent with the responses obtained, as well as a corresponding new solution. 
This process is repeated until a best solution is found. The method may be extended to 
allow for the maximization of a concave function of objectives by making two changes, viz.: 
(i) the trades are presented in terms of scenarios: for example, "Which do you prefer, 
alternative A or alternative B?"; (ii) each new non-dominated extreme point solution of the 
problem is compared with the old, and either the new solution or_ one preferred to the old 
one is used for the next iteration. Finally, the procedure terminates with a neighbourhood 
that contains the optimal solution. 
In the approach of Korhonen, Wallenius and Zi?nts (1984), the DM's answers, when making 
the choice between the maximizing solution and the adjacent efficient solution (Zionts 
(1981)), are used to generate a convex cone (or a set of cones) that is then used to eliminate 
solutions dominated by it. The individual's answers are also used to construct a new set of 
consistent multipliers (weights) and to find a new solution. The process is then repeated by 
identifying the adjacent efficient solutions to the new solution, asking new questions of the 
DM, and so on. The process will converge to an overall optimal solution with respect to the 
individual's implicit utility function. 
A further technique is that of Steuer (1986), termed the interactive weighted-sums method. 
His method generates only a relatively small number of non-dominated extreme point 
solutions (scenarios). This is achieved by selecting a convex cone in/... (weights) space that 
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in general is large and includes convex cones corresponding to many non-dominated 
extreme pomt solutions. Rather than generating all of them, he generates only a very small 
number of extreme point solutions, and questions the DM regarding their relative 
attractiveness. These responses he will use to contract the cone. A filter device is used to 
keep the number of solutions considered by the DM at a time as small as the DM wants. 
These interactive value function based methods were developed in a linear programming 
context, but can in principle be applied whenever the space of feasible attribute vectors is 
convex. They tend to lend themselves well to the issue of reducing a large set of 
alternatives to a smaller set. Their interactive nature, and more so the reduced amount of 
comparisons needed, say, compared to the MAUT approach, are factors that make them 
particularly attractive for this purpose. 
(c) Goal Program~ing and Related Techniques 
The goal programming approach (attributed to Chames and Cooper (1961)), in general, 
starts by having the DM specify achievement levels for each criterion, in terms of the 
. 
relevant performance measures. These levels are, according to Stewart et al. (1993), 
typically one of three types. They are either (i) goals or aspiration levels, or (ii) veto or 
exclusion levels, or (iii) reference levels. 
We suppose that for each attribute i (representing a particular criterion of evaluation), the 
DM can specify some desirable goal or target level of achievement, z...0 , say. The aim of goal 
programming is to find a solution (alternativ~) which is as near as possible to the target. 
Some measure of the discrepancy that exists from the target needs to be defined. There are 
three possible forms of representing the discrepancy that have been proposed, and they can 
be used either singly, or in combination with each other. The three forms are (i) 
Archimedean, (ii) Pre-emptive, and (iii) Tchebycheff or Min-Max. For a discussion about 
these three forms, the reader is referred to Stewart (1992). The measures of discrepancy for 
each attribute are summed, and goal programming would then be used to minimize this 
summation function. 
Goal programming has an advantage over utility based procedures when the number of 
criteria become excessively large. According to Stewart (1992), "goal programming is 
probably the method of choice for the purpose of screening a large (or infinite) number of 
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alternatives down to a short-list, when the number of criteria is large". Furthermore, in real 
life situations, goal setting is a common phenomenon. Therefore, a technique that attempts 
to make the DM come as close as possible to his or her pre-specified goals, would seem 
an appropriate method to use for most DMs. 
One of the major weaknesses of goal programming is that the DM must specify both goals 
and their relative importance (in terms of weights) a priori. The subjectivity inherent in 
determining the level of attainment for each goal, and the penalty weights for 
overattainment or underattainment, present a critical problem in the formulation of the goal 
programming model. It is therefore apparent in the case where goal programming techniques 
are applied to problem solving, that they should be used in an interactive mode. 
The Interactive Multiple Goal Programming (IMGP) procedure of Spronk (1981) is a 
technique that was especially designed for financial planning, but which has been, and 
continues to be, used in a variety of different applications. The method works in terms of 
two sets of reference levels, where these levels converge towards each other. The "nadir" 
values are the set of lower bounds and the "ideals" represent the set of best achievable 
values or "potentials". At each iteration, the DM examines the lower bounds and indicates 
which of these should be improved first. Once an increase in the lower bound for this 
criterion has been made, the effect on the potentials, with regard to the now tightened 
constraint on acceptable values, is calculated and shown to the DM. If the DM agrees that 
the loss in potential is acceptable, the new lower bound is made definitive and the next 
phase of the interaction starts. If the DM does not accept the loss in potential, the increase 
(in nadir value) is reduced systematically unti~ the losses in potential are acceptable. 
The DM can continue with this procedure until he or she ends up with an environment 
containing the optimal solution. However, the DM can also stop the procedure sooner. This 
will occur as soon as there is a set of solutions satisfying the required goal values. The DM 
may then choose freely from this set and according to Spronk (1990), may even use 
viewpoints (and criteria) that were not (or could not be) included in the original model 
when making his or her choices. 
The ideas of goal programming, and particularly those of goal programming techniques used 
in an interactive mode, makes this a very useful and transparent procedure to use when 
reducing a large number of alternatives to a smaller set. Interactive procedures induce 
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learning effects and thereby allow DMs to correct their earlier sources of error, before they 
continue their search for a solution(s). Stewart (1992), reports to have found the IMGP 
procedure to be relatively slow in converging to an environment containing the optimal 
solution. However, he has found the procedure to produce very satisfying results and notes 
that a particular useful property of IMGP, is that the DM is not required to sacrifice 
anything which he or she may perceive they have already gained. Stewart (1988), reports 
that although progress towards a final solution was slow using the IMGP procedure, the 
result in the form of a final short-list (of alternatives) was preferred to a single solution. 
He also states that the user expressed satisfaction with IMGP, in that it was "easy to 
understand", and that "continual progress" was seen to occur (towards the final solution). 
Stewart et al. (1993), report using a scalarizing function, in the spirit of Wierzbicki (1980), 
as part of their procedure to reduce a large number of policy scenarios to a smaller set. In 
his paper of 1980, Wierzbicki tries to justify the belief that real decisions are made with the 
use of reference objectives or aspiration levels, rather than the opinion that single decisions 
are made by maximizing a utility or value function. He perceived the reference point to be 
neither an ultimate aspiration level nor merely a minimum necessary level of performance. 
Wierzbicki defines a scalarizing function to be optimized which, according to Stewart 
(1992), is really a "surrogate value function" that is "defined so as to give first preference 
to improving the worst underperformances relative to the reference point". A typical 
scalarizing function (to be minimized) is shown below, 
k. 
MAX wi ( z/ - zJ + e _E wi ( z/ - zJ 
ltsisk} • i=1 
where 'Zj_. is some reference level for attribute (objective) i and the weights, wi, 
would be proportional to the reciprocal of the range from nadir to ideal values. 
The procedure is for the DM to continue modifying his or her expectations, as represented 
by the reference levels, until no further gains are perceived. 
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2.3 MCDM and Related Approaches_ Relevant to Analysing the Foreground Set 
The methods discussed in the previous section apply in principle to any decision space, finite or 
infinite. The common assumption is that criteria are representable by quantifiable attributes, and this 
can be problematical when criteria are highly qualitative and/or represent group or political interests. 
In such cases value judgements cannot be expressed in terms of preferences between vectors of 
attributes. Value judgements can then only be expressed by direct comparisons of real alternatives. 
For example, in using MAUT, marginal utilities in terms of each criterion would be assessed by 
direct rankings of alternatives as in SMART (Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique) - see von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) or Goodwin and Wright (1991) for a discussion of this technique. 
This requires that, for purposes of analysis, the large set (decision space or Background Set as 
previously defined) be reduced to a smaller set, or the Foreground Set, as we will refer to it. 
The process of reducing a large set of policy alternatives to a smaller set is not very well 
documented in the literature. Authors have tended to refer to this process (or processes similar to 
it) as "screening procedures". According to Walker (1986), two properties of good screening 
procedures are: -1... 
"(1) no very good alternatives will be missed, and 
(2) the number of alternatives to be evaluated in impact assessment will be relatively 
small." 
These guidelines or properties are all very good, but .they do not provide specifics. The work of 
Miller (1956), however, suggests that 7 (plus or minus two) scenarios will be an ideal number on 
which a direct comparison could be made. Miller states: 
" ... the span of absolute judgement and the span of immediate memory impose severe 
limitations on the amount of information that we are able to receive, process, and 
remember." 
Human cognitive skills can therefore cope with at most 5 to 9 separate items of information at any 
one time. MCDM and related methodologies can be utilised in the process of selecting a short-list 
(or Foreground Set) consisting of such 5 to 9 policy scenarios. Two approaches, discussed in the 
previous section, are well-suited to the process of reducing a large set of alternatives to a short-list. 
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These are (i) the technique of Steuer (1986), termed the interactive weighted-sums method, which 
we discussed in section 2.2 (b), and (ii) the ideas of Wierzbicki (1980), which we discussed in 
section 2.2 (c). These two approaches were utilized (in combination) by Stewart et al. (1993), to 
select a Foreground Set of scenarios (see appendix C of Stewart et al. for a full description of the 
combined procedure). In our simulation study we have used a similar procedure to select a 
Foreground Set of alternatives, and we provide a full description of this procedure in section 3.5 
of chapter 3. 
In the remainder of this section, we will examine the overall process whereby a final solution set 
is extracted from the newly formed Foreground Set of alternatives. We will first look at which 
MCDM and related methods support group decision conferencing. Secondly, we will focus on how 
the various conflicting interest groups may set about seeking consensus solutions. Finally, we will 
examine which MCDM methods can be used to revise or review the Foreground Set by using the 
output from the consensus seeking process. 
2.3.1 Group Decision Support 
Group decision making and negotiation support are being studied more frequently in the 
literature due to the importance of the process and its applicability to modem day problem 
solving situations. The paper by Jelassi et al. (1990), for instance, distinguishes between 4 
types of multi-person decision making situations: (i) individual decision making in a group 
setting, (ii) hierarchical o  bureaucratic decision making, (iii) group decision making or one 
party decision making, and (iv) multi party decision making or negotiation. This paper 
provides an overview of formal models for group decision making and negotiation and 
places a special focus on those models that can be implemented in a computer based DSS. 
There is a growing realization in the literature that the use of modem microcomputers with 
their associated information technology, is becoming an absolute necessity for facilitating 
the process of group decision ma~ing. 
Decision analysis should ideally be carried out within the group. The model, according to 
French (1989), should be developed and analyzed in the group environment. He further 
states that the members need to see, understand and be able to contribute in their own 
language throughout the modelling process. The power of the modem portable 
microcomputer and its graphical capabilities (together with overhead or video projection), 
means that decision analysis can be carried out almost anywhere. French continues to 
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discuss the relationship and close interaction between the decision analysts or "facilitators", 
as they are becoming known, and the decision making groups. He also develops some 
further ideas for the "decision conferencing" format but admits that this format is evolving 
with experience. The reader is also referred to Goodwin and Wright (1991), wherein they 
discuss the role of decision analysis with special emphasis on decision conferences and 
problems involving the allocation of resources. 
We will be focusing on some of the MCDM techniques that could be applied to the group 
decision making process in the light of the overall process we have previously described, 
i.e. extracting a solution set from the Foreground Set of policy scenarios. 
(a) Value Functions 
We have seen from section 2.2 (a) that the value function (utility based) approach 
is enormously helpful for the DM to gain further insight into his or her preference 
structure. Keeney and Raiffa (1976), discuss some of the uses of the utility function 
approach or that of multiattribute utility analysis in aiding group decision making. 
In French (1989), a paper by Belton is presented that describes the use of a simple 
multiple criteria model as a decision aid to a large service company. The paper 
describes how the model aided the company to select a computer system from a 
short-list of alternatives. One of the main features of the model that was appealing 
to the members of the decision making group, and was also of particular benefit to 
the process as a whole, is the graphic.:aI representation of the results. The scoring 
of the various criteria was presented on a 0-100 scale with the worst and best 
options constrained to 0 and 100 respectively. Some members of the group were 
somewhat uneasy with the use of such a scale, but Belton feels that the feelings of 
unease are generally overcome with familiarity. 
Stewart et al. (1993), strongly recommend the VISA (Visual Interactive Sensitivity 
Analysis) computer package for use in any implementation of scenario based 
planning procedures. This package is developed by Belton and Vickers (1989), and 
Stewart et al. demonstrate how the package could be used to facilitate consensus 
seeking both between individual members of a group (i.e. a "within-interest" group 
phase) as well as between different decision making or interest groups (i.e. a 
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"between-interest" group phase). The 0-100 scale is termed a "thermometer scale". 
At the within-group phase of an analysis it could be used to represent and evaluate 
the scores (of the alternatives) for the different attributes or criteria of the particular 
group. At the between-group phase it could in turn be used to evaluate the different 
alternatives of the short-list or Foreground Set, the alternatives now having 
aggregated scores for the criteria of the various groups, in order to make a final 
selection. 
Belton and Vickers (1990), state that the approach on which VISA is based is best 
suited to "the problem of choosing a preferred alternative from a set of well defined 
alternatives, or to indicate a preference ordering over such a set of alternatives". 
The indication of a preference ordering over a set of well defined alternatives, will 
be of value to the process of seeking a consensus solution as well as the process of 
revising or re-evaluating the Foreground Set of policy scenarios. The process of 
choosing a preferred alternative from a set of well defined alternatives, is completed 
by using the model structure below, where the model determines an overall value, 
Vi, for each alternative i. 
k 
v; = L wi vii 
j =1 
where vii = evaluation (or score) of alternative i on criterion j, and 
wi = relative importance (weight} of criterion j. 
Before choosing the best alternative(s), a thorough sensitivity analysis has to be 
conducted, especially on the criteria weights. The authors warn that the results 
provided by this model, vis-a-vis the overall scores of the alternatives, should not 
be "unquestioningly accepted as the answer". If the results of the analysis is that 
two or more alternatives perform similarly well overall, then the user should not 
blindly accept the resulting ranking, but should explore the results in greater depth. 
After all, the solution is a set, and this set is not necessarily limited to one 
alternative only. The richness of the graphiql presentation of alternative profiles 
and sensitivity analysis, together with the interactive analysis provided in VISA, is 
a good environment for the further exploration of the results. 
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(b) Goal Programming in Interactive Mode 
The goal programming approach, in interactive mode, has been found to be a very 
transparent procedure. Stewart and Brent (1988), report that the IMGP procedure 
of Spronk (1981) would be "valuable in a group decision aiding context". They also 
report that a number of users, from widely differing backgrounds (marine scientists, 
economists and industry management), experimented with a prototype IMGP system 
that the authors had developed. All the users were able to reach compromise 
solutions that satisfied their decision goals. Furthermore, the extent to which· the 
solutions obtained by the widely differing interest groups tended to converge, 
provided further support for using the IMGP as part of their proposed DSS. 
Khorramshahgol and Steiner (1988), recognize that a major drawback of the goal 
programming procedure is that the DM must specify his or her goals and priorities 
a priori. The authors suggest using the Delphi method in an attempt to overcome 
this problem. DMs will therefore structure their objectives prior to goal 
programming as follows: (i) they will identify the goals, (ii) they will determine 
priorities among the goals, and (iii) they will establish a target level for each goal. 
The Delphi method is a systematic procedure to obtain a consensus from a group 
of participants that makes use of written responses. This will avoid the problem 
experienced in face-to-face meetings in which a few influential members can 
dominate the process. It allows for eliciting expert opinion in an iterative process. 
Because the Delphi method is therefore an iterative process and it preserves the 
anonymity of the group members, ~orramshahgol and Steiner feel that it holds 
decided advantages over other techniques. The reader is referred to Delbecq et al. 
(1975), for a further description of the Delphi method. von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
(1986), present a brief discussion on the Delphi method. They also cite references 
wherein the Delphi method, the Nominal Group Technique and free-form 
discussion have been compared experimentally for the purpose of probability 
estimation. 
Group decision making, negotiation and consensus seeking between conflicting interests are 
processes that cannot be restricted and rigidly administered by means of pre-specified 
algorithms. Algorithms can and should, however, provide a framework for these processes 
to be carried out within. The role that computer based DSS can play in facilitating this 
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process is a crucial one. Empirical evidence does, however, still need to be acquired to 
substantiate some of the computer based DSS that have been proposed in the literature. 
2.3.2 Seeking Consensus Solutions 
The process of seeking a consensus solution should be iterative in nature, so that if a 
consensus cannot be reached, the Foreground Set can be revised before we attempt to seek 
a further solution. The MCDM approaches that could utilize the outputs from such a 
consensus seeking process are discussed in section 2.3.3. In this section we will be 
concentrating on applying MCDM and related approaches to seeking consensus between 
interests and/or groups, when the preferences of each interest or group (over the Foreground 
Set) have been expressed as thermometer scales as described in section 2.3.1 (a). 
(a) Value Functions and Goal Programming in Interactive Mode 
From our previous discussions in sections 2.2 (b) and 2.2 (c) we commented that 
both the value function and goal programming approaches respectively, in 
interactive mode were favoured to the same approaches when not used in interactive 
mode. The interactive nature of these approaches would allow the DM to re-
examine the final solution set. 
For the interactive utility based procedures, we have previously seen that the 
methods are well suited to reducing a large number of alternatives to a smaller set. 
Once the smaller set has been establ~shed, the procedure could be re-applied in 
order to extract a solution set. The ideas of Steuer as well as those of Zionts and 
co-workers, as previously discussed in section 2.2 (b), could be used for this 
purpose, although, according to Stewart (1992), they are better suited to the process 
of reducing the large set of policy scenarios to a Foreground Set. The difference 
would be that they will now be applied across the various conflicting interests with 
the questions being posed to the various groups. 
Under the broad category of interactive goal programming methods, we have stated 
in section 2.3.1 (b) that the IMGP procedure of Spronk (1981), is according to 
Stewart and Brent (1988), valuable in a group decision aiding context. Stewart 
(1988), however, also reported that the solution form of producing a short-list of 
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alternatives by this method was preferred (by DMs) to producing a single solution. 
This would allow the DMs to re-assess the solution set (including the re-
assessment of their goals) before they have to make a final decision, and would 
therefore make the IMGP method suitable for the purpose of extracting a solution(s) 
from the Foreground Set of policy scenarios. The manner by which the solution set 
is extracted from our Foreground Set, would be by applying goal programming to 
the interest group thermometer scales. The goal programming approach that was 
used in our simulation study is reported in section 3.7.3 of chapter 3, under the 
heading of Maximum/Minimum (Max/Min). 
The Compromise Programming (CP) method, as discussed by Duckstein et al. 
(1993), is a distance-based technique that was developed by Zeleny (1973). It is 
designed to identify so-called compromise solutions, that are determined to be the 
closest solutions, by some distance measure, to an ideal (but infeasible) solution. 
A distance measure that can be used in CP and one of the most frequently used 
measures of closeness, is a family of weighted LP metrics, defined as follows: 
[ 
k • 
P I zi -zi L = W· 
P ~ 1 range (criterion i) 
where ~ • = best (optimal) value for criterion i, 
wi = weight for criterion i, and 
pE: [1; oo]. 
The compromise solution, a feasible solution that is as close as possible to the ideal 
in terms of the chosen metric (with given p and WJ, then results from the following 
optimization problem: 
Min L 
I alternatives I p 
for all alternatives in the feasible space. 
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For a given set of weights {wJ and for all p, the set of compromise solutions, 
called the compromise set, is obtained. Usually, o~y three points of the 
compromise set are calculated, viz. the extremes for p = l, p = oo and an 
intermediate point for p, say, p = 2. It is worth to note that the CP method, for 1 
:S p < oo, always produces a non-dominated solution. For p = oo the uniqueness of 
the solution, which is the same as the Tchebycheff solution, is not guaranteed. 
Stewart (1992) suggests that this can be avoided by ensuring that the set of 
alternatives is Pareto optimal at the outset. When this is, however, not feasible or 
practical, Stewart goes further to suggest a modification of the distance measure. 
The reader is referred to Stewart (1992), for more information on this modified 
distance measure. 
A positive factor of the CP method is that it produces a compromise set of 
solutions. The DMs, however, still have to specify the weights (w) and the distance 
function(s) (i.e. choose a value for p) to be used. For each point in the compromise 
set (i.e. a value for p ), a solution set can b  extracted according to the rankings 
produced by the method. This, ideally, can be repeated for several points in the 
compromise set and a comparison can be made between the various solution sets 
that are extracted. This will allow the DMs to justify their recommendation(s), since 
they would have gained further insight into the problem by comparing the outcomes 
produced by the various distance functions. 
(b) Outranking Approach 
The concept of outranking relations between alternatives was born out of difficulties 
encountered with diverse problems according to Roy (1990). The outranking 
philosophy as such, was developed by Roy and co-workers in Paris and enjoys 
popularity in Europe. This philosophy is implemented in the various versions of the 
ELECTRE method, ELECTRE being a French acronym for Elimination Et Choisis 
Translation REalite (or elimination and choice algorithm). For the various versions 
of ELECTRE, the reader is referred to Roy (1990). 
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Outranking between alternatives a and b, say, in the sense of ELECTRE is based 
on two requirements: 
(1) alternative a has to be better than b in a sufficient number of sufficiently 
important criteria, and 
(2) alternative a must not be much worse than b in the remaining criteria. 
The first requirement is embodied in a concordance index Cab, and the second in a 
discordance index Dab. Therefore, for any pair of decision alternatives (a and b, say, 
with attribute vectors z3 and i'), two quantities are defined as follows. The first 
quantity is, 
Concordance: cab = :E {wi} 
i:zt>~· 
where the wi are i attribute weights (usually normalized to sum to unity), 
and where in the case of ties, half the weight is counted. 
This definition can be interpreted as the sum of the weights of criteria or attributes 
for which alternative a is better than alternative b. These weights are not seen in 
tradeoff terms, but are rather relative voting weights accorded to the respective 
criteria. The second quantity is, 
Discordance: [ (z/ - zi°) l =Max i Si 
=Max Max --- ; 0 { [ (z/-zt)]} i Si 
where Si is some suitable scaling factor, eg. the range of attribute values for 
attribute i, Maxxe: x[ zJ - Minxe; x[ zJ. 
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The interpretation given to this definition is the largest s~led difference in favour 
of alternative b, taken over all criteria or attributes. 
Conventionally, the concordances and discordances are displayed as nxn matrices, 
where n is the number of alternatives. If alternative a dominates alternative b then 
Cab = 1 and Dab :s 0, but in general for two non-dominated solutions Cab < 1 and 
Dab > 0. In general, however, the principle states that alternative a "outranks" 
alternative b if there is insufficient reason to conclude that b is better than a. Thus 
if a dominates b then a outranks b, but b does not outrank a. However, we could 
have b outranking a at the same time as a outranks b. 
The ELECTRE I method uses the concept of outranking in a stronger sense than 
dominance. It combines the concordance and discordance indices by comparing 
each index to respective threshold levels, say, c· and d. respectively. Alternative a 
is then said to outrank b if: 
and 
Furthermore, if .c· = 1 or d. = 0, then a outranks b if and only if a dominates b. 
Therefore to strengthen the idea we would need to use c • < 1 and/or d. > 0. These 
two index value comparisons are then used to obtain an outranking matrix and the 
elements of this matrix say, rab, can b~ described as follows: 
1 if Cab Cl:. C • and Dab :S d • 
r = { 
ab 
0 otherwise 
This outranking matrix embodies a relation R, that can be analyzed in several ways. 
From this outranking matrix, a set of alternatives can be formed in such a way that 
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they are not outranked by other alternatives. The definition of this set is similar to 
that of efficient alternatives (in the Pareto sense) and is the following: 
E(R) = {a l rba = 0, for every alternative b} 
The approach of analysing the outranking matrix is that of obtaining a partial rank 
ordering of the alternatives. In simplified terms, the method works if there are 
neither too many nor too few outranking relationships. Another way of displaying 
the outranking relationships is using a graphical representation, with nodes 
representing alternatives, and directed arcs representing outrankings. These 
outranking graphs, in particular, help DMs focus their attention on critical issues 
and gain further insight into their own preference structures. 
The valuable insights gained from the ELECTRE I method can only be achieved 
when the number of alternatives under consideration are relatively small. Stewart 
(1992), suggests a number of 6 or less, although this is a subjective opinion based 
on the author's experiences. It is quite plausible that a larger number of alternatives 
may also produce valuable insights for the OM. What is obvious though, is that the 
level of insight attained would be directly linked to the number of alternatives being 
considered. The larger the number of alternatives being considered, the smaller the 
amount (or level) of insight that will be attained. 
Furthermore, it is important how these insights may be used to discard certain 
alternatives from further consideration. The outranking matrix that produces the 
partial rankings of alternatives, together with the graphical representation of these 
outranking relationships, will determine which alternatives should be retained and 
which should be discarded. There is, however, no fixed rule that states how this 
information should be used if one were to stop at this point. Each problem situation 
is unique and DMs will use the information as an aid or as a basis upon which to 
make further decisions. 
If one was to continue with the outranking approach, then the ELECTRE II method, 
using the preference graphs as input, can provide a complete ordering of the 
alternatives. Gershon et al. (1982), suggest that the ELECTRE I and II methods 
could be used to obtain "a complete ordering among these systems based upon 
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quantifiable and nonquantifiable ordinal criteria". The systems they refer to are 
alternative river basin (management) strategies that involve qualitative ordinal 
criteria. They further propose that ELECTRE I be applied for the purposes of 
screening where the number of alternative systems become excessively large, and 
ELECTRE II be applied to rank the remaining systems. 
Two preference graphs must be generated by ELECTRE I for use as input to the 
ELECTRE II procedure. These graphs will represent the strong and weak preference 
structures of the DM. The strong preference graph results from the use of stringent 
threshold values. This means that the DM will use a high level of concordance (c*) 
and a low level of discordance (d'). For the weak preference graph, the DM will 
relax his or her threshold values by lowering the level of concordance and raising 
the level of discordance. The relaxed threshold values represent lower bounds on 
system performance that the DM is willing to accept. The ELECTRE II approach 
requires two separate rankings, referred to as the forward and reverse rankings. 
The first step in the forward ranking procedure is to obtain a set, named C, the 
elements of which are all nodes (alternatives) in the strong preference graph that are 
not outranked by any other alternatives. Next, the alternatives in set C that are not 
outranked in the weak preference graph are identified and defined as set A. The 
elements of set A are assigned the rank of one. The next step consists of reducing 
the weak and strong preference graphs by eliminating all alternatives that are part 
of set A and all arcs (outranking ~elationships) that originate from these alternatives. 
The reduced strong preference graph i~ re-examined and all remaining alternatives 
that are not outranked by any other alternatives now comprise a new set C. The 
iterative procedure is repeated with the elements of the new set A being assigned 
a rank two. This continues until all alternatives have been eliminated from the weak 
and strong preference graphs and thereby have a ranking assigned to them. 
The first step of the reverse ranking procedure is to reverse the direction of all the 
arcs (outranking relationships) in both the weak and strong preference graphs. This 
reversal means that a high concordance relationship now becomes a low 
concordance, and a low discordance relationship now becomes a high discordance. 
The remaining steps are identical to those of the forward ranking procedure with 
one difference: the alternative that is ranked last is ranked first and the remaining 
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alternatives are ranked in reverse order. This re-establishes the correct direction of 
the ranking process. 
Upon completion of both the forward and reverse ranking procedures, an average 
ranking of the two is taken for each alternative. The final stage of ELECTRE II is 
to order alternatives with respect to their average rankings and thereby establish a 
complete ranking of the alternatives. 
The ELECTRE II method, as a procedure on its own, does not allow for an 
interactive re-evaluation of the final solution set that is produced. It produces a 
strict and complete ranking of all the alternatives in the Foreground Set. This is 
perhaps advantageous in certain situations but can most certainly be 
disadvantageous in other settings. A better approach would be to use both 
ELECTRE I and II in the process of extracting a final solution set. By doing so, the 
DMs may be able to combine the information they gain from the partial rankings 
of ELECTRE I, with that of the strict rankings of ELECTRE II. This would allow 
them to at least further justify any conclusions that are reached, before any further 
recommendations are made. 
2.3.3 Revising the Foreground Set 
If the initial Foreground Set is insufficient to allow for the realization of aspirations of the 
interest groups, then the consensus solution will not have a high level of support from all 
the interests concerned. The Foreground Set w.ill therefore have to be revised in light of the 
outputs obtained from the process of seeking a consensus solution. The scenario based 
planning procedure of Stewart et al. (1993), as previously outlined in figure 2.1, provides 
a schematic indication of how this might be achieved. Stewart et al. quote Bui's (1987) 
description of the essence of the consensus seeking process as follows: 
"In effect, when a decision maker first attempts to establish an order of preferences, 
his analysis often results in a ranking of the alternatives ... He would then logically 
choose the alternative that is ranked first in the vector of preferences. However, 
unless the chosen alternative obviously outranks its counterparts, there is no reason 
why the next ranked alternative could not be considered as a comparatively 
acceptable solution." 
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When there is more than one DM involved, this process of seeking consensus (as portrayed 
by revising the Foreground Set) becomes especially important. This does not mean to say 
that the process is irrelevant when only one DM is involved, since this single DM may have 
to justify his or her ultimate decisions to a third party. The process of consensus seeking 
adds further support in favour of the ultimate solution(s) that the single DM may present. 
The process can be accommodated by certain MCDM methods. It is, however, important 
to distinguish between problems involving single and multiple DMs. We discuss the MCDM 
methods under their broad headings below, and in this section a single DM is assumed. We 
can think of the single DM as a facilitator to the various conflicting interest groups. The 
appropriate MCDM methods that support multiple DMs in a group decision making process 
were previously discussed in section 2.3.1 of this chapter. 
(a) Value Functions in Interactive Mode 
We have noted in section 2.2 that value functions, more so in an interactive mode, 
induce a learning effect for the DM. The DM may then use these insights gained 
since they enable the DM to better understand his or her own preference structure. 
Stewart et al. (1993), report that the ideas of Korhonen, Wallenius and Zionts 
(1984), which have been presented earlier in this chapter, can be used to facilitate 
the process of revising the Foreground Set by using the partial orderings of the 
alternatives. The Korhonen, Wallenius and Zionts method uses the DM's pairwise 
judgements to generate certain convex polyhedral cones that may eliminate 
alternatives. All alternatives (or solutipns) that are dominated by these cones may 
be eliminated and need never be presented to the DM. The reader is referred to 
Stewart et al. (1993), appendix C, for a discussion on further ideas (cf. ideas of 
Wierzbicki in a goal programming context) that attempt to implement MCDM 
methodologies in order to accommodate the process of consensus seeking in the 
Foreground Set. 
(b) Goal Programming in Interactive Mode 
The IMGP method of Spronk (1981), presented in section 2.2 (c), can also facilitate 
the consensus seeking process. The fact that the DM can adjust his or her goal 
levels interactively (specifically the nadir values), indicates that the output from the 
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process of seeking a consensus solution can be used by the DM to review his or her 
goal levels. This process of reviewing or resetting the goal levels, in light of further 
insights that may have been gained, will lead to a renewed evaluation of the 
Foreground Set of policy scenarios. 
The fact that the DM has to specify overall goal levels and (penalty) weights both 
subjectively and a priori is a criticism that is levelled at the goal programming 
approach. The IMGP procedure does address the issue of adjusting the goal levels 
interactively, although the original intervals for these goals (i.e. the ideal and nadir 
values) still have to be specified when the large set of scenarios are being 
considered. However, the pre-specification of penalty weights still remains a valid 
criticism. These weights could possibly be re-examined by the DM once the 
Foreground Set has been established or once some additional insight has been 
achieved during the process of seeking a consensus solution. Once these weights 
have been reviewed, the Foreground Set of policy scenarios may then be revised 
in order to reflect the new set of penalty weights, and also the revised goal levels. 
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CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION OF THE APPROACH ADOPTED FOR THE STUDY 
3.1 Overview of the Simulation Approach 
In order to accommodate the objectives of this study, as outlined in section 1.4 of chapter 1, we 
have chosen to adopt a simulation approach. This approach has both decided advantages and 
disadvantages attached to it. These are briefly discussed in section 1.5 of chapter 1, and we will deal 
further with some of the limitations encountered, once we report on the results of the study in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
As stated in section 1.4 of chapter l, we will focus in particular on two areas of the procedure for 
scenario based policy planning, as developed by Stewart et al. (1993), (we have previously provided 
their full procedure diagrammatically in figure 2.1 of chapter 2). The areas we will attempt to 
simulate are: 
(1) reducing a large set of policy scenarios (analogous to our Background Set) to a more 
manageable smaller set (analogous to our Foreground Set), and 
(2) further refining the smaller set to extract a solution set from it. 
The simulation study algorithm we have used is summarized in figure 3.1 on the following page, 
for a particular iteration (decision event), and described in detail in the remaining sections of this 
chapter. For a particular simulation run, 100 iterations were carried out before the final statistical 
analysis was conducted. There are, however, a few details that need to be mentioned before we 
continue. 
The first is that the algorithm was applied separately to two data sets, both serving as the 
Background Set of policy scenarios. These two data sets are described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 in 
more detail. We will, however, conduct our analysis, in terms of simulating possible real life 
decision events, separately for each of the two data sets. The reasons for doing so are the following: 
(1) We used table Bl in Appendix B of Stewart et al. (1993), to serve as the first data set. The 
full table is provided in section 3.2 below and the data, although being hypothetical, 
represents realistic scenarios for the development of the Sabie-Sand river catchment area 
in the Eastern Transvaal region of South Africa. The data has already been used by Stewart 
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11. I Select the best scenario(s). I ...stage 2 
J. 
12. I Update the statistical analysis. I 
Figure 3.1: A schematic representation of the simulation study algorithm 
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et al. to illustrate the various MCDM approaches (that the authors considered for their own 
purposes), as well as some of the strengths and weaknesses of the methods. Therefore, the 
data contained in this table would be used as a "preliminary" type of investigation into the 
various MCDM methods that we will be considering in this study. 
(2) The second data set we used was randomly generated using an adapted experimental design 
procedure. The data set also changed from one iteration to the next. Further details about 
the experimental design procedure are provided in section 3.3. Results obtained from this 
data set would therefore hopefully serve as a confirmation of the findings from the first data 
set. New findings are also expected and these will be reported in chapter 5. 
(3) External factors, that may or may not affect the results yielded by the various methods, 
could also be examined by using the second data set. This data set more closely provides 
an "aggregate measure" of numerous decision events since the data changes for every 
iteration of a particular simulation run. (The effects of changing external factors, such as 
the number of interest groups, are reported separately when we report the results for the 
second data set in chapter 5.) 
The second detail to be mentioned is that we have labelled two steps of the simulation algorithm, 
viz. "stage l" and "stage 2". MCDM and related methods are applied at these two steps of the 
simulation procedure. These steps or stages represent part of the process of revising the newly 
formed Foreground Set of policy scenarios (stage 1), and the process of extracting a solution set of 
policy scenarios (stage 2). The steps were labelled so that the MCDM methods, used in a certain 
simulation run, could be identified at (or associated. with) the particular step of the simulation 
procedure, at which they were being used. 
For the remainder of this chapter we will describe in more detail the two data sets (sections 3.2 and 
3.3 respectively). This will reflect the first two steps (i.e. 1 and 2 as labelled) of the simulation 
algorithm illustrated in figure 3.1. The remaining steps of the algorithm are described in this chapter 
as follows: steps 3, 4, and 5 in section 3.4; step 6 in section 3.5; step 7 in section 3.6; steps 8 and 
9 in section 3.7; steps 10 and 11 in section 3.8; and step 12 in section 3.9. 
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3.2 Summary of the First Data Set 
The first data set, provided in table 3.1 on the following page, is taken from table Bl, Appendix 
B, of Stewart et al. (1993). Table Bl was used by Stewart et al., to illustrate the various MCDM 
approaches the authors reported on in their study, including the strengths and weaknesses of these 
methods. The authors also hoped that the hypothetical data for the particular region could serve as 
a demonstration project. 
Columns 2 to 5 of table 3.1 comprise the policy elements and columns 6 to 9 the derived attributes 
or criteria for this data set. Together, the values for columns 2 to 9 will form the 8 attributes by 
which the 20 policy scenarios are evaluated for the first data set. This data set represents simplified 
and hypothetical policy scenarios for a region such as the Sabie-Sand River system in the Eastern 
Transvaal. The reader is, however, referred to Appendix B of Stewart et al. (1993), for further 
background information on this data set. 
For the purposes of our study, the data in table 3.1 will be read as follows: zii• for decision 
alternatives or policy scenarios i = 1, ... , 20, and attributes j = 1, ... , 8. Furthermore, there are p = 
4 interest groups defined as follows: 
(1) the forestry interest group, 
(2) the irrigation interest group, 
(3) the rural communities interest group, and 
(4) the conservation interest group. 
For each interest group, a particular set of attributes that apply to the interest group has been 
selected from the total of 8. These sets, as they apply to the specific interest group, are defined 
below. Accompanying each attribute will be its direction of preference (i.e. maximizing or 
minimizing), that is unique to the particular interest group, and this forms the q = 11 surrogate 
planning objectives for this data set. 
(1) Forestry interest group: 
(a) (column 2) Percentage change in afforestation, relative to status quo, permitted or 
enforced, with a feasible range of options from -3% (i.e. a 3% reduction) to +5% 
- maximize; 
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TABLE 3.1: Data Set No. 1 
(Simplified and Hypothetical Policy Scenarios for a region such as the Sabie) 
Attributes 
Policy % % Dam size % Rural Cost % % % 
Scenarios Change Cut (%of Populn. (Rm) Change Change Change 
in in Max.) Served Annual Low Peak 
Forestry Irrigation Flow Flows Flows 
1 -3 20 60 30 450 20 50 -5 
2 -3 35 80 40 575 17 65 -13 
3 -3 50 60 40 500 15 65 -5 
4 -3 50 100 50 650 15 80 -20 
5 -1.5 20 ,_,. 60 30 450 7 35 -8 
6 -1.5 35 80 40 575 5 50 -15 
7 -1.5 50 60 40 500 2 50 -8 
8 -1.5 50 100 50 650 2 65 -23 
9 0 20 60 30 450 -5 20 -10 
10 0 35 80 50 625 -1 35 -14 
11 0 50 60 40 500 -10 35 -10 
12 0 50 100 50 650 -10 50 -25 
13 +2.5 20 60 30 450 -26 -5 -14 
14 +2.5 35 80 50 625 -22 10 -18 
15 +2.5 50 60 40 500 -31 10 -14 
16 +2.5 50 100 60 700 -24 25 -26 
17 +5 20 60 40 500 -40 -30 -15 
18 +5 35 80 50 625 -43 -15 -23 
19 +5 50 60 30 450 -58 -15 -22 
20 +5 50 100 60 700 -45 0 -30 
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(b) (column 4) The sizing of the dam to be constructed at a predetennined site, 
expressed as a percentage of the optimal size from engineering or economic 
considerations, which may range between 60% and 100% - maximize; 
(c) (column 6) Total investment costs in millions of Rand - minimize. 
(2) Irrigation interest group: 
(a) (column 3) Percentage reduction in current levels of irrigation for agriculture in the 
area, with pennissible values between 20% and 50% of current use - minimize; 
(b) (column 5) Percentage of the rural population to be provided with standpipes within 
100 metres of their dwellings, with values ranging between 30% and 60% -
maximize. 
(3) Rural communities interest group: 
(a) (column 5) Percentage of the rural population to be provided with standpipes within 
100 metres of their dwellings, with values ranging between 30% and 60% - . 
maximize; 
(b) (column 8) Percentage change (from status quo conditions) in the minimum (low) 
flow during the year - maximize; 
(c) (column 9) Percentage change (from status quo conditions) in the peak flow during 
the year - minimize. 
(4) Conservation interest group: 
(a) (column 7) Percentage change (from status quo conditions) in total annual flow -
maximize; 
(b) (column 8) Percentage change (from status quo conditions) in the minimum (low) 
flow during the year - maximize; 
(c) (column 9) Percentage change (from status quo conditions) in the peak flow during 
the year - maximize. 
For the simulation process on this data set, the sets of attributes together with their directions of 
preference, as they apply to the 4 interest groups, will remain unchanged from one iteration to the 
next for a particular simulation run. What was varied (between iterations), is the sets of utility 
functions that apply to each attribute of a particular inter~st group. 
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3.3 Summary of the Second Data Set 
The second data set or randomly generated data set, as it will sometimes be referred to, was formed 
in such a way that it would closely resemble the first data set. The main reason for this is that we 
wanted to test whether the results obtained from the first data set would be repeated in the second. 
Furthermore, we were also interested in obtaining any new results as well as exploring the effects 
of external factors on the decision making process. These factors include the effects of the number 
of interest groups, the effects of the number of policy elements and the effects of the number of 
derived attributes on the results. 
To start, we used p = 4 interest groups, m = 4 policy elements generated by means of an 
experimental design procedure and n = 4 derived attributes generated from these policy elements. 
In order to simulate real life decision events, we re-generated the derived attributes from one 
iteration to the next. To be accurate, we should therefore be referring to this data set as "randomly 
generated data sets" and not just, by implication, a "single" randomly generated data set. The latter 
is used, however, for ease of distinction. The manner in which interest groups were assigned 
attributes (~, for the i-th attribute), consisting of combinations of policy elements (xJ and derived 
attributes (y J, as well as how this assignment varied from one iteration to the next, will be discussed 
later in this section. 
The experimental design procedure used to generate the scenarios reflecting the policy elements, is 
similar to the one used by Stewart et al. (1993), in their appendix C. The authors use this procedure 
to generate their Background Set of scenarios, as defined by combinations of (m) policy elements. 
An argument is presented by the authors for not using_the full 2m factorial design, for them policy 
elements. This argument is based mainly on practical considerations that need to be taken for large 
values of m. With m increasing in size, the full 2m factorial design will require an even quicker 
increasing amount of intensive computer processing. Instead, Stewart et al., propose using a 
particular version of the factorial design procedure that is aimed specifically at maximizing the 
spread of scenarios which are to be considered. 
The full design procedure will be headed under a ''partial factorial design set" and an "extended 
centre point set". The latter refers to an "extended centre point" that ensures an additional richness 
in the centre (x; = Vz) of the design set, i.e. with values for~ between 1i4 and%. ~ is defined as the 
level chosen for the i-th policy element, on a standardized scale on which the minimum value is 
0 and the maximum value is 1. In some cases,~ may only be able to take on the values 0 or 1; for 
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example, one policy element may refer to whether or not a particular dam is built. In this case xi 
= 0 means no dam is built and xi = 1 means that a dam is built. 
The design procedure proposed by Stewart et al., is the following: 
Partial Factorial Design Set: 
Form~ 4, use the complete 2m factorial design (see example in table 3.2 on the following 
page). 
Form > 4, the following design, consisting of (2+m+m2) scenarios is proposed: 
One scenario defined by xi = 0 for all policy elements i 
m scenarios, in each of which ".i = 1 for a particular policy element j, and xi = 0 for 
all i;ooj 
m(m-1)!2 scenarios, in each of which ".i = x1 = 1 for a particular pair of policy 
elements j and 1, and ~ = 0 for all i;ooj,l 
m(m-1)!2 scenarios, in each of which ".i = x1 = 0 for a particular pair of policy 
elements j and 1, and ~ = 1 for all i;ooj,l 
m scenarios, in each of which ".i = 0 f<?r a particular policy element j, and xi = 1 for 
all i;ooj 
One scenario defined by xi = 1 for all policy elements i 
This design allows for the estimation of all main effects of each policy element, as well as all first-
order interaction effects. 
Extended Centre Point Set: (For continuous policy elements only) 
The following (1+2m) scenarios are proposed: 
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TABLE 3.2: Illustrating the proposed experimental design procedure for m = 4 elements 
Policy Policy Elements 
Scenarios X1 Xz X3 X4 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 1 0 
5 0 0 0 1 
6 1 1 0 0 
7 1 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0 1 
9 0 1 1 0 
10 0 1 0 1 
11 0 0 1 1 
12 1 1 1 0 
13 1 1 0 1 
14 1 0 1 1 
15 0 1 1 1 
16 1 1 1 1 
17 1h 1h 1h 1h 
18 Y4 1h 1h 1h 
19 1h Y4 1h 1h 
20 1h lh - Y4 1h 
21 1h 1h 1h Y4 
22 % 1h 1h 1h 
23 1h % 1h 1h 
24 1h 1h % 1h 
25 1h 1h 1h % 
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One scenario defined by xi = 1h for all policy elements i 
m scenarios, in each of which~ = 1/.i for a particular policy element j, and xi = Vi 
for all i;o!j 
m scenarios, in each of which ~ = % for a particular policy element j, and xi = 1h 
for all i;o!j 
This design allows for the estimation of the additional richness of the centre point set. As an 
example of the above design procedure, we listed the 24 + (1+2( 4)) policy scenarios generated by 
the procedure in table 3.2 on the previous page, form= 4 policy elements. All the policy elements 
in this example are continuous variables. 
The values shown in table 3.2 are all expressed in standardized form, where, as stated before, xi = 
1 corresponds to the maximum value (say, z.mu for attribute 1), and xi = 0 to the minimum value 
(say, zimin), for the i-th policy element. The standardized values can be converted back into their 
natural units for each policy element. The relationship between the x/s and the zi's, that can be used 
to carry out this conversion, is shown in the equation below: 
x. = 
I 
(zi-zimin) 
( Z;mu -zimin) 
By using this design procedure, the number of policy·scenarios do not increase (as the number of 
policy elements increase) as rapidly as they would for the full 2m factorial design. This design 
procedure would therefore make the data set computationally easier to work with, when there is an 
increasing number of policy elements used in the study. 
The derived attributes (yJ, are generated for this data set as a function of the policy elements (xJ, 
or y = f {x1, x2, .•• xJ. We calculated the j-th derived attribute (for j = 1 ton) as follows: 
r 
Yj = L J3jr (f;)2 
i=l 
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for coefficients, ~ir• random on the Uniform (-1; + 1] distribution, and 
where we definer (r < m) factors, fi, in the sense of multivariate factor analysis, as follows: 
for coefficients, ail, also random on the Uniform (-1; + 1] distribution. 
We used r = 3 factors when generating the derived attributes for the second data set, and decided 
to keep this constant value of r for all the simulation runs. 
Furthermore, for a particular iteration of a simulation run, each interest group was assigned a 
random number of attributes. This random number changed from one iteration to the next. The 
attributes (zJ, are made up of a randomly chosen number of policy elements (xJ, as well as a 
random number of derived attributes (yJ. The policy elements remained the same for all iterations, 
but the derived attributes changed from one iteration to the next. The attributes are then selected in 
order to apply to a specific interest group, for the particular iteration. Overlapping of attributes was 
allowed in a particular iteration, but of course each policy element or derived attribute, will also 
have a randomly chosen direction of preference associated with it. This will be unique to a 
particular interest group, in a particular iteration. We allowed each interest group to have the same 
number of policy elements and derived attributes applicable to it. However, which policy elements 
and which derived attributes, together with their directi9ns of preference, remained different for each 
of the interest groups. 
To sum up, we have changed the policy elements and derived attributes, as well as varied the degree 
of overlap of both policy elements, derived attributes and also directions of preference, from one 
iteration to the next. The external factors that may affect our results could be varied using this 
randomly generated data set. These started out at p = 4 interest groups, m = 4 policy elements and 
n = 4 derived attributes for this data set. These values were subsequently changed in further 
simulation runs and any effects that resulted from such changes, will be reported in chapter 5. 
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3.4 Utility Values and the Nash Optimum 
Once we had established the Background Set of policy scenarios, we were able to start simulating 
the DMs' responses to the various MCDM approaches. First we needed to generate a value or utility 
function for each attribute of each interest group. We therefore simulated a preference structure that 
is assumed to satisfy the axioms of MAUT includingpreferential independence. Carrying out this 
approach under the assumption of preferential independence, (as noted in section 2.2 (a) of chapter 
2), requires that the relative strengths of preference between scenarios differing on one criterion 
only, are independent of levels of achievement on the other criteria. 
For a particular interest group, the MAUT model would require two steps. The first is the 
specification of marginal value functions (shown as vFi(zFi; RFJ below - "F/' for the forestry interest 
group of the first data set, say), for each of the attributes (j) of the interest group. The second step 
would require the specification of importance weights (shown as wi below). The utility function for, 
say, the forestry interest group of the first data set, could then be represented as follows: 
VF(Zp) = L 
j arrributes of interest 
w.vF(zF;RF) } I I I 
The utility value provided by the utility function VrtzF), will therefore be calculated for each policy 
scenario in the Background Set. Furthermore, for the forestry interest group of the first data set, 
used as an example again, we would have j = 3 attributes, with: 
w1 being the weight for the percentage change in afforestation attribute, 
w2 being the weight for the dam size (as a percentage of the optimal size) attribute, and 
w3 being the weight for the total investment costs (millions of rand) attribute. 
The weights (rescaled to sum to 100) used in the first data set of this study, together with the 
interest group to which they apply, are the following: 
Forestry: W1 = 56 
Wz = 22 
W3 = 22 
Irrigation: W1 = 75 
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Rural: 
W 2 = 25 
W 1 = 50 
W2 = 25 
Conservation: w1 = 23 
W2 = 45 
W 3 = 32 
The weights used for the interest groups (p) of the second data set, were kept equal for all the 
attributes of a particular group. 
The marginal value function for a particular attribute of an interest group is assumed to be of the 
functional fonn shown below. We will for the remainder of this section, be referring to the first data 
set, using the forestry interest group as an example again. 
-z /R 
v (z · R ) =a - be '1 ' 1 F1 F1 ' F1 
The parameters a and bare arbitrary in theory, but are conventionally chosen to ensure that vFj(zFjmin; 
RFi) = 0 and vFi(zFtax; RFj) = 1, where zFjmin and zFtax are respectively the worst and best values for 
zFj• i.e. the j-th attribute of the forestry interest group. So for the percentage change in afforestation 
attribute (i.e. j = 1, or column 2 of table 3.1 in section 3.2) of the forestry interest group, we will 
have ZFl min= -3 and ZFl max = +5. Furthennore, we define ZFjmid as the average of zFrin and zFrax, and 
in this case it turns out to be +1 (i.e. ((-3) + (+5)) I 2). 
The parameter RFi is sometimes called the "risk tolerance". If vFj(zFj; RFj) is also a utility function 
for decision making under uncertainty, then RFj represents the amount that a DM would be willing 
to give up (from the expected consequence), in order to avoid the risks associated with a particular 
lottery. Stewart et al. (1993), refer to it as being "related to the amounts that a "rational gambler" 
would be prepared to wager, if his values were in fact represented by such a function". The 
calculation of RFi depends on where it lies within the interval (-oo; +oo). In the study we used an 
iterative procedure to calculate RFi• and this procedure is documented in appendix 3A at the end of 
this chapter. 
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We simulated different utility functions for each attribute of a particular interest group. Each 
function will be characterized by a single parameter u, where u = vFj(zFj mid; RF)· Values for u are 
generated uniformly on [L, U]. The bounds L and U are chosen to represent specific levels of risk 
aversion (noting that u < 1h implies risk seeking an_d u > 1h implies risk aversion). For this study 
we used L = 0.3 and U = 0.9 as our interval bounds. 
Once u has been generated, the parameters of the marginal value function vFi(zFi; RFi), are obtained 
as solutions to: 
vFi(zFimin; RFi) = 0 
VFi(zFtax; RFj) = 1 
vFj(zFimid; RFi) = u 
By using equations (1) and (2) to fix parameters a and b, RFj needs to be chosen to satisfy: 
mid U =vF(Zp ;RF) 
i I I 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
This needs to be solved numerically for RFi• and the procedure used to perform this task is 
documented in appendix 3A at the end of this chapter. It must be remembered that for the forestry 
interest group, we had three separate attributes that described this interest group, and we would 
therefore have to find RFi for each of these relevant attributes (i.e. j = l, 2 and 3). Therefore, we 
will obtain three separate marginal value functions for this interest group. Each marginal value 
function obtained will be multiplied by its associated importance weight wi, and by adding these 
three resulting products, we can obtain the final utility function, VF(zF), for the forestry interest 
group. 
Once we were able simulate the establishment of marginal value functions for each of the criteria 
of an interest group, we could calculate the values yielded by these functions for all the policy 
scenarios in our Background Set. We then repeated the entire process for the remaining interest 
groups defined for the particular data set. This would yield a set of utility scores, uii• for the i = 1, 
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... , s policy scenarios in the Background Set, and j = l, ... , p interest groups defined for the 
particular data set. 
The utility scores are then used to obtain the Nash solution (Nash: 1950), for the Background Set 
of policy scenarios. The Nash solution is that policy scenario that provides the "best" consensus 
solution between the p different interest groups. It will be used as a benchmark for comparing the 
solution(s) yielded by the particular MCDM methods, when these methods are applied to the data 
set at a later stage in the simulation algorithm. The formula used for obtaining the Nash value for 
a particular policy scenario i, is given below: 
p II ( uij - min ( uii ) ) 
j =l 
The Nash optimum is the maximum solution (policy scenario), calculated over all scenarios (s) in 
the Background Set, of the above set of Nash values generated. 
Once the utility values have been obtained, they are rescaled to lie within the range [O; 100] and 
ranked from largest (1) to smallest (s). This is completed separately for each interest group, and of 
course the Nash value with rank (1) will be the maximum and therefore the Nash solution. 
3.5 The Foreground Set 
The study proceeds to simulate the selection of a set of scenarios from the Background Set to form 
a reduced set, known as the Foreground Set of policy "scenarios. Ideally, these scenarios should be 
chosen to contain realistically close-to-best expectations for all the interest groups, as well as some 
potentially good compromise solutions. We first define the attributes related to the p interest groups 
as the surrogate planning objectives z1, ... , zq. Recall that q = 11 for the first data set. Therefore, 
for this data set the following relationships will apply: 
z1 - forestry attribute 1 
Zi - forestry attribute 2 
z3 - forestry attribute 3 
z11 - conservation attribute 3 
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For the purposes of discussion it is assumed that each z. is standardized to a maximum value of 1 
and a minimum value of 0. The automated approach then used in the study, is to select the 
Foreground Set as the t scenarios in the Background Set, that are most frequently generated 
according to the following algorithm: 
(1) Generate random sets of weights w1, w2, ••• , wq (q = 11 in our case) which sum to 1, and 
for each set generated find the alternative (scenario) that minimizes the following scalarizing 
function: 
where ~ • is some "reference level" for objective i. In our case an appropriate reference level 
may be the "ideal point" defined by z." = 1 for all i surrogate planning objectives. We also 
used a small value of 0.1 (as suggested by Stewart et al. (1993)) for & in the simulation 
study. 
(2) Maintain a list of all alternatives that are generated in this way. 
The number of times, out of say, 1000 randomly generated sets of weights, that each scenario was 
selected as "best" according to the above algorithm, termed the Steuer/Wierzbicki approach, was 
recorded. The t scenarios with the highest frequencies of being recorded as best were chosen to form 
the Foreground Set of pol cy scenarios. 
We term the algorithm the Steuer/Wierzbicki approach for the following reasons. The process of 
reducing the Background Set to a 'smaller Foreground Set is analogous to the process of filtering 
defined by Steuer (1986). The difference is that Steuer developed his procedure based on 
alternatives that were of a linear programming structure. We have adapted his procedure and instead 
used the Wierzbicki (1980) scalarizing function criterion in order to select the best scenario for each 
set of weights generated in the algorithm. This approach was suggested in Stewart et al. (1993), as 
part of the initial iteration in their scenario based planning procedure. 
The t scenarios chosen according to our algorithm, will be the ones "most likely" to be viewed as 
well balanced between the generally conflicting objectives of the various interest groups. The work 
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of Miller (1956), suggests that t = 7 (plus or minus 2) would be an ideal number of scenarios on 
which value judgments, from interested parties, can effectively be expressed in terms of comparisons 
between them. For the purposes of discussion the number 7 will be used, although the study was 
conducted using Foreground Sets of sizes 5 through 9 inclusive. 
3.6 Interest Thermometer Scales 
Once the (t) policy scenarios that make up the Foreground Set have been calculated, we proceed 
with the algorithm by simulating the construction of thermometer scales for each interest group. 
These thermometer scales rank the Foreground Set scenarios according to the underlying utility 
preferences (scores) of the various interest groups. 
In practice, each interest group would first construct thermometer scales for the criteria that are 
relevant to the interest. These are then aggregated to give an overall score (8i) for the scenarios 
being considered. Once this has been completed, one may either display value paths (of the 
scenarios as scored by the various interests) for direct selection of the best two or three alternatives, 
say, or one could use one or more "rules" to do the selection automatically (cf. section 3.7 of this 
chapter). 
We have simulated the construction of the final or aggregated (standardized) thermometer scales for 
the various interests (p of them), by using the (~J utility scores associated with the Foreground Set 
scenarios, and rescaling them (8ii) so that the best Foreground Set alternative had a score of 100, 
and the worst alternative a score of 0. When doing the sensitivity analysis on our MCDM 
approaches, we added some "random error" to these ?tility scores and the results of this addition 
are reported on in chapters 4 and 5. 
3. 7 Revising the Foreground Set 
We have simulated the choice of Foreground Set scenarios by using the Steuer/Wierzbicki approach 
(see section 3.5 of this chapter). In the simulation study, we would also like to reflect the consensus 
views that the DMs may have arrived at once they were able to evaluate their choices for 
Foreground Set scenarios. The consensus seeking process is of course an iterative one, but we will 
only be completing two such "iterations" in a single iteration of a particular simulation run for our 
algorithm. A single revision of the original Foreground Set (representing the second iteration in the 
consensus seeking process), does provide one with a good enough feel for what the process entails 
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in reality. The manner by which we intend to simulate this, is by eliminating certain scenarios say, 
K, from further consideration by the DMs, and replacing them with other suitably chosen 
alternatives. The process of consensus seeking will be divided into two stages, namely: 
(1) We will use MCDM approaches to obtain a rank ordering (across the various conflicting 
interests) of all the scenarios in the Foreground Set. We would then eliminate the K lowest 
ranking options from the set and retain the remaining ones for further consideration. The 
MCDM methods will be applied to the rescaled scores (6ii) of each interest group (for each 
Foreground Set scenario), that were previously generated in section 3.6. 
(2) The second stage will essentially be a repetition of the Steuer/Wierzbicki approach (cf. 
section 3.5). The only difference is that the weights used in this step of the simulation 
algorithm will not lead to one or more of the eliminated scenarios being ranked more highly 
(according to the Wierzbicki scalarizing function criterion) than any of the scenarios 
classified as retained for further consideration. This is analogous to the procedures 
developed by Zionts and co-workers, see Zionts (1976), Zionts and Wallenius (1976, 1983) 
and Korhonen, Wallenius and Zionts (1984), as briefly described in section 2.2 (b) of 
chapter 2. This second stage of our approach was suggested in Stewart et al. (1993), and 
is represented by step 9 of the simulation algorithm provided in figure 3.1. We describe the 
process of determining valid sets of weights, say 1000 again, in algorithmic form below: 
(a) Let {D} =set of discarded scenarios. 
(b) Let {R} = set of retained scenarios. 
(c) Generate a set of weights. 
(d) Test to see that every scenario i in set R ranks higher, according to the scalarizing 
function (Wierzbicki) criterion, than every scenario j in set D. 
( e) If the test gave a true answer then count this set of weights as valid and generate 
a new set of weights; 
Else ignore the set of weights and generate a new set of weights. 
The revised Foreground Set will therefore consist of the previously retained as well as the newly 
chosen policy scenarios. The latter are chosen by using the "valid" sets of weights. 
We have labelled two steps (steps 8 and 11) of the simulation algorithm as diagrammatically 
depicted in figure 3.1. The first label ("stage l"), corresponds to the first stage in our procedure for 
Chapter 3: Description of the Approach adopted for the Study 50 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
simulating the consensus seeking process above, whereby K scenarios are eliminated (by 
classification in the form of rank ordering) from the Foreground Set. We used four MCDM or 
related techniques, described in more detail below, in separate runs, in order to eliminate the K 
scenarios from the initial Foreground Set. 
3.7.1 Maximizing the Sum of Scores (Maxscoresum) 
This technique will also be referred to as the Maxscoresum method and it comprises two 
parts. The first part involves the summing of the rescaled utility scores (Si) for each 
Foreground Set scenario i, where the summing takes place over the j = 1, ... , p inte.rest 
groups. The second part involves the calculation of the maximum of these summed scores 
over all scenarios in the Foreground Set. We can combine these two parts as follows: 
Once the scores for each scenario have been summed, as described by the first part of this 
method, they are ranked from biggest to smallest. The K lowest ranking scenarios are 
eliminated from the Foreground Set, whilst the remaining ones are retained for further 
consideration. 
3.7.2 Minimizing the Sum of Ranks (Minranksum) 
This technique, also referred to as the Minranksum method, consists of two parts. The first 
can be described as the summing, for each Foreground Set scenario i, of the ranks of the 
rescaled utility scores (Si), taken over all p interest groups. These ranks (~i) are the within-
interest-group rank of the particular scenario's (i) score, as reflected by the ordinal position 
of this scenario on the axis of the relevant interest thermometer scale (j). Therefore, the 
scenario with a rescaled utility score of 100 will be awarded rank 1 for the particular 
interest group, and the scenario with a score of 0 will be awarded rank t. The second part 
consists of the calculation of the minimum of these summed ranks (since rank 1 is the best), 
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calculated over all scenarios in the Foreground Set. Combined these two parts are shown 
below: 
Min 
(i =l, .... t) 
Once the summed ranks (i.e. part one of the method) have been calculated, they are sorted 
from smallest to biggest. The scenarios that are associated with the K largest summed ranks 
are eliminated from the Foreground Set, whilst the remaining ones are retained. 
3.7.3 Maximum/Minimum (Max/Min) 
The Maximum/Minimum (or Max/Min) technique can be described as the method providing 
the "best of the worst" solution. The "worst" part can be described as the minimum rescaled 
utility score taken across all p interest groups for a particular Foreground Set policy scenario 
i. The "best" part can be described as the maximum score (of the previously worst selected 
ones), taken over the entire set of policy scenarios in the Foreground Set. We can combine 
these two parts and represent them as shown below: 
Max 
(i =l, .. .,t) [ Min c eij)] (j =1 •... ,p) 
Once the minimum or worst scores are found for each policy scenario i (taken across the 
p interest groups), the K worst ones are eliminated by discarding them from the Foreground 
Set. The remaining scenarios are retained for further consideration. 
3.7.4 ELECTRE I 
The ELECTRE I method was described in detail in section 2.3.2 (b) of chapter 2. For our 
purposes, we will use ELECTRE I to find between-interest compromises. We will therefore 
be basing our ELECTRE I calculations on the rescaled utility values or thermometer scores, 
eii• that resulted when the various interest thermometer scales were generated. 
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We calculated both sets of concordance and discordance values for the t Foreground Set 
policy scenarios. These two sets of values were used to obtain an outranking set of values 
(matrix) for the policy scenarios. For this study, we used c· = 0.5 and ct• = 0.5 (in all 
simulation runs), as our threshold levels for concordance and discordance respectively. The 
outranking values would then form our outranking matrix of dimension t rows by t columns. 
We used this outranking matrix to obtain a partial rank ordering of the Foreground Set 
alternatives. The method we used to complete this rank ordering process was described in 
section 2.3.2 (b), and as was previously stated in this section, the method works well if 
there are neither too many nor too few outranking relationships. This made our choices for 
threshold levels critical and the values eventually used (0.5 for both concordance and 
discordance), were determined by experimentation. 
Policy scenarios that had partial rankings of 1, 2 or 3 assigned to them were considered for 
further investigation and were therefore retained in the Foreground Set. We would discard 
the remaining ones from the Foreground Set. Clearly, this method does not produce a 
constant value for K, i.e. the number of alternatives to be eliminated from the Foreground 
Set, and K would change from one iteration to the next. 
3.8 Finding the Best Policy Scenario(s) 
Once the revised Foreground Set has been generated, we will simulate the procedure of setting up 
revised interest thermometer scales for the p interest groups. This procedure is similar to the one 
of setting up the initial thermometer scales, as described in section 3;6 above, and the only 
difference would be that a revised set oft Foreground ~et policy scenarios would now be used. We 
will then be able to simulate the extraction of a solution set of policy scenarios from this revised 
Foreground Set. As discussed in section 3.7 before, the consensus seeking process consists of many 
iterations in reality. We have, however, only simulated 2 such iterations of this process by means 
of revising the initial Foreground Set at least once. We will then simulate the generation of revised 
interest thermometer scales, and once these have been calculated, we will simulate how DMs may 
choose the best scenario(s). 
For this procedure we will be using the 4 MCDM methods described in sections 3.7.1through3.7.4 
above. These methods were previously used to eliminate K scenarios from the initial Foreground 
Set, by using the rank orderings (of the scenarios) produced by the particular method. The only 
difference would be that we will on this occasion be using the particular method to simulate the 
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search for the scenario(s) which is/are ranked first. For certain methods, this will produce a single 
policy scenario, whilst for others it will produce more than one scenario. Once the solution set has 
been selected, we can conduct a statistical analysis, in order to measure the quality of the solution 
produced by the particular MCDM approach. 
3.9 Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis will focus on the results produced by the 4 MCDM methods that were used 
at the stages labelled 1 and 2 of the simulation algorithm (see figure 3.1). Once the solution set has 
been generated, one would be interested to see how "good" a compromise solution it really provides. 
The term "good" is qualified in the analysis by measuring the quality of the solution produced 
against the Nash optimum. The Nash optimum is considered to be the ''pseudo-best" or 
"benchmark" against which the other solutions could be measured. Each Foreground Set scenario 
has an associated ranking in terms of its Nash value, where the Nash values were generated once 
the Background Set of policy scenarios had been established. Clearly the scenario with ranking 
equal to one would be the Nash optimum. Once a solution set is chosen from the (revised) 
Foreground Set, one would therefore be interested to see how these solution set scenarios are ranked 
in relation to the Nash optimum. 
Statistics were recorded for the Nash optimum solution, for each iteration of the algorithm, wherein 
a particular MCDM approach has been used. These are as follows: 
(1) The utility value of each of the p interest groups, for the Nash optimum solution, and 
(2) The standard deviation of this utility value for each of the p interest groups, for the Nash 
optimum solution. 
Similarly, statistics were kept for the solution set produced by a particular MCDM approach, for 
each iteration. These are as follows: 
(1) The utility value of each of the p inte~est groups, for the best compromise solution, and 
(2) The standard deviation of this utility value for each of the p interest groups, for the best 
compromise solution. 
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Further key statistics were recorded in order to determine the quality of the best compromise 
solution produced. They are the following: 
(1) The probability of selecting the Nash optimum as the estimated best solution (i.e. telling one 
how often the Nash optimum is an element of the final solution set), 
(2) . The average ranking of the estimated best solution (or elements of this set), where this 
solution is ranked according to the Nash value associated with it, and 
(3) The average size of the estimated best solution set of policy scenarios. 
Once we completed 100 iterations for a particular simulation run, the set of statistics we have been 
keeping for each iteration could be averaged for the particular population to which it applies. A final 
statistical analysis is therefore conducted at the end of the last iteration. We based our final 
judgements of the MCDM approach used in this simulation run on the statistics produced by this 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX 3A: ALGORITHMS THAT IMPLEMENT THE ITERATIVE PROCEDURE 
USED TO CALCULATE RISK TOLERANCE FACTORS (Rj) 
The utility values for a particular interest group are generated using the following formula: 
V(z) = 
j artributes of interesr 
The marginal value function vlzi; ~), is evaluated for each relevant attribute j, of each interest 
group. The algorithm will therefore be applied to a particular attribute of a specific interest group. 
We will be solving for ~ (the risk tolerance parameter) in order to use it to obtain the marginal 
value function for this G-th) attribute. The equations that are used are described in section 3.4 of 
chapter 3, and we are primarily interested in the following relationship: 
The algorithm as described below, is divided into three sections, and section (2) will deal with the 
manner in which we solve for Ri. 
(1) Generate a random u E: [O; 1] from the Uniform distribution and transform it to lie within 
the pre-determined range [L; U]. 
(2) · Check to see where u lies within the following 3 ranges and continue with the appropriate 
calculations. 
(a) u E: [0.5 - e; 0.5 + e ], where e is chosen suitably (for instance a value of 0.0001 
is used in the study), ~ Ri = oo. 
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We calculate the marginal value function as follows: 
thus allowing us to find vi(zi; ~) for this attribute. 
(b) u > (0.5 + e), ~ ~ > 0. 
We calculate~ by using the following algorithm, referred to as calc_r _rpos(): 
(i) 
(ii) 
Appendix 3A 
If vj(zrd; ~ °) < u 
Then 
~· = ~o 
~o = 1h * ~·. 
If vj(z/nid; ~ °) > u 
Then 
Else 
Proceed to iterationO · - as described below 
~· = ~o 
~o = 1h * ~· 
Repeat (test 2). 
Else If vi(zimia; ~°) > u 
Then 
~· = 2 * ~o. 
If vj(zrd; ~) < u 
Then 
(test 1) 
(test 2) 
(test 3) 
(test 4) 
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Else 
Proceed to iterationO 
~o= ~· 
~· = 2 * ~o 
Repeat (test 4). 
The algorithm referred to as iterationO is the following: 
Start with the following assignments: 
(i) 
Li/ = v.(z.mid. R .0\ - u 
J J J ' A":J } 
~ - = u - vi(zimid; ~) 
~new=((~-* ~o) + (~+*~))I(~ - + ~+) 
y.new = v.(z.mid, R .n•W\ 
J J J ' A":J } 
If I v.n•w - u I < e 
J 
Then 
Solution~ = ~new. 
(ii) Else If vtw > (u + e) 
Then 
~O =~new 
~+ = vi(zimid; ~°) - u 
~new= ((.6.i- * ~o) + (~+*~))I(~-+~+) 
y.new = V·(Z·mid. R .neW\ 
J J J ) A":J } 
Repeat step (i). 
(iii) Else If vtw < (u - e) 
Then 
~·=~new 
y.ncw = v.(z.mid, 12.neW\ 
j J J ' A":J } 
Repeat step (i). 
(c) u < (0.5 - e), => ~ < 0. 
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We calculate ~by using the following algorithm, referred to as calc_r _rnegQ: 
(i) 
(ii) 
If vj(z/nid; ~ °) < u 
Then 
~· = ~o 
~o = 2 * ~·. 
If vj(zrd; ~ °) > u 
Then 
Else 
Proceed to iterationO 
~· = ~o 
~o = 2 * ~· 
Repeat (test 2). 
Else If vj(z/nid; ~ °) > u 
Then 
If vj(zrd; ~) < u 
Then 
Else 
Proceed to iterationO . 
~o=~· 
~· = ~ * ~o 
Repeat (test 4). 
(test 1) 
(test 2) 
(test 3) 
(test 4) 
(3) Once we have solved for Ri in either of the algorithms described in sections b or c above, 
we can find the marginal value function, vi(zi; ~), for this attribute. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST DATA SET 
4.1 Procedure for Implementing the MCDM Methods 
The simulation study was used to evaluate the different MCDM methods used at the steps labelled 
"stage 1" and "stage 2" in the simulation algorithm, as summarized in figure 3.1 of the previous 
chapter. This evaluation was carried out by first looking at the MCDM approach as carried out for 
a particular simulation run, thereby providing one with an indication of how efficient the approach 
is. The second part of the evaluation would focus on how robust the MCDM approach is, by 
carrying out a sensitivity analysis on the results yielded. 
The MCDM methods were employed at the labelled stages of the simulation algorithm, for a 
particular simulation run, in the combinations shown below. 
Stage 1 Method Stage 2 Method 
Maxscoresum Maxscoresum 
Minranksum Minranksum 
Max/Min Max/Min 
ELECTRE I ELECTRE I 
ELECTRE I Maxscoresum 
ELECTRE I Minranksum 
ELECTRE I Max/Min 
Once these simulation runs were completed, we could assess the results yielded by the respective 
combinations of MCDM methods. The efficiency of these combinations would be represented by 
the quality of the final solution produced by them. This means that we would be interested to see 
how good a compromise solution the final selection of policy scenario(s) represents for the 
conflicting interest groups in the study. 
The sensitivity analysis will focus on two aspects of the simulation algorithm. The first is that of 
perturbing the thermometer scores of the various interest groups. The second aspect focused on was 
perturbing the concordance weights (of the ELECTRE I approach) assigned to the various interest 
groups, where initially, all interests are assigned equal weights. By perturbing the concordance 
weights, we were investigating the rather ''political" issue of assigning different importance 
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weightings to the various interest groups. We could of course also investigate this issue by 
perturbing the weights assigned to the interest groups for the other MCDM approaches. However, 
the concordance weights fonn an integral part of the ELECTRE I approach and it is not clear as to 
how random errors on these weights would affect the results produced. This makes it an important 
and interesting aspect of the method that needs to be addressed. For the Maxscoresum, Minranksum 
or Max/Min approaches, the function of the weights, and subsequent changes that could occur when 
specifying these weights, is much more clearly delineated. It must, however, be stated that in 
retrospect, one would possibly also want to investigate any random errors that could be made on 
these weights and this does perhaps limit the overall results yielded in this study. 
On the whole, we therefore wanted to test the effects of such weight assignments on the decision 
making process, where errors made on these weights may conceivably have a vague or unclear 
effect on the result produced by the MCDM approach. This will allow us to make recommendations 
when other MCDM approaches are used in further studies, and where different interest weightings 
becomes an important and perhaps even necessary factor. We also investigated any additive or 
interactive effects that may result when the MCDM approaches (ELECTRE I specifically) were 
exposed to both the above sources of error (i.e. perturbing thennometer scores and concordance 
weights) simultaneously. 
For the interest thennometer scores, we were interested to see just how accurately these scores had 
to be stipulated (i.e. how close they needed to be to their true position on the various interest 
groups' thennometer scales) in order to obtain the same or largely similar results when no precision 
error was involved. This approach would determine how robust the particular combination of 
MCDM methods would be to the degree of accuracy. with which the interest groups set up their 
respective thennometer scales. To test the effects of such precision errors on the results, we 
combined the MCDM methods in the manner described below. 
Stage 1 Method Stage 2 Method 
Maxscoresum(o) Maxscoresum( a) 
Minranksum( a) Minranksum( a) 
Max/Min( a) Max/Min( a) 
ELECTRE I(o) ELECTRE l(o) 
ELECTRE l(o) Maxscoresum( a) 
ELECTRE I(o) Minranksum( a) 
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ELECTRE I( o) Max/Min(o) 
We used the symbol o (sigma), for standard deviation as shown in brackets next to 
each method, to indicate that this MCDM method forms part of the sensitivity 
analysis and thereby distinguish it from its original implemented form. The true 
(simulated) rescaled scores, 8ii• for the i-th Foreground Set policy scenario (i = 1, ... , t) of 
the j-th interest thermometer scale G = 1, ... , p), were perturbed by the addition of a precision error 
in the form of the random variable, ~i· The ~i are independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
random variables from the Normal distribution with a mean value of 0 and a variance of d-. The 
resulting perturbed scores for a particular thermometer scale were again rescaled, so that the 
maximum had a value of 100 and the minimum a value of 0. We will provide the exact figures used 
for o when tabulating the results of the simulation runs for the sensitivity analysis in appendix 4B 
at the end of this chapter. 
The second area of the sensitivity analysis would look at the issue of perturbing the concordance 
weights that were used in the ELECTRE I method. Our starting point was that each interest group 
had an equal weight and we could then proceed to perturb these weights multiplicatively. This was 
completed by combining the MCDM methods in the manner shown below. 
Stage 1 Method 
ELECTRE I( a) 
ELECTRE I( a) 
ELECTRE l(a) 
ELECTRE l(a) 
Stage 2 Method 
ELECTRE I( a) 
Maxscoresum 
Minranksum 
Max/Min 
The symbol a (alpha), that appears in brackets next to the ELECTRE I methods, is used to indicate 
that they form part of the sensitivity analysis. The weight, wi, for the j-th interest group is perturbed 
multiplicatively as follows: 
w. = w. * e "; ) ) 
where the ui are i.i.d. random variables from the Normal distribution, with mean 0 and 
variance a2. 
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We obtain this functional form from the equation shown below, where~ is the proportional error 
to which the weight wi is subjected: 
log w. = log w. + u. 
e J e J J 
In this study we suppose that the magnitude of the proportional error is at worst 100a%. Restating 
this in more precise terms would be that an approximate 95% confidence interval, is z 100a% when 
using a 2 standard deviation approximation. The following set of equations will demonstrate what 
this implies and how a is used in our calculations: 
1 
l+a 
< e "; < 1 +a 
where e "1 E [ e -7.a; e +7.a ] 
So 1 + a "" e +7.a 
From the above set of equations we can see how a is used to provide us with the standard deviation 
a, which in turn is used to calculate the proportional error, ~· We will provide the exact figures 
used for a when tabulating the results of the simulation runs for the sensitivity analysis in appendix 
4B at the end of this chapter. 
We also combined the two potential sources of error, by perturbing both the concordance weight 
assignments as well as the thermometer scores. The manner in which the MCDM methods were 
combined in order to complete this part of the sensitivity analysis is shown below. 
Stage 1 Method 
ELECTRE I(a)(o) 
ELECTRE I(a)(o) 
ELECTRE l(a)(o) 
Chapter 4: Analysis of the First Data Set 
Stage 2 Method 
ELECTRE l(a)(o) 
Maxscoresum( o) 
Minranksum( o) 
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ELECTRE I(a)(a) Max/Min( a) 
We will again provide the exact figures used for a and a in appendix 4B at the end of this chapter. 
As mentioned before, the sensitivity analysis would test how robust the respective combination of 
MCDM methods were, by focusing primarily on two potential sources of error, viz., the interest 
thermometer scores and the concordance weights assigned to the interest groups. These sensitivity 
tests were, however, not carried out on all the Foreground Set sizes used in the initial stage of the 
study (i.e. sizes 5 through 9), wherein we determined the efficiency of the various MCDM 
approaches. A Foreground Set consisting oft = 7 scenarios would suffice for the test purposes since 
this was also the number suggested according to the work of Miller (1956) - see the end of section 
2.2 of chapter 2 and section 3.5 of chapter 3. We will therefore base our conclusions on the results 
yielded by the sensitivity runs for 7 Foreground Set scenarios. However, we will also consider what 
the average results were for all the Foreground Set sizes, when we previously assessed the efficiency 
of the various MCDM approaches. 
4.2 Results Produced by the MCDM Methods 
The results that provide the detailed outcome of the simulation runs conducted for the various 
MCDM approaches, are tabled in appendix 4A at the end of this chapter. The description of these 
results for the particular combination of MCDM methods is given below, with each description 
containing a reference (in its heading) to the table number in appendix 4A to which it refers. 
Before dealing with the individual combinations of methods, it is worth noting that the forestry 
interest group appears to be disadvantaged when looking at the mean utility values of the Nash 
solution, for all 7 combinations of MCDM methods used. These mean utility values for the 7 
combinations of methods are provided at the top of tables 4A.1 to 4A.7 in appendix 4A. An 
example of this discrepancy may be found in table 4A.l, where forestry has an average utility value 
for the Nash Solution of 60.83, versus values of 67.30, 67.52 and 67.16 for the remaining interests. 
The reason for this seeming anomaly, is that forestry is more fundamentally in opposition to the 
other three interests in this data set. This would therefore imply that it becomes increasingly more 
difficult to obtain a good compromise solution. 
For this data set, we did not vary the degree of overlap for the various attributes that applied to the 
four interest groups. This may have some bearing on the anomaly that has occurred and is perhaps 
Chapter 4: Analysis of the First Data Set 64 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
a restricting limitation for the analysis on this data set. Therefore, when doing the simulation process 
for the second (randomly generated) data set, we will vary the attributes, together with their 
. ; 
directions of preference. Consequently, the analysis on the results obtained from this data set in 
chapter 5 (i.e. the mean utilities for the Nash optimum at least) should not favour any particular 
interest group, and a fair spread of the mean utility values across all interests is expected to occur. 
Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum (table 4A.1) 
We see that this combination of MCDM methods provides us with a probability of 72% (on 
average) of selecting the Nash optimum as our solution. Coupled to this, the solution is a single best 
policy scenario which has an average ranking of 1.86. ·Furthermore, the utility values of the 
respective interest groups in our solution compare favourably to those of the Nash optimum 
(provided at the top of the table), which was used as a basis for comparison. We also see that these 
utility values represent a fair compromise solution to all groups, since they on average range in 
utility preference from approximately 62 (62.22) to 69 (68.94). These averages for the compromise 
solution lie within 1 to 3 units (on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum (i.e. within 2 to 5% of 
Nash). 
When considering the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as our solution, one can see that 
it tends to increase as the Foreground Set increases in size. There is, however, no noticeable effect 
for this statistic when changing the value for K, i.e. the number of scenarios discarded whilst 
revising the Foreground Set. 
Minranksum + Minranksum (table 4A.2) 
The probability of selecting the Nash optimum as. our solution (or as is the case for this 
combination, an element of the solution set) is on average only 56%, which is substantially worse 
than, say, the 72% reported for the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum approach above. Furthermore, in 
a solution set consisting on average of 1.33 alternatives, we find that the scenarios have an average 
ranking equal to 3.13. The utility values for the solution produced by this combination of MCDM 
methods, on average tend to favour the rural communities interest group (average utility = 68.91). 
We also find that there exists a more noticeable difference between the average utility values of the 
compromise solution versus those of the Nash solution for the remaining interest groups. These 
average values lie within 2 to 6 units (on the 0-100 scale) or 3 to 9ro of the Nash optimum. 
There are no noticeable effects in the results when changing either the size of the Foreground Set 
or the number of scenarios discarded (K) when revising the Foreground Set. 
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Max/Min + Max/Min (table 4A.3) 
This combination produces a single best solution and we have on average a 61 % probability of 
selecting the Nash optimum as this solution. The policy scenario in the solution set has an average 
ranking equal to 1.72. The average utility values for the forestry (58.51) and irrigation (62.45) 
interest groups is noticeably lower than those of the remaining two interest groups. These same two 
interests also have lower average utilities for the compromise solution when compared to the Nash 
optimum. The average utility values for the compromise solution lie within 2 to 6 units (on the 0-
100 scale) or 3 to 9% of the Nash optimum. 
There are no noticeable effects in the results when changing either the size of the Foreground Set 
or the number of policy scenarios discarded (K) when revising the Foreground Set. 
ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I (table 4A.4) 
This combination of MCDM methods produces on average a 72% probability of selecting the Nash 
optimum as part of the solution set. This is one of the highest probabilities reported for the 
combinations of methods and is matched only by the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum approach. 
However, to place this in perspective, we see that the solution consists, on average, of 2.01 policy 
scenarios. Coupled to this, the scenarios in the solution set have an average ranking equal to 3.70. 
Furthermore, the rural communities interest group is favoured by this combination of methods with 
an average solution utility value of 69.18, when compared to the remaining interest groups (utility 
values of 58.53, 59.01 and 63.31). The remaining interests also have noticeably lower average 
utilities for the compromise solution when compared to the Nash optimum. These average utilities 
lie within 2 to 8 units (on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum, or put differently, within 3 to 
12% of Nash. 
When considering the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as part of the solution set, one can 
see that, with the exception of a Foreground Set of size 7 scenarios, this probability increases as the 
value for C. increases. In other words, by retaining more scenarios when revising the Foreground 
Set, we increase the probability of selecting the Nash solution (as part of our solution set). There 
are, however, no marked effects on the results when looking at the different sizes of the Foreground 
Sets. 
ELECTRE I+ Maxscoresum (table 4A.5) 
The probability of selecting the Nash optimum as our solution, where this solution consists of only 
a single policy scenario, is on average 71 %. This is a high probability when considering that there 
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is only a single alternative in the solution. Furthermore, this scenario has an average ranking of 1.79. 
The utility values for the alternatives in our solution set are close to those of the Nash solution. 
These average utility preferences also range from approximately 60 (60.44) to 70 (69.61) for the 
different interest groups and lie within 1 to 3 units (on the 0-100 scale) or 1 to 4% of the Nash 
optimum. 
There are no marked effects in the results when changing the number of scenarios retained for 
further consideration (C), when we revise the Foreground Set. Different Foreground Set sizes on the 
whole also tend to play no major role in determining the best solution. We do, however, find that 
when there is a Foreground Set of size 7 policy alternatives, both the probability of selecting the 
Nash optimum and, more so, the average ranking of the solution tends to worsen. This deterioration · 
can be seen when we compare these two statistics for the other Foreground Set sizes used in the 
study. 
ELECTRE I + Minranksum (table 4A.6) 
This combination of MCDM approaches produces a solution that has an average size of 1.25 policy 
alternatives. There is on average a 57% chance of selecting the Nash optimum as part of the 
solution set and the scenarios in the set will have an average ranking equal to 2.60. The rural 
communities interest group is favoured by the solution produced by this combination of methods, 
with an average solution utility value of 71.02. This one can compare to the remaining interest 
groups that have average utility values of 60.53, 61.54 and 62.71. The average utility values for the 
compromise solution tend to lie within 1 to 5 units (on the 0-100 scale) or 1 to 8% 9f the Nash 
optimum. 
It is noted that the Foreground Set of size 6 and a partial rank cut off value (C) of 3, produces a 
solution that has a probability of including the Nash optimum in the solution set equal to 73%. This 
is a markedly higher probability than all the other Foreground Set sizes or partial rank cut off 
values. There are no other noticeable effects reflected in the results when either changing the 
Foreground Set size or the partial rank cut_off values (C). 
ELECTRE I+ Max/Min (table 4A.7) 
For this combination of methods, the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as the solution is 
on average 61 %, where this solution tends to be a single policy scenario. This scenario has an 
average ranking of 1.77. The forestry interest group appears to be disadvantaged by the solution 
produced for this combination of methods, with an average solution utility value of only 57.17. This 
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compares to the remaining interest groups that have average solution utility values of 62.13, 68.14 
and 66.87. These average utilities for the compromise solution lie within 1 to 5 units (on the 0-100 
scale) or 2 to 8% of the Nash optimum. 
There are no noticeable effects in the results when changing the partial rank cut off value (C), but 
we do see that the probability of selecting the Nash optimum tends to increase when larger 
Foreground Set sizes are used. 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis focused on perturbing firstly, the interest thermometer scores, followed by 
perturbing the concordance weights assigned to the interest groups. These were then combined so 
that both sources of error could be investigated simultaneously, in a particular simulation run. 
We have previously stated at the end of section 4.1, that the sensitivity runs were conducted on the 
different combinations of MCDM methods using Foreground Sets of size 7 scenarios only. The 
results for these sensitivity runs are tabulated in appendix 4B at the end of this chapter, and will 
therefore be obtained by using Foreground Sets consisting of 7 policy scenarios only. We will again 
accompany the description of these results with a reference (in the heading of the description) to 
the table number in appendix 4B to which it refers. 
4.3.1 Perturbing the Interest Thermometer Scores 
Maxscoresum(u) + Maxscoresum(u) (table ~B.1) 
For K = 3, there appears to be some deterioration of the results when compared to those 
corresponding to them in table 4A.1. This is reflected mainly in the deterioration of the 
probability of selecting the Nash optimum when a changes in value from 5 (0.69) to 10 
(0.59). For K = 4, the probability of selecting the Nash optimum worsens even more when 
a changes from 5 (0.72) to 10 (0.48). 
We also find that the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 8 
units (on the 0-100 scale) or 4 to 12% of the Nash optimum. This is more than the 2 to 5% 
recorded for the unperturbed results in table 4A.l, and would seem to suggest that this 
combination of methods is not robust when there is a large form of precision error made 
on the interest thermometer scores. 
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Minranksum(u) + Minranksum(u) (table 4B.2) 
There are no changes of note in these results (i.e. deteriorating outcomes) when compared 
to the corresponding results obtained in table 4A.2. This combination of MCDM methods 
therefore appears to be robust to precision errors being made on the interest thermometer 
scores. 
Max/Min(u) + Max/Min(u) (table 4B.3) 
There is no marked deterioration in these results when the scores are perturbed (compared 
to the corresponding results in table 4A.3), and this combination of methods is therefore 
seemingly robust to errors being made on the thermometer scores. 
ELECTRE l(u) + ELECTRE l(u) (table 4B.4) 
The probability of selecting the Nash optimum and the average ranking of the scenarios in 
the solution set, deteriorated noticeably (for o = 10) when compared to the unperturbed set 
of results in table 4A.4. This deterioration is visible for both C = 2 and 3. Original figures 
for these statistics were (from table 4A.4) for C = 2: 0.7 and 3.98 respectively and for C 
= 3: 0.71 and 3.73 respectively. 
We also find that the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 2 to 13 
units (on the 0-100 scale) or 3 to 19% of Nash. This is more than the 3 to 12% recorded 
for the unperturbed results in table 4A.4, and would seem to lend weight to the suggestion 
that this combination of MCDM methods is not robust to precision errors being made on 
the interest thermometer scores. 
ELECTRE l(u) + Maxscoresum(u) (table 4B.5) 
There is a noticeable decrease in the probability of selecting the Nash optimum for o = 10 
(for C = 3), when these results are compared to the unperturbed results in table 4A.5. The 
utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 2 to 5 units (on the 0-100 
scale) or 3 to 8% of the Nash optimum. This compares favourably with the 1 to 4% 
recorded for the unperturbed results in table 4A.5. Based on these results, we can therefore 
not conclude with any certainty as to whether or not this combination of MCDM methods 
is robust to precision errors being made on the thermometer scores. 
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ELECTRE l(u) + Minranksum(u) (table 4B.6) 
The results shown in this table indicate that no marked deterioration of the compromise 
solution has occurred when compared to the unperturbed results of table 4A.6. This, 
however, only applies to the probability of selecting the Nash optimum and the average 
ranking of solution set alternatives. 
The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 2 to 10 units (on the 0-100 
scale) or 3 to 15% of the Nash optimum. This is noticeably more than the 1 to 8% recorded 
for the unperturbed results in table 4A.6. Based on these results, we can therefore conclude 
that this combination of MCDM methods is not robust to precision errors being made on 
the thermometer scores. 
ELECTRE l(u) + Max/Min(u) (table 4B.7) 
There are noticeable changes that result when the thermometer scores are perturbed for this 
combination of methods. These changes are visible when one looks at the probability of 
selecting the Nash optimum as well as the average ranking of the solution policy scenario. 
Both changes that have occurred constitute a deterioration of the results and this happens 
when a = 10 for C = 2 and a = 5 for C = 3. 
The utility values for the compromise solution lie within 3 to 10 units (on the 0-100 scale) 
of the Nash optimum, compared to 1 to 5 units for the unperturbed results. Therefore, when 
compared to the unperturbed results of table 4A.7, we find that this combination of MCDM 
methods does not seem to be robust to certain levels of error being made on the interest 
thermometer scores. 
4.3.2 Perturbing the Concordance Weights 
The second part of the sensitivity analysis looked at perturbing the concordance weights, 
used in the ELECTRE I method, that were assigned to each interest group. 
ELECTRE l(a) + ELECTRE l(a) (table 4B.8) 
For C = 2, there is a change in the average ranking of the solution set scenarios from the 
first level of a introduced. The unperturbed value for this statistic was 3.98 in table 4A.4, 
and we see that at level a = 0.05 it already has a value of 4.99, later deteriorating to a value 
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. of 6.11 for a = 0.40. There is also a deterioration of the probability to selecting the Nash 
optimum, where the unperturbed probability was 0.7 in table 4A.4. 
However, for C = 3 these effects are less noticeable. The average ranking of the solution 
set scenarios do, however, worsen markedly when a reaches the level of 0.15. This 
combination of MCDM methods therefore provides one with a signal representing a 
complex interaction. The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 5 to 
13 units (on the 0-100 scale) or 7 to 19% of the Nash optimum. This is considerably more 
than the 3 to 12% recorded in table 4A.4. We can therefore conclude that the evidence 
provided does seem to indicate that this combination of methods is not robust to 
proportional errors being made on the concordance weights. 
ELECTRE l(a) + Maxscoresum (table 4B.9) 
The proportional errors that were simulated for the concordance weights do not appear to 
affect these results negatively when they are compared to the unperturbed results provided 
in table 4A.5. The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 6 units 
(on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum, compared to the 1 to 3 units for the unperturbed 
results. Therefore, this combination of MCDM methods seems to be robust to any errors 
being made on the concordance weights. 
ELECTRE l(a) + Minranksum (table 4B.10) 
The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 2 to 10 units (on the 0-100 
scale) or 3 to 15% of the Nash optimum. This is noticeably more than the 1 to 8% recorded 
for the unperturbed results in table 4A.6. Therefore, this combination of MCDM methods 
seems not to be robust to any errors being made on the concordance weights. 
ELECTRE l(a) +Max/Min (table 4B.11) 
There appears to be no marked deterioration in these results when compared to those 
obtained for the unperturbed simulation runs in table 4A.7. The utility values for the 
compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 7 units (on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash 
optimum, compared to the 1 to 5 units for the unperturbed results. Therefore, this 
combination of MCDM methods seems to be robust to proportional errors being made on 
the concordance weights. 
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4.3.3 Perturbing both the Interest Thermometer Scores and the Concordance 
Weights 
The final part of the sensitivity analysis consisted of combining the precision errors on the 
thermometer scores with the proportional errors on the concordance weights, in a single 
simulation run. The key issue we wanted to address by doing this, is to find out whether 
these effects appear to be simply additive or whether there is in fact evidence of some form 
of interaction between the two sources of error. 
ELECTRE l(a)(u) + ELECTRE l(a)(u) (table 4B.12) 
This combination of MCDM methods did not appear to be robust when previously exposed 
to both precision and proportional errors in separate sensitivity runs. The results shown in 
this table indicate that there is some evidence of an additive effect when the combination 
of methods is exposed simultaneously to both sources of error. When we look at the average 
ranking of the scenarios in the solution set in particular, there is an indication that this 
combination of MCDM methods is not robust when exposed to both sources of error 
simultaneously. This is further supported by the utility values of the compromise solution. 
In this set of runs they tend to lie within 9 to 27% of the Nash optimum, compared to the 
3 to 12% for the unperturbed simulation runs in table 4A.4. 
ELECTRE l(a)(u) + Maxscoresum(u) (table 4B.13) 
For the previous sensitivity tests, this combination of methods seemed to be robust when 
tested on proportional errors made on the concordance weights, but it was not clear as to 
whether or not this combination was robust wpen tested separately on the precision errors 
made on the thermometer scores. We now find, after combining these two sources of error 
in the same sensitivity runs, that for C = 2, the results worsen when looking at the 
probability of selecting the Nash optimum in particular. However, for C = 3, the results do 
not appear to be much different from those obtained in the previous two (separate) 
sensitivity tests! This combination of MCDM methods therefore provides one with evidence 
of some form of interaction between the two sources of error when they are combined in 
the same set of sensitivity runs. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 11 % of 
the Nash optimum, compared to the 1 to 4% for the unperturbed results in table 4A.5. 
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Based on these results, we therefore cannot be sure whether or not this combination is 
robust when exposed to both sources of error simultaneously. 
ELECTRE l(a)(u) + Minranksum(u) (table 4B.14) 
This combination of MCDM methods seemed not to be robust in both previous sets of 
sensitivity runs when they were conducted in separate simulation runs. After combining 
these two sources of error in the same sensitivity runs, we find that for C = 2, there is a 
deterioration of the results for both the probability of selecting the Nash optimum and the 
average ranking of the policy scenarios in the solution set. However, for C = 3, there 
appears to in fact be an improvement in these results when compared to the unperturbed 
results obtained from table 4A.6. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 1 to 7 units 
(on the 0-100 scale) or 2 to 11 % of the Nash optimum. This compares favourably with the 
1 to 8% recorded for the unperturbed results. There appears to be some form of interaction 
between these two sources of error and based on this evidence, we therefore cannot be sure 
whether or not this combination of methods is robust when exposed to both sources of error 
simultaneously. 
ELECTRE I(a)(u) + Max/Min(u) (table 4B.15) 
This combination of MCDM methods seemed to be robust when subjected to proportional 
errors made on the concordance weights, but not robust when subjected to precision errors 
made on the interest thermometer scores (when previously tested in separate sensitivity 
runs). We now see that the results shown in t~is table are definitely worse than the results 
obtained when this combination of methods was exposed to both sources of error in separate 
sensitivity runs. This is the case for both C = 2 and 3 and is reflected when looking at both 
the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as well as the average ranking of the solution. 
The effects of these two sources of error appears to be additive and this combination of 
MCDM methods is therefore not robust when exposed to both sources of error in the same 
sensitivity runs. This is further supported by the utility values of the compromise solution. 
In this set of runs they tend to lie within 2 to 19% of the Nash optimum, compared to the 
2 to 8% for the unperturbed simulation runs in table 4A.7. 
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4.4 Overall Conclusions for the Analysis on this Data Set 
In table 4.1 on the following page, we provide the summarized findings of the evaluation of the 
various combinations of MCDM methods, as previously discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3. This table 
provides information for the various combinations concerning: (i) the combination's performance 
measure or quality of the solution produced, (ii) whether or not the combination is affected by the 
size of the Foreground Set and K or C, and (iii) how robust the method is when exposed to the two 
forms of error as implemented by the sensitivity analysis. 
The overall conclusions that can be drawn from our findings are the following: 
(i) From the point of view of quality of solution that the combination of methods produce, we 
would definitely recommend the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum and the ELECTRE I + 
Maxscoresum MCDM approaches. We would possibly also recommend the Max/Min + 
Max/Min and ELECTRE I + Max/Min approaches. The ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I method 
fared rather poorly when ranking the solution set scenarios produced, and we therefore 
hesitate to recommend this combination of methods without further investigating why this 
has occurred. 
(ii) From the point of view of robustness of the combination of methods, we would definitely 
recommend the Max/Min+ Max/Min MCDM approach, and possibly also the Minranksum 
+ Minranksum, ELECTRE I + Maxscoresum and Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum approaches. 
The latter combination would be recommended because it was not robust for only very large 
precision errors being made on the thermome~er scores. 
(iii) On the whole, there does not appear to be a preferred Foreground Set size or preferred 
values for K or C according to the results obtained. 
(iv) Therefore from an overall point of view (combining mainly criteria (i) and (ii) above) we 
would tend to favour the Max/Min+ Max/Min and Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum MCDM 
approaches. However, the reason why the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum approach failed 
to be robust for large forms of precision error being made on the thermometer scores, needs 
further investigation. 
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 Combination or Methods 
Maxscoresum 
+ 
Maxscoresum 
Mlnranksum 
+ 
Mlnranksum 
Max/Min 
+ 
Max/Min 
ELECTREI 
+ 
ELECTREI 
ELECTREI 
+ 
Maxscoresum 
ELECTREI 
+ 
Mlnranksum 
ELECTREI 
+ 
Max/Min 
TABLE 4.1: Summary of Results: Data Set No. 1 
Combination Performance as Measured by: Results for Combination How Robust Is the Combination when Exposed to: Affected by: 
' 
Probablllty of Average Ranking or Precision Error Proportional Error Precision and 
Selecting the Nash Foreground Kore (thermometer (concordance Proportional Solution Set Scenarios Set Size Optimum scores) weights) Error 
72% 1.86 yes no not robust n/a n/a 
56% 3.13 no no robust n/a n/a 
61% 1.72 no no robust n/a n/a 
72% 3.70 no yes not robust not robust not robust 
71% 1.79 inconclusive no not clear robust not clear 
57% 2.60 inconclusive inconclusive not robust not robust not clear 
61% 1.77 yes no not robust robust not robust 
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It must be noted that at this stage of the study, we have only analyzed the results obtained from the 
first data set. Our recommendations will possibly change once we have analyzed the results obtained 
from the second randomly generated data set. These results are analyzed in the following chapter. 
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APPENDIX 4A: THE DETAILED RESULTS OF THE VARIO US MCDM APPROACHES 
FOR THE FIRST DATA SET 
In this appendix we provide the detailed tabulated outcomes of the various MCDM approaches as 
these combinations of methods were applied to the first data set. The tables listed below have 
column headings that are too long to be given in full. Therefore, the columns are headed by 
shortened descriptions. Their full descriptions are given below and they apply to all the tables in 
this, and subsequent appendices. 
Foregr. Set: The size (number of policy scenarios, t) of the Foreground Set. 
K: The number of policy scenarios that will be eliminated from the Foreground Set 
before revising this set. 
C: It is applicable whenever the ELECTRE I method was used. Scenarios with a 
partial ranking less than or equal to C assigned to them would be retained for 
further consideration, whilst the remaining ones would be eliminated when revising 
the Foreground Set. 
The statistics that are kept relating to the Nash optimum solution are the following: 
1. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups and their associated Standard Deviations: 
These utility values are the averages taken over all Foreground Set sizes and their respective values 
of K or C (relating to the Nash solution), for a partic~lar combination of MCDM methods (i.e. for 
a particular table of results). At the top of each table we therefore have the mean utility values for 
each of the four interest groups (their order being: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and 
conservation), together with their associated standard deviations. The initial values used to obtain 
the mean utility values of the Nash optimum solution, are taken from the population consisting of 
100 iterations, where an iteration is described by the simulation algorithm summarized in figure 3.1 
of chapter 3. The initial utility value used to calculate the mean shown at the top of each table, is 
therefore also an average that has been calculated for the 100 iterations of a particular simulation 
run. In each iteration we will therefore have a unique set of utility values that have been generated 
for each relevant attribute of a particular interest group. 
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The statistics that are kept relating to the best compromise solution are the following: 
2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups and their associated Standard Deviations: 
The population that was used to calculate these mean utility values for each of the four interest 
groups, again consists of 100 iterations (i.e. one simulation run), where a single iteration is described 
by the simulation algorithm summarized in figure 3.1 of chapter 3. For these statistics, the utility 
values are calculated for the best compromise solution in each iteration of a particular simulation 
run. 
Probability or Prob.: The probability of selecting the Nash optimum as the best solution (i.e. 
telling us how often the Nash optimum is an element of the final solution 
set). This probability is calculated for 100 iterations of a particular 
simulation run. 
Average Rank: 
Solo. Set Size: 
Average: 
The average ranking of the best solution or elements of this solution set, 
where the ranking takes place according to the Nash value associated with 
the policy scenario(s). The average is calculated for 100 iterations of a 
particular simulation run. 
The average size of the best solution set of policy scenarios. This average 
is calculated for 100 iterations of a particular simulation run. 
The average column values (i.e. the mean utility values for the (4) interest 
groups, the probability of sel~cting the Nash optimum, etc.) for the best 
compromise solution. This average is calculated for all Foreground Set sizes 
and their respective values of Kor C. The average utility values of the four 
interest groups calculated for the best compromise solution here, therefore 
corresponds to the average utility values of the Nash optimum solution 
shown at the top of each table. 
The tables for the various combinations of MCDM methods are given below. 
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TABLE 4A.1: Results of Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
60.83 2.2 67.30 2.9 67.52 2.9 67.16 2.9 
Foregr. K Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Rank Set Size 
; 
5 2 0.69 2.1 1 59.27 2.1 63.41 2.7 72.09 3.3 65.54 2.8 
5 3 0.67 1.74 1 62.38 2.4 64.41 2.8 69.92 3.1 66.87 2.9 
6 2 0.68 1.89 1 60.95 2.3 64.67 2.7 71.58 3.3 65.75 2.9 
6 3 0.59 2.14 1 61.19 2.3 65.42 2.9 67.32 2.9 64.02 2.7 
6 4 0.68 2 1 61.44 2.3 65.68 2.8 67.25 2.9 66.18 2.9 
7 2 0.74 1.99 1 62.97 2.5 65.98 2.9 70.16 3.2 64.26 2.7 
7 3 0.68 2.49 1 63.41 2.6 68.56 3.1 68.28 3.0 61.75 2.5 
7 4 0.74 1.73 1 62.22 2.4 64.63 2.7 68.77 3.0 65.95 2.8 
7 5 0.73 1.74 1 63.45 2.5 68.58 3.1 67.29 2.8 63.57 2.6 
8 2 0.73 2.06 1 63.31 2.5 69.53 3.2 68.71 3.0 63.04 2.6 
8 3 0.77 1.55 1 61.96 2.4 67.63 3.0 67.95 2.9 65.03 2.7 
8 4 0.68 2.15 1 63.25 2.5 65.33 2.8 69.36 3.1 65.03 2.8 
8 5 0.7 2.04 1 63.45 2.6 67.4 3.0 69.02 3.0 63.22 2.6 
8 6 0.71 1.91 1 64.29 2.6 64.13 2.8 71.08 3.2 62.48 2.6 
9 2 0.82 1.52 1 62.87 2.5 69.24 3.1 68.56 3.0 63.38 2.6 
9 3 0.77 1.4 1 60.47 2.2 67.26 3.0 69.61 3.1 68.17 3.0 
9 4 0.79 1.67 1 59.18 2.1 67.33 3.0 67.04 2.8 69.01 3.1 
9 5 0.76 1.79 1 63.26 2.5 68.98 3.1 67.06 2.9 64.43 2.7 
9 6 0.75 1.63 1 62.4 2.4 66.91 2.9 69.59 3.1 64.72 2.8 
9 7 0.74 1.72 1 62.64 2.5 68.11 3.0 68.25 3.0 64.07 2.7 
Average 0.72 1.86 1.00 62.22 2.4 66.66 2.9 68.94 3.0 64.82 2.8 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4A.2: Results of Minranksum + Minranksum Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utllity Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
60.97 2.2 67.03 2.9 67.42 2.9 66.44 2.8 
Foregr. K Probabllity Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Devladons: Combination or Methods Set Rank Set Size 
5 2 0.62 2.71 1.43 59.66 2.1 62.59 2.6 69.82 3.1 64.58 2.7 
5 3 0.67 3.01 1.61 60.5 2.2 57.64 2.1 72.75 3.4 62.03 2.4 
6 2 0.61 3.17 1.45 62.71 2.5 63.59 2.6 70.72 3.2 58.38 2.2 
6 3 0.59 2.82 1.34 62.49 2.4 58 2.2 72.19 3.3 62.12 2.5 
6 4 0.55 2.63 1.19 58.52 2.1 62.96 2.6 69.05 3.0 65.79 2.9 
7 2 0.57 2.92 1.41 63.95 2.6 58.81 2.3 71.15 3.3 60.06 2.2 
7 3 0.58 2.97 1.41 63.17 2.5 64.28 2.7 68.17 3.0 59.22 2.2 
7 4 0.54 3.15 1.28 61.25 2.4 64.81 2.8 69.53 3.1 61.67 2.5 
7 5 0.43 3.93 1.34 65.56 2.7 61.63 2.6 66.51 2.9 56.25 1.9 
8 2 0.6 2.69 1.27 64.02 2.6 60.39 2.4 71.88 3.4 61.63 2.5 
8 3 0.59 2.53 1.22 61.14 2.4 63.98 2.7 70.53 3.2 63.44 2.6 
8 4 0.57 3.58 1.31 64.67 2.6 67.5 3.0 66 2.8 59.97 2.4 
8 5 0.5 3.50 1.3 65.3 2.7 63.82 2.8 66.19 2.9 58.03 2.1 
8 6 0.58 3.28 1.38 61.22 2.3 62.14 2.6 68.41 3.0 61.4 2.5 
9 2 0.6 2.79 1.24 64.32 2.6 67.04 3.0 67.75 2.9 59.85 2.3 
9 3 0.6 3.31 1.31 64.1 2.6 63.96 27 67.79 3.0 59.16 2.2 
9 4 0.52 3.54 1.3 64.47 2.6 65.68 2.9 67.29 2.9 58.02 2.2 
9 5 0.43 3.27 1.28 65.43 2.7 60.88 2.6 66.86 2.9 59.53 2.3 
9 6 0.47 3.73 1.28 65.08 2.7 62.64 2.7 68.3 3.0 56.99 2.1 
9 7 0.54 3.01 1.26 63.16 2.5 61.9 2.6 67.23 2.9 63.25 2.7 
Average 0.56 3.13 1.33 63.04 2.5 62.71 2.6 68.91 3.1 60.57 2.4 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4A.3: Results of Max/Min+ Max/Min Simulation Runs 
I. Mean Utlllty Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
61.12 2.3 67.14 2.9 67.94 2.9 66.45 2.8 
Foregr. K Probablllty Average Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Set Rank Set Size 
5 2 0.5 1.84 1 55.33 1.7 61.23 2.3 68.81 3.0 65.61 2.7 
5 3 0.51 1.93 1 57.27 1.9 59.16 2.2 68.63 3.0 67.57 2.9 
6 2 0.59 1.7 1 59.12 2.1 65.3 2.7 67.25 2.8 64.41 2.6 
6 3 0.7 1.59 1 60.96 2.2 63.86 2.6 67.98 2.9 64.36 2.6 
6 4 0.57 1.95 1 59.84 2.1 57.81 2.1 69.03 3.0 67.83 2.9 
7 2 0.68 1.61 1 60.47 2.1 63.8 2.6 67.16 2.8 65.6 2.7 
7 3 0.59 1.75 1 56.79 1.8 64.76 2.7 66.47 2.8 66.3 2.8 
7 4 0.52 1.82 1 59.83 2.1 61.79 2.4 64.24 2.5 65.56 2.7 
7 5 0.63 1.64 1 61.28 2.3 60.31 2.3 67.86 2.9 66.89 2.8 
8 2 0.65 1.64 1 55.41 1.7 63.05 2.5 65.04 2.6 71.83 3.3 
8 3 0.67 1.71 1 56.79 1.8 62.84 2.5 65.23 2.7 69.11 3.0 
8 4 0.67 1.53 1 62.45 2.4 61.4 2.4 67.07 2.8 65.75 2.7 
8 5 0.57 1.73 1 60.95 2.2 60.88 2.3 64.77 2.6 63.5 2.5 
8 6 0.62 1.73 1 59.17 2.0 63.45 2.5 65.95 2.7 66.75 2.8 
9 2 0.61 1.76 1 55.4 1.7 64.46 2.6 65.06 2.6 70.82 3.2 
9 3 0.56 1.83 1 55.88 1.7 63.35 2.5 64.08 2.5 69.42 3.1 
9 4 0.62 1.6 1 58.78 2.0 64.94 2.7 63.99 2.5 67.25 2.9 
9 5 0.61 1.67 1 61.02 2.2 61.32 2.4 66.66 2.8 65.26 2.7 
9 6 0.61 1.83 1 57.43 1.9 61.7 2.4 64.7 2.6 69.01 3.1 
9 7 0.62 1.56 1 55.98 1.7 63.56 2.6 67.41 2.8 70.47 3.2 
Average 0.61 1.72 1.00 58.51 2.0 62.45 2.5 66.37 2.7 67.17 2.9 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4A.4: Results of ELECTRE I+ ELECTRE I Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
60.61 2.2 66.92 2.9 67.30 2.8 66.36 2.8 
Foregr. c Probablllty Average Solo. 2. Mean Utlllty Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Set Rank Set Size 
5 2 0.72 3.86 2.1 54.52 1.6 52.21 1.5 73.79 3.5 67.15 2.8 
5 3 0.82 4.24 1.91 48.73 1.1 56.65 1.9 69.88 3.1 72.98 3.4 
6 2 0.73 3.63 2.19 58 2.0 55.85 1.9 70.83 3.2 63.96 2.6 
6 3 0.81 3.38 2.1 55.54 1.7 52.96 1.5 73.45 3.4 65.69 2.7 
. 
7 2 0.7 3.98 2.01 60.81 2.2 62.06 2.4 66.51 2.8 60.93 2.3 
7 3 0.71 3.73 2.04 58.77 2.0 56.37 1.9 71.19 3.2 60.97 2.3 
8 3 0.62 4.04 1.98 61.66 2.3 60.12 2.3 68.83 3.0 59.3 2.2 
8 4 0.71 3.18 1.84 61.33 2.3 63.74 2.6 68.07 2.9 60.25 2.2 
9 3 0.69 3.83 2.14 62.64 2.4 66.08 2.8 63.53 2.5 60.17 2.2 
" 
4 (J, 701 us 1.t 11-,.2, :;: . .f 64,Q!t 2.6 61.1, :u cU.111 i.4 
Average 0.72 3.70 2.01 58.53 2.0 59.01 2.1 69.18 3.0 63.31 2.5 
• in the order: forestry, inigation, nual communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4A.S: Results of ELECTRE I + Maxscoresum Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
60.61 2.2 66.92 2.9 67.30 2.8 66.36 2.8 
Foregr. c Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Rank Set Size 
5 2 0.75 1.54 1 59.69 2.1 63.92 2.7 71.5 3.3 66.85 2.8 
5 3 0.75 1.83 1 55.03 1.7 68.97 3.1 67.85 . 2.9 70.36 3.2 
6 2 0.67 1.91 1 60.15 2.2 64.1 2.7 69.41 3.1 66.53 2.8 
6 3 0.76 1.45 1 60.37 2.2 ~.1 2.8 70.38 3.2 65.01 2.7 
. 
7 2 0.6 2 1 60.47 2.3 66.05 2.9 70.24 3.2 64.44 2.7 
7 3 0.64 2.26 1 60.78 2.3 65.61 2.8 70.36 3.2 61.12 2.4 
8 3 0.7 2.2 1 61.42 2.4 . 68.77 3.1 68.45 3.0 62.85 2.6 
8 4 0.73 1.55 1 62.71 2.5 67.45 3.0 69.43 3.0 61.86 2.4 
9 3 0.74 1.45 1 61.09 2.3 64.56 2.8 69.47 3.1 66.04 2.8 
9 4 0.74 1.74 1 62.68 2.S 66.51 2.9 ~.97 3.0 65 z.1 
.. 
Average 0.71 1.79 1.00 60.44 2.3 66.10 2.9 69.61 3.1 65.01 2.7 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4A.6: Results of ELECTRE I+ Minranksum Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Devladons: Nash Solution 
60.61 2.2 66.92. 2.9 67.30 2.8 66.36 2.8 
Foregr. c Probability Average Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Devladons: Combination or Methods Set Rank Set Size 
5 2 0.61 2.32 1.27 57.51 1.9 60.28 2.4 73.03 3.4 65.83 2.8 
5 3 0.66 2.15 1.19 52.02 1.4 69.18 3.1 66.89 2.8 71.6 3.3 
6 2 0.58 2.16 1.33 61.99 2.4 58.89 2.2 71.83 3.3 63.02 2.5 
6 3 0.73 2.05 1.31 57.81 2.0 63.05 2.5 70.64 3.2 65.67 2.7 
. 
7 2 0.54 2.78 1.29 61.71 24 58.73 2.3 72.91 3.4 62.27 2.5 
7 3 0.43 3.33 1.34 60.62 2.3 54.86 1.9 72.82 3.4 60.18 2.3 
8 3 0.5 3.21 1.23 62.02 2.4 61.14 2.5 71.88 3.3 59.44 2.3 
8 4 0.53 2.68 1.2 63.1 2.5 65.34 2.8 69.76 3.1 58.47 2.2 
9 s 0,.55 2.117 Ut e$.~ :i.e ft,81 jl,(I 71).17 s.:i ff,lltl jl.J 
9 4 0 . .56 2.44 1.16 64.61 2.6 62.14 2.6 70.31 3.2 60.77 2.4 
Average 0.51 2.60 1.2S 60.53 2.3 61.54 2.5 71.02 3.2 62.71 2.5 
• in the order: forestry, lnigation, nual communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4A.7: Results of ELECTRE I+ Max/Min Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
60.61 2.2 66.92 2.9 67.30 2.8 66.36 2.8 
Foregr. c Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Rank Set Size 
5 2 0.44 2.22 1 52.5 1.4 61.78 2.4 69.68 3.1 70.28 3.2 
5 3 0.5 1.96 1 50.81 1.2 63.26 2.5 65.96 2.7 73.43 3.4 
6 2 0.55 1.95 1 57.55 1.9 59.4 2.3 70.11 3.1 65.67 2.7 
6 3 0.65 1.73 1 55.85 1.7 61.59 2.4 69.77 3.1 67.84 2.9 
7 2 0.58 1.78 1 59.17 2.1 63.33 2.6 67.5 2.9 64.77 2.7 
7 3 0.65 1.84 1 58.81 2.0 57.37 2.0 70.88 3.2 64.22 2.6 
8 3 0.64 1.52 1 59.34 2.1 64.25 2.6 65.46 2.7 65.32 2.7 
8 4 0.68 1.57 1 57.83 1.9 63.77 2.6 67.48 2.8 65.65 2.7 
9 3 0.7 1.56 1 59.95 2.1 62.32 2.5 67.56 2.9 66.26 2.8 
9 4 0.66 1.58 1 59.89 2.1 64.22 2.6 66.95 2.8 65.21 2.7 
Average 0.61 1.77 1.00 57.17 1.9 62.13 2.5 68.14 2.9 66.87 2.8 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
-----------------------------
V) 
00 
$ 
I>< ;a 
c 
a) 
~ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
APPENDIX 4B: THE DETAILED RESULTS OF THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
CONDUCTED ON THE VARIOUS MCDMAPPROACHES FOR THE FIRST DATA 
SET 
In this appendix we provide the detailed tabulated outcomes of the sensitivity analysis conducted 
on the various MCDM approaches for the first data set. The tables listed below have column 
headings that consist of shortened descriptions. Their full descriptions are provided at the beginning 
of appendix 4A. The explanation of the symbols a and a has also previously been provided in 
section 4.1 of this chapter. 
The tables for the sensitivity analysis conducted on the various combinations of MCDM methods 
are listed on the next few pages. 
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TABLE 4B.1: Results of Maxscoresum(u) + Maxscoresum(u) Simulation Runs 
rn Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated, Standard DevlaUons: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
2 3 0.78 1.55 1 63 2.5 66.93 2.9 67.93 2.9 65.89 2.8 
5 3 0.69 2.21 1 63.09 2.5 68.45 3.1 69.27 3.0 60.29 2.4 
10 3 0.59 2.22 1 60.23 2.2 61.83 2.5 70 3.1 65.78 2.8 
2 4 0.65 1.89 1 63.92 2.6 66.92 3.0 68.12 3.0 62.75 2.6 
5 .. 0.'72 2.0'7 1 6'-88 2.15 155,'71 2.9 61.86 u 63.41 2.6 
10 4 0.48 2.88 1 63.89 2.5 63.71 2.8 . 67.89 3.0 59.65 2.3 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rwal communities and conservation 
TABLE 4B.2: Results of Minranksum(u) + Minranksum(u) Simulation Runs 
rn Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard DevlaUons: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
2 3 0.58 2.73 1.44 63.29 2.5 60.06 2.4 71.39 3.3 59.26 2.1 
5 3 0.55 3.49 1.41 62.3 2.4 61.72 2.6 69.34 3.1 60.2 2.3 
10 3 0.58 2.67 1.29 62.45 2.4 62.48 26 70.01 3.2 61.33 2.4 
2 4 0.57 3.13 1.28 64.02 2.6 61.83 2.5 67.34 6.9 59.69 2.2 
5 4 0.56 3.03 1.18 62.95 2.5 64.24 2.8 68.76 3.0 61.46 2.4 
10 4 051 3.11 1.18 59.44 2.2 63.04 2.7 69.48 3.1 63.02 2.6 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rwal communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4B.3: Results of Max/Min(u) + Max/Min(u) Simulation Runs 
rn Probablllty Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated, Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Rank Set Size 
2 3 0.64 1.53 1 57.47 1.9 63.77 2.6 66.03 2.7 66.24 2.8 
5 3 0.53 1.89 1 59.11 2.1 62.15 2.4 67.39 2.8 63.34 2.5 
10 3 0.65 1.75 1 57.64 1.9 62.97 2.5 65.3 2.6 66.49 2.8 
2 4 0.6 1.76 1 59.39 2.1 60.89 2.3 66.62 2.8 66.24 2.7 
s 4 0.55 1.89 1 .59.22 2.0 59.98 2.2 65.96 2.7 64.43 2.6 
10 4 0.53 2.12 1 56.83 1.8 60.52 2.3 . 66.81 2.8 66.29 2.8 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
TABLE 4B.4: Results of ELECTRE l(u) + ELECTRE l(u) Simulation Runs 
rn Probablllty Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Rank Set Size 
2 2 0.71 4.12 2.01 61.47 2.3 61.12 2.3 68.41 3.0 59.93 2.2 
5 2 0.64 4.34 1.75 59.4 2.1 61.14 2.4 68.65 3.0 62.04 2.5 
10 2 0.58 4.30 1.75 59.88 2.2 60.47 2.3 65.09 2.7 62.31 2.5 
2 3 0.75 3.34 1.86 61.69 2.3 59.72 2.2 69.53 3.1 62.51 2.4 
5 3 0.78 3.46 2.01 58.69 2.0 58.06 2.1 69.38 3.1 63.29 2.5 
10 3 0.62 4.36 2.11 58.64 2.0 53.91 1.7 72.03 3.3 60.69 2.3 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
--- --- --
00 
00 
r:Q 
'<:t' 
>< ~ 
0.. 
<-
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
TABLE 4B.5: Results of ELECTRE l(u) + Maxscoresum(u) Simulation Runs 
rn Probability Average Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their assoclated,Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
2 2 0.65 2.3 1 62.37 2.4 68.28 3.1 68.22 3.0 61.9 2.5 
.. 
5 2 0.62 2.62 1 62.14 2.4 67.78 3.0 67.92 2.9 63.72 2.7 
10 2 0.55 2.8 1 61.33 2.4 61.14 2.5 69.18 3.1 63.63 2.6 
2 3 0.76 1.66 1 61.27 2.3 64.67 2.8 70.42 3.2 67 2.9 
5 3 0.74 2.06 1 61.01 2.3 65.67 2.9 68.82 3.0 64.5 2.7 
10 3 0.54 2.17 1 62.16 2.4 61.54 2.5 70.44 3.2 61.83 2.5 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
TABLE 4B.6: Results of ELECTRE l(u) + Minranksum(u) Simulation Runs 
~ Probability Average Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
2 2 0.5 3.41 1.26 63.45 2.5 60.32 2.5 70.76 3.2 59.17 2.3 
5 2 0.56 3.67 1.36 59.83 2.2 62.35 2.6 69.72 3.1 63.06 2.6 
10 2 0.5 3.83 1.24 58.24 2.1 56.21 2.0 70.42 3.2 65.2 2.8 
2 3 0.63 2.32 1.22 60.78 2.2 59.01 2.3 72.11 3.4 66.16 2.8 
5 3 0.62 2.53 1.25 60.05 2.2 61.13 2.5 70.62 3.2 62.56 2.5 
10 3 0.44 3.27 1.29 59.94 2.2 57.06 2.1 71.11 3.2 61.91 2.5 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 48.7: Results of ELECTRE l(u) + Max/Min(u) Simulation Runs 
0 
O'I 
rn Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Rank Set Size 
2 2 0.63 1.74 1 61.55 2.3 
5 2 0.58 2.14 1 60.16 2.2 
10 2 0.49 2.35 1 58.52 2.0 
2 3 0.59 1.!!8 1 !!8.21 2.0 
5 3 0.48 2.17 1 55.67 1.7 
10 3 0.54 2.25 1 57.17 1.9 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
------------ - - - ----------- - --------- ----- - - - - ------------ -
63.95 2.6 66.59 
62.97 2.6 67.99 
57.12 2.0 67.54 
60.8 2.4 70.09 
59.15 2.3 68.07 
56.25 2.0 •70.85 
2.8 62.74 
2.9 63.59 
2.9 65.61 
3.1 68.17 
2.9 66.14 
3.2 65.11 
2.4 
2.6 
2.7 
3.0 
2.8 
2.7 
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TABLE 48.8: Results of ELECTRE l(a) + ELECTRE l(a) Simulation Runs 
rn Probability Average Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
0.05 2 0.65 4.99 2.71 57.72 1.9 55.2 1.8 68.51 3.0 60.26 2.2 
0.15 2 0.72 5.24 2.43 60.85 2.2 65.05 2.7 62.9 2.4 56.73 1.8 
; 
0.25 2 0.58 6.08 2.89 51.53 1.3 53.85 1.6 62.64 2.4 67.16 2.9 
0.40 2 0.59 6.11 2.69 51.27 1.3 53.63 1.6 63.05 2.4 67.7 3.0 
0.05 3 0.81 3.95 2.57 60.03 2.1 54.3 1.6 70.49 3.1 60.31 2.2 
0.15 3 0.87 4.16 2.6 62.39 2.3 54.41 1.6 71.38 3.2 58.69 2.0 
0.25 3 0.76 4.34 2.32 65.91 2.7 56.16 1.8 69.93 3.1 54.01 1.6 
0.40 3 0.76 4.42 2.6 58.45 2.0 59.28 2.2 67.99 2.9 60.58 2.2 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
TABLE 48.9: Results of ELECTRE l(a) + Maxscoresum Simulation Runs 
rn Probability Average Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups* and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
0.05 2 0.65 2.02 1 63.09 2.5 66.03 2.9 70.5 3.2 59.24 2.2 
0.15 2 0.77 1.9 1 62.01 2.4 68.1 3.1 69.84 3.1 62.61 2.5 
0.25 2 0.59 2.27 1 62.26 2.4 63.15 2.7 70.2 3.2 61.35 2.4 
0.40 2 0.65 2.12 1 61.38 2.3 63.43 2.7 69.15 3.1 63.67 2.7 
0.05 3 0.76 1.64 1 60.14 2.2 66.81 2.9 67.93 2.9 66.41 2.9 
0.15 3 0.83 1.6 1 63.44 2.5 66.45 2.9 69.79 3.1 64.97 2.8 
0.25 3 0.84 1.6 1 63.35 2.5 67.45 2.9 69.16 3.0 64.83 2.7 
0.40 3 0.76 1.43 1 61.21 2.3 68.31 3.0 69.57 3.1 64.23 2.6 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4B.10: Results of ELECTRE l(a) + Minranksum Simulation Runs 
rn Probablllty Average Solo. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
0.05 2 0.45 2.89 1.27 62.92 • 2.5 56.45 2.1 73.76 3.5 57.54 2.0 
0.15 2 0.64 3.11 1.42 61.17 2.3 63.31 2.7 71.16 3.2 59.78 2.3 
; 
0.25 2 0.48 2.79 1.31 61.12 2.3 59.53 2.3 70.6 3.2 61.16 2.4 
0.40 2 0.5 3.27 1.38 59.77 2.2 58.35 2.2 69.89 3.1 61.3 2.4 
0.05 3 0.69 2.38 1.34 61.49 2.3 63.48 2.7 69.79 3.1 62.1 2.5 
0.15 3 0.67 2.48 1.23 61.72 2.4 63.19 2.6 71.34 3.3 63.28 2.6 
0.2, 3 0.66 2.49 1.32 61.28 2,3 62.7!5 2.6 72.44 3.4 62.76 2.5 
0.40 3 0.65 2.60 1.35 60.91 2.3 64.81 2.8 70.89 3.2 61.93 2.4 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rwal communities and conservation 
TABLE 4B.11: Results of ELECTRE l(a) +Max/Min Simulation Runs 
~ Probab111ty Average Soln. 2. Mean Ut111ty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
0.05 2 0.6 1.79 1 59.7 2.1 61.39 2.5 70.48 3.2 60.44 2.2 
0.15 2 0.71 1.66 1 59.82 2.1 63.69 2.7 69.92 3.1 62.94 2.4 
0.25 2 0.45 2.28 1 57.93 2.0 59.85 2.3 66.86 2.8 64.08 2.6 
0.40 2 0.62 1.78 1 57.02 1.9 59.88 2.2 67.11 2.8 66.83 2.8 
0.05 3 0.59 1.78 1 56.84 1.8 60.85 2.3 69.23 3.0 65.86 2.8 
0.15 3 0.59 1.69 1 58.66 2.0 61.61 2.4 70.43 3.1 65.24 2.7 
0.25 3 0.67 1.68 1 59.34 2.1 61.43 2.3 70.44 3.1 66.75 2.8 
0.40 3 0.69 1.62 1 57.94 1.9 65.57 2.7 67.02 2.8 65.59 2.7 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4B.12: Results of ELECTRE l(a)(u) + ELECTRE l(a)(u) Simulation Runs 
I I I c I Prob. Average Soln. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their assoclate,d Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods a tT Rank Set Size 
0.4 10 2 0.47 7.15 2.76 43.25 1.5 48.4 1.03 61.7 2.3 77.22 3.8 
0.4 10 3 0.63 5.08 2.42 54.08 1.5 59.56 2.2 66.75 2.8 64.13 2.6 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
TABLE 4B.13: Results of ELECTRE l(a)(u) + Maxscoresum(u) Simulation Runs 
c Prob. Average Solo. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) lntere5t Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods a tT Rank Set Size 
0.4 10 2 0.52 2.5 1 58.53 2.1 59.73 2.3 68.62 3.0 67.6 3.0 
0.4 10 3 0.6 2.14 1 57.96 2.0 63.82 2.7 69.75 3.1 68.01 3.0 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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TABLE 4B.14: Results or ELECTRE l(a)(a) + Minranksum(a) Simulation Runs 
I a I u le I Prob. Average Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their assoclat~d Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
0.4 10 2 0.46 3.46 1.33 57.73 2 59.02 2.2 66.77 2.9 66.05 2.9 
0.4 10 3 0.59 2.55 1.33 57.99 2.0 59.77 2.3 70.63 3.2 66.99 2.9 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
TABLE 4B.1S: Results or ELECTRE l(a)(a) + Max/Min(a) Simulation Runs 
a u c Prob. Average Soln. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Rank Set Size 
0.4 10 2 0.46 2.76 1 54.2 1.6 53.76 1.7 68.39 3.0 71.09 3.3 
0.4 10 3 0.5 2.11 1 55.89 1.7 60.01 2.3 67.65 2.9 68.35 3.0 
• in the order: forestry, irrigation, rural communities and conservation 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND DATA SET 
5.1 Procedure for Implementing the MCDM methods 
We formulated the randomly generated data set in such a way that it would closely resemble the 
previously analyzed (or first) data set. Our main reason for doing this is that we wanted to test 
whether the results obtained from the first data set would be repeated in the randomly generated data 
set. Furthermore, we were also interested in obtaining any new results as well as exploring the 
effects that external factors have on the results produced by the various MCDM approaches. For the 
analysis on this data set, we started with p = 4 interest groups, m = 4 policy elements generated by 
means of the experimental design procedure described in section 3.3 of chapter 3, and n = 4 derived 
attributes generated from these policy elements. The effects on the compromise solution that result 
when we change these three external factors are reported in section 5.4, where we vary the values 
for p, m and n. 
In order to further simulate real life decision events, we also re-generated the 4 derived attributes 
from one iteration to the next. We previously described in section 3.3 of chapter 3, how we varied 
the attributes (forming the surrogate planning objectives for the various interest groups) from one 
iteration to the next for a particular simulation run. 
The MCDM methods were therefore employed at the labelled stages of the simulation algorithm 
(figure 3.1 of chapter 3), for a particular simulation run consisting of 100 iterations, in the 
combinations shown below. 
Stage 1 Method 
Maxscoresum 
Minranksum 
Max/Min 
ELECTRE I 
Stage 2 Method 
Maxscoresum 
Minranksum 
Max/Min 
ELECTRE I 
The efficiency of these MCDM methods would again be represented by the quality of the final 
solution produced by each combination of methods used. 
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In order to confinn some of the results obtained from the first data set, the sensitivity analysis was 
again conducted by looking at possible errors on the thennometer scores (for all methods) and the 
concordance weights (for the ELECTRE I method specifically) for the various MCDM approaches. 
When perturbing the interest thennometer scores, the MCDM methods were combined as shown 
below. 
Stage 1 Method 
Maxscoresum(cr) 
Minranksum( a) 
Max/Min( a) 
ELECTRE I(cr) 
Stage 2 Method 
Maxscoresum( a) 
Minranksum( a) 
Max/Min( a) 
ELECTRE l(cr) 
The symbol a (sigma), shown in brackets next to each method, was previously explained in section 
4.1 of chapter 4. We will provide the exact figures used for a when reporting the results of the 
simulation runs for the sensitivity analysis in appendix 5B at the end of this chapter. 
The second area of the sensitivity analysis was that of perturbing the concordance weights that were 
used in the ELECTRE I method. The ELECTRE I method was combined as follows: 
Stage 1 Method 
ELECTRE I( a) 
Stage 2 Method 
ELECTRE I( a) 
We will again the exact figures used for a (alpha), previously explained in section 4.1 of chapter 
4, in appendix 5B at the end of this chapter. 
In order to investigate any cumulative effects for the potential sources of error, we combined the 
area of perturbing concordance weight assignments with that of perturbing thennometer scores in 
one set of sensitivity runs. The manner in which the ELECTRE I .method was combined in order 
to complete this part of the sensitivity analysis is shown below. 
Stage 1 Method 
ELECTRE I(a)(cr) 
Chapter 5: Analysis of the Second Data Set 
Stage 2 Method 
ELECTRE I(a)(o) 
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We will again provide the exact figures used for a and a in appendix SB, at the end of this chapter. 
5.2 Results Produced by the MCDM Methods 
The results that provide the detailed outcome of the simulation runs conducted for the various 
MCDM approaches, are tabled in appendix SA at the end of this chapter. The description of these 
results for the particular combination of MCDM methods is given below, with each description 
again containing a reference (in its heading) to the table number in appendix SA to which it refers. 
When doing the analysis on this randomly generated data set, we found that the average utility 
values of the Nash solution did not favour any particular interest group and a fair spread of the 
utility values across all interests occurred. This was also the case for the average utility values of 
the compromise solution for all the combinations of MCDM methods. We also found that the Nash 
values for the Background Set scenarios were all more closely clustered when compared to the first 
data set. This was a result of the good spread of utility values that occurred for this data set. This 
would imply that the Nash optimum would have one or two other alternatives (ranked second and 
third best) that had Nash values very close to that of the Nash optimum, and that they were just as 
likely to be viewed as good "benchmark" alternatives. 
Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum (table SA.1) 
This combination of MCDM methods provides us with a probability of selecting the Nash optimum 
as our solution, that is on average equal to 63%, compared to 72% for the previous data set. This 
discrepancy is explained by the fact that the Nash values are more closely clustered for this data set, 
and the effect hereof was explained in the paragraph above. We will also find that this pattern in 
the results will be repeated for the remaining three combinations of methods. The solution consists 
of a single best policy scenario that has an average ranking equal to 3.51. Furthermore, the utility 
values of the respective interest groups for our best compromise solution, compare favourably to 
those of the Nash optimum (provided at the top of the table), which was used as a basis for 
comparison. The average utility values for the compromise solution (at the bottom of the table), tend 
to lie within 1 unit (on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum, and they also represent a good 
compromise solution to all groups, centring around 76 units in utility preference. 
There is no marked effect in the results when either changing the value for K, i.e. the number of 
scenarios discarded when revising the Foreground Set, or increasing the size of the Foreground Set. 
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Minranksum + Minranksum (table 5A.2) 
The probability of selecting the Nash optimum as an element of our solution set (consisting on 
average of 1.37 policy scenarios) is on average 59%. This compares to the figure of 56% obtained 
for the previous data set. The scenarios in our solution set have an average ranking of 4.17, whereas 
for the first data set we had an average ranking equal to 3.13. We also find that the average utility 
values for the best solution are on average marginally lower than those of the Nash solution, and 
tend to lie within 1 to 2 units (on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum. 
There are no noticeable effects in the results when changing either the size of the Foreground Set 
or the number of scenarios discarded (K) whilst revising the Foreground Set. 
Max/Min + Max/Min (table 5A.3) 
The solution produced by this combination of MCDM methods consists of a single policy scenario 
and there is on average a 47% probability of selecting the Nash optimum as this solution (compared 
to 61 % before). This policy scenario has an average ranking equal to 2.67, whereas for the previous 
data set it had an average ranking in table 4A.3 equal to 1.72. The average utility values for the four 
interest groups are spread evenly amongst these interests but are lower than the average utilities for 
the Nash optimum solution. The compromise solution has utilities fluctuating around 71 units whilst 
the Nash optimum has utilities around 76 units. 
There are also no noticeable effects in the results when changing either the size of the Foreground 
Set or the number of scenarios discarded (K) when revising the Foreground Set. 
ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I (table 5A.4) 
In a solution set that consists, on average, of 1.86 alternatives, we have a 68% chance of selecting 
the Nash optimum as an element of the set (72% was the probability for the previous data set). The 
scenarios in our solution tend to have an average ranking of 5.66, when we had an average ranking 
of 3.70 for the previous data set. We do find that the average utility values for the compromise 
solution are lower than those of ~he Nash solution. The latter has utilities fluctuating around 76 units 
whilst the values for the compromise solution tend to centre around 73 units. 
When considering the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as part of the solution set, one can 
see that, with the exception of a Foreground Set of size 9 this time (it was a set of size 7 before), 
this statistic increases as the value for C increases. In other words, by eliminating less or retaining 
more scenarios when revising the Foreground Set, the greater our chance becomes of including the 
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Nash optimum in our solution. There are no marked changes in the results when looking at the 
different sizes for the Foreground Sets. 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the sensitivity analysis we would first perturb the interest thermometer scores and follow this by 
perturbing the concordance weights assigned to the various interest groups. We would then combine 
both sources of error in the same set of simulation runs. 
It must be remembered that we conducted the sensitivity runs on the different combinations of 
methods using Foreground Sets of size 7 policy scenarios only. The results for these sensitivity runs 
are tabulated in appendix SB at the end of this chapter. We again include the table number reference 
(for the appendix SB) in the heading of the description of the results for each combination of 
methods. 
5.3.1 Perturbing the Interest Thermometer Scores 
Maxscoresum(u) + Maxscoresum(u) (table SB.1) 
For K = 3, there is a deterioration of the results when compared to the corresponding ones 
in table SA.1. This is seen mainly in a decrease of the probability of selecting the Nash 
optimum when a changes in value from 2 (0.61) to S (0.S). For K = 4, the probability of 
selecting the Nash optimum deteriorates more when a changes from S (0.63) to 10 (0.51). 
There is also a marked worsening of the results when one examines the average ranking of 
the solution and compare this to the results o~tained from table SA.l. 
We also find that the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 2 to 6 
units (on the 0-100 scale) or 3 to 8% of the Nash optimum. This is more than the 1 unit 
recorded for the unperturbed results in table SA.l, and would seem to suggest that this 
combination of MCDM methods is not robust when the interest thermometer scores are 
subjected to certain levels of precision error. We obtained a similar result from the previous 
data set. 
Minranksum(u) + Minranksum(u) (table 5B.2) 
There are marked changes in these results when compared to the unperturbed results 
obtained in table SA.2. These changes, especially amplified when K = 4 and a = 10, occur 
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for both the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as well as the average ranking of 
scenarios in the solution set. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 8 units 
(on the 0-100 scale) or 4 to 11 % of the Nash optimum. This is more than the 1 to 2 units 
recorded for the unperturbed results in table 5A.2, and this combination of MCDM methods 
is therefore not robust to precision errors being made on interest thermometer scores. We 
did not obtain the same result for the analysis conducted on the previous data set. 
Max/\\1in(u) + Max/Min(u) (table 5B.3) 
There were noticeable changes in the results when the thermometer scores were perturbed, 
compared to the unperturbed results in table 5A.3. The deterioration of the results are visible 
when looking at the probability of selecting the Nash optimum for both K = 3 and 4, with 
changes being more noticeable for K = 4. 
However, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 7 to 10 units (on 
the 0-100 scale) or 9 to 13% of the Nash optimum. This is only marginally higher than the 
4 to 6 units (or 5 to 8%) recorded for the unperturbed results in table 5A.3. Therefore, on 
the whole, it would seem that this combination of methods is robust to precision errors 
being made on the thermometer scores. We obtained a similar result for the analysis 
conducted on the previous data set. 
ELECTRE l(u) + ELECTRE l(u) (table 5B.4) 
The probability of selecting the Nash opti~um was not affected negatively when this 
combination of MCDM methods was exposed to a precision error being made on the 
thermometer scores. The average ranking of the scenarios in the compromise solution set 
deteriorated most notably for a = 10, when compared to the unperturbed set of results 
tabulated in table SA.4. This deterioration occurred for both C = 2 and 3 in a Foreground 
Set consisting of 7 scenarios. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 4 to 9 units 
(on the 0-100 scale) or 5 to 12% of the Nash optimum. This is more than the 3 units 
recorded for the unperturbed results in table 5A.4, and this combination of MCDM methods 
is therefore not robust to precision errors being made on the interest thermometer scores. 
For the analysis on the previous data set, we obtained a similar result. 
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5.3.2 Perturbing the Concordance Weights 
The second part of the sensitivity analysis looked at perturbing the concordance weights, 
used in the ELECTRE I method, that were assigned to each interest group. 
ELECTRE I(a) + ELECTRE I(a) (table 5B.5) 
For C = 2, there is a deterioration in the average ranking of the solution set scenarios from 
the first level of a introduced. The unperturbed value for this statistic was 5.53 in table 
5A.4, and we see that at a = 0.05 it already has a value of 6.82. This deteriorates further 
to reach a value of 6.98 for a = 0.15. There is, however, no deterioration of the 
probabilities to select the Nash optimum, as was the case for the previous data set, for both 
C = 2 and 3. The average ranking of the solution set scenarios, however, worsens for C = 
3 from the first level of proportional error introduced. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 10 to 15 units 
(on the 0-100 scale) or 13 to 20% of the Nash optimum. This is substantially more than 
the 3 units recorded for the unperturbed results in table 5A.4, and this combination of 
MCDM methods therefore appears not to be robust to proportional errors being made on 
the concordance weights. This was also the case for the analysis conducted on the previous 
data set. 
5.3.3 Perturbing both the Interest Thermometer Scores and the Concordance 
Weights 
When perturbing both the interest thermometer scores and the concordance weights 
simultaneously, we were interested to see whether these sources of error affected the 
outcome in an additive manner, or whether some form of interaction had occurred. 
ELECTRE l(a)(u) + ELECTRE l(a)(u) (table 5B.6) 
The results obtained from the sensitivity runs conducted for this combination of methods 
deteriorate when one looks at the average ranking of the scenarios in the solution set in 
particular. There appears to be an additive effect causing this further deterioration to occur 
when compared to the results obtained when the combination of methods was exposed to 
both sources of error separately. 
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The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 8 to 13 units (on the 0-100 
scale) or 11 to 17% of the Nash optimum. This is markedly more than the 3 units recorded 
for the unperturbed results in table SA.4, and would seem to suggest that this combination 
of MCDM methods is not robust when exposed to both sources of error simultaneously. 
5.4 Effects of External Factors 
The effects that the following three external factors have on the compromise solution produced by 
the various combinations of MCDM methods was investigated. These factors are (i) the number of 
policy elements, (ii) the number of derived attributes, and (iii) the number of interest groups. The 
examination of the effects of these external factors was conducted on the different combinations of 
methods using Foreground Sets of size 7 scenarios only (again as motivated by the work of Miller: 
19S6). The effect of each external factor was investigated separately for the combinations of MCDM 
methods shown below. 
Stage 1 Method 
Maxscoresum 
Minranksum 
Max/Min 
ELECTRE I 
Stage 2 Method 
Max scores um 
Minranksum 
Max/Min 
ELECTRE I 
The tables providing the detailed outcome of these investigations are provided in appendix SC at 
the end of this chapter. We describe the effects of each external factor on the particular combination 
of methods below and again include in the heading of each description, the reference to the table 
number in appendix SC to which it refers. 
5.4.1 Number of Policy Elements 
Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum (table SC.1) 
For K = 3, we see that when 6 policy elements were introduced, the probability of selecting 
the Nash optimum decreased to SO%. The average ranking of solution set scenarios also 
worsened and they had an average ranking equal to S.68. For K = 4, the average ranking 
of the solution increased to 4.7S and 4.08 when S and 6 policy elements were introduced 
respectively. 
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The above results suggest that, on the whole, there is not a marked effect on the probability 
of selecting the Nash optimum when more policy elements are introduced. There does, 
however, appear to be some deterioration in the average ranking of the solution as more 
policy elements are introduced. If we were to look at the average value for this statistic 
(taken over all Foreground Set sizes and values for K) reflected in table 5A.1, we will see 
that it is 3.51. This value, when used as a benchmark, further indicates that there is some 
deterioration in the value of this statistic as the number of policy elements increased. This 
is particularly noticeable when K = 3 and 6 policy elements were used in the simulation 
runs for this combination of MCDM methods. 
However, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 5 units (on 
the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum. This compares favourably with the 1 unit recorded 
for the unperturbed results in table 5A.l. It is therefore not clear as to whether the results 
deteriorated that noticeably as the number of policy elements included in the study increased 
for this combination of MCDM methods. 
Minranksum + Minranksum (table 5C.2) 
For both K = 3 and 4 there is a deterioration in the probability of selecting the Nash 
optimum as more policy elements are introduced. There is also a marked increase in the 
average ranking of scenarios in the solution set as more policy elements are included in the 
simulation runs for this combination of methods. However, the deterioration for this statistic 
is less pronounced for K = 4 when one takes into account this statistic's average value 
(taken over all set sizes and values for K in table 5A.2) of 4.17. This value indicates that 
for K = 4, the results only deteriorate marked~y when 6 policy elements are introduced. 
The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 7 units (on the 0-100 
scale) of the Nash optimum. This is more than the 1 to 2 units recorded for the unperturbed 
results in table 5A.2. Overall, these results therefore tell us that this combination of MCDM 
methods produces progressively worse solutions as the number of policy elements are 
increased in the study. 
Max/Min + Max/Min (table 5C.3) 
The probability of selecting the Nash optimum deteriorates for both K = 3 and 4 as the 
number of policy elements used in the study increase. The average ranking of the solution 
also increases as the policy elements used increase in number. This, however, is more 
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noticeable when the policy elements increase from 5 to 6 for K = 4. For both the previous 
mentioned statistics, we find that the deterioration of the results are less obvious when we 
compare the values for these statistics to their respective averages (taken over all set sizes 
and values for K) shown in table 5A.3. These average value are 47% and 2.67 for the 
probability of selecting the Nash optimum and the average ranking of the solution 
respectively. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 4 to 6 units 
(on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum. This is the same as the 4 to 6 units recorded for 
the unperturbed results in table 5A.3. On the whole, the results produced by this 
combination of MCDM methods, do not deteriorate noticeably as the number of policy 
elements included in the study increase. 
ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I (table 5C.4) 
The probability of selecting the Nash optimum deteriorates for both C = 2 and 3 (more 
noticeably for C = 3) as the number of policy elem nts used in the study increase. There 
is also a very marked increase in the average ranking of solution set scenarios for both cases 
of C, and this is especially noticeable when 6 policy elements are utilised in the study. 
However, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 5 to 7 units (on 
the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum. This compares favourably with the 3 to 4 units 
recorded for the unperturbed results in table 5A.4. It is therefore not clear as to whether or 
not this combination of MCDM methods provides one with noticeably deteriorating results 
as the number of policy elements used in the study increase in number. 
5.4.2 Number of Derived Attributes 
Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum (table 5C.5) 
For both the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as well as the average ranking of 
the solution, there are no noticeable changes in the results as the number of derived 
attributes used in the study increased. The marginal changes that did take place, occurred 
mainly for K = 4, when we noticed a marginal increase in the probability of selecting the 
Nash optimum as the solution, as the number of derived attributes increased. 
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However, this marginal improvement only occurred for the one statistic mentioned above, 
and we can therefore say that as the number of derived attributes increased, there were no 
marked effects reflected in the results, where this combination of MCDM methods is 
concerned. The utility values for the compromise solution further support this conclusion, 
since they tend to lie within 3 to 5 units (on the 0-100 scale) of the Nash optimum. This 
compares favourably with the 1 unit recorded for the unperturbed results in table 5A.1. 
Minranksum + Minranksum (table 5C.6) 
For both K = 3 and 4 there is a deterioration of the results, as measured by the probability 
of selecting the Nash optimum, when 5 derived attributes are used in the study. However, 
when 6 derived attributes are used, the probability improves noticeably for both K = 3 and 
4. For K = 3, we also see that the average ranking of the solution set scenarios improves 
marginally. However, for K = 4, this statistic deteriorates noticeably. 
The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 3 to 6 units (on the 0-100 
scale) of the Nash optimum. This compares favourably with the 1 to 2 units recorded for 
the unperturbed results in table 5A.2, and it is therefore not very clear as to what pattern 
the results follow (as more derived attributes are used in the study) for this combination of 
MCDM methods. 
Max/Min+ Max/Min (table 5C.7) 
For both K = 3 and 4, and where 5 derived attributes are used in the study, the probability 
of selecting the Nash optimum as the solution and the average ranking of the solution 
deteriorates. This deterioration continues when. 6 derived attributes are included in the study 
for K = 3, but an improvement takes place in the results for K = 4. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise tend to lie within 5 to 7 units (on the 0-
100 scale) of the Nash optimum, and this compares favourably with the 4 to 6 units 
recorded for the unperturbed results in table 5A.3. Where this combination of MCDM 
methods is concerned, we therefore do not have a clear indication of how the results would 
be affected as the number of derived attributes used in the study increase. 
ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I (table 5C.8) 
For both C = 2 and 3, the general trend is for an increase to occur in the probability of 
selecting the Nash optimum as the solution, as more derived attributes are included in the 
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study. This trend is more marked in the results for C ~ 3. There is, however, a deterioration 
in the average ranking of solution set scenarios for both cases of C, which is more 
noticeable when 5 derived attributes are used in the study for C = 3. 
The utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie within 6 to 9 units (on the 0-100 
scale) of the Nash optimum. This is more than the 3 to 4 units recorded for the unperturbed 
results in table 5A.4, and for this combination of MCDM methods, the results do not 
provide any definite indications as to whether the increase in the number of derived 
attributes produces better or worse results. 
5.4.3 Number of Interest Groups 
The spread of utility values over all the conflicting interest groups remained fairly even, as 
the number of interests in the simulation study increased, for all ( 4) combinations of 
MCDM methods. However, the results indicate that as the number of interest groups 
increased, so the utility scores (on the 0-100 scale) at which the compromise solution was 
established, tended to decrease. This is the case for all the combinations of MCDM methods 
reported on below, but was more noticeable for the last three combinations, viz., the 
Minranksum + Minranksum, Max/Min + Max/Min and ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I 
combinations. 
Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum (table 5C.9) 
There seems to be a definite deterioration of the results as the interest groups increased in 
number. This deterioration is reflected in both tpe probability of selecting the Nash optimum 
as the solution, and more noticeably in the average ranking of the solution. 
This combination of MCDM methods therefore produced results that deteriorated as the 
number of interest groups used in the study increased. 
Minranksum + Minranksum (table 5C.10) 
When looking at the probability of selecting the Nash optimum and the average ranking of 
solution set scenarios, we clearly see that the results become worse as the number of interest 
groups increase in number. This deterioration is particularly noticeable for K = 4, and it is 
therefore clear that this combination of MCDM methods produced results that deteriorated 
as the number of interests used in the simulation study increased. 
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Max/Min+ Max/Min (table 5C.11) 
For both K = 3 and 4, it is clear that the probability of selecting the Nash optimum as the 
solution decreases as the interest groups increase in number. However, when looking at the 
average value (taken over all Foreground Set sizes and values for K) for this statistic 
provided in table 5A.3, we see that it has a value of 47%. Using this statistic as a 
benchmark, we still have a deteriorating solution being produced as the number of interests 
increase, but to a lesser extent than the 53% and 51 % would seem to indicate for K = 3 and 
4 respectively. Also, the average ranking of the solution remains largely unaffected by the 
increase in the number of interest groups. 
However, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie well below 70 units (on 
the 0-100 scale) for all the interests, as the interest groups increase in number. It therefore 
appears that this combination of MCDM methods produced results that deteriorated as the 
number of interest groups in the study increased. 
ELECTRE I+ ELECTRE I (table 5C.12) 
The probability of selecting the Nash optimum as the solution generally increased for both 
C = 2 and 3, as the number of interest groups used in the simulation study increased in. 
number. The average ranking of solution set scenarios, however, deteriorated for both cases 
of C as the number of interest groups increased. This was particularly noticeable when 6 
interest groups were included in the study. 
Furthermore, the utility values for the compromise solution tend to lie below 70 units (on 
the 0-100 scale) for all the interests, as the in~erest groups increase in number. It therefore 
appears that this combination of MCDM methods also produced results that deteriorated as 
the number of interest groups in the study increased. 
5.5 Overall Conclusions for the Analysis on this Data Set 
.... 
A summary of the results obtained in sections 5.2 and 5.3 is provided in table 5.1 on the following 
page. In these two sections we evaluated the different MCDM approaches and also tested how 
robust they were to the precision and proportional errors that were made on the thermometer scores 
and the concordance weights respectively. 
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Combination 
or 
Methods 
Maxscoresum 
+ 
Maxscoresum 
Mlnranksum 
+ 
Mlnranksum 
Max/Min 
+ 
Max/Min 
ELECTREI 
+ 
ELECTREI 
TABLE 5.1: Summary of Results: Data Set No. 2 (Randomly Generated) 
Combination Performance as Measured by: Results ror Combination How R~bust is the Combination when Exposed to: Affected by: 
Probablllty or Average Ranking of Precision Error Proportional Error Precision and 
Selecting the Nash Foreground Kore (thermometer (concordance Proportional Solution Set Scenarios Set Size Optimum scores) weights) Error 
63% 3.51 no no not robust n/a n/a 
59% 4.17 no no not robust n/a n/a 
47% 2.67 no no robust n/a n/a 
68% 5.66 no yes not robust not robust not robust 
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The conclusions we can draw from the results obtained in sections 5.2 and 5.3 are the following: 
(i) From the point of view of quality of solution that the combination of MCDM methods 
produces, we would recommend the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum combination. The 
Max/Min + Max/Min approach fares rather poorly in the probability of selecting the Nash 
optimum, whilst the ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I approach fares badly where the average 
ranking of the solution set scenarios is concerned. 
(ii) From the point of view of robustness of the combination of MCDM methods, only the 
Max/Min + Max/Min approach proved to be robust. However, further investigations are 
required to establish why the remaining combinations fail to be robust for the two potential 
sources of error on which they were tested. 
(iii) On the whole, there does not appear to be a preferred Foreground Set size or preferred 
values for K or C according to the results obtained. 
(iv) Combining criteria (i) and (ii) above, we therefore tend to favour the Maxscoresum + 
Maxscoresum and the Max/Min + Max/Min approaches. We would possibly further 
investigate these two approaches, since the first failed to be robust to precision errors being 
made on the thermometer scores, whilst the latter has a low probability of selecting the 
Nash optimum as the compromise solution. 
These results are fairly similar (at least for the overall conclusions in (iv)) to those obtained when 
analysing the first data set. We did acknowledge th~t the first data set had a rather restricting 
limitation as regards the fact that the surrogate planning objectives were not varied from one 
iteration to the next for a particular simulation run. We do, however, find that the Max/Min + 
Max/Min (or best of the worst) and the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum MCDM approaches, seem 
to be the two combinations that stand out when compared on the overall quality (including being 
robust to precision and proportional errors) of the solution they produce, for both data sets. 
Both these combinations tend to produce single best policy scenarios as their solution. They also 
produce a complete rank ordering of the remaining alternatives in the (revised) Foreground Set. This 
allows the DM the freedom of choice as to decide whether he or she will settle for a single best 
alternative or include a (subjective) number of the next best ranked alternatives to consider for 
further investigation. 
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In table 5.2 below, we summarize the effects that the external factors have on the solution produced 
by the various MCDM approaches. From this table we see that the number of interest groups tends 
to be the external factor that most affects the compromise solution produced by the various MCDM 
approaches. One can expect that as the interests increase in number, so it becomes increasingly more 
difficult to obtain consensus at maximum levels of efficiency for all the groups concerned. The 
results reflected these decreasing utility scores (on the 0-100 scale) for the compromise solution, 
as more interests were included in the study. 
The Max/Min + Max/Min approach was the only combination not affected by increasing the number 
of policy elements in the study, whilst the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum approach was the only 
combination not affected by increasing the number of derived attributes. These were the two MCDM 
approaches we felt we could recommend, based on the results we obtained for both data sets, 
although more testing should be carried out on these two combinations. 
TABLE 5.2: Effects of External Factors for Data Set No. 2 (Randomly Generated) 
Results for Combination of Methods Affected by: 
Combination 
of Number of Policy Number of Derived Number of Interest 
Methods Elements Attributes Groups 
Maxscoresum 
+ not clear no yes 
Maxscoresum 
Minranksum 
+ yes not clear yes 
Minranksum 
Max/Min 
+ not clear no yes 
Max/Min 
ELECTREI 
+ not clear not clear yes 
ELECTREI 
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APPENDIX SA: THE DETAILED RESULTS OF THE VARIOUS MCDM APPROACHES 
FOR THE SECOND DATA SET 
In this appendix we provide the detailed tabulated outcomes of the various MCDM approaches, as 
applied to the second (randomly generated) data set. The full descriptions of the shortened column 
headings for the tables in this appendix, are provided in appendix 4A at the end of chapter 4. 
The tables of results for implementing the various combinations of MCDM methods start on the 
following page. 
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J<'oregr. K Probability Average Set Rank 
5 2 0.61 2.9 
5 3 0.52 4.04 
6 2 0.58 4.05 
6 3 0.62 3.72 
6 4 0.67 4.44 
7 2 0.5 4.49 
7 3 0.61 3.2 
7 4 0.65 2.61 
7 5 0.7 3.45 
8 2 0.58 4.32 
8 3 0.64 3.04 
8 4 0.65 4.24 
8 5 0.67 3.07 
8 6 0.72 2.93 
9 2 0.59 3.65 
9 3 0.62 3.34 
9 4 0.61 3.15 
9 5 0.72 3.11 
9 6 0.7 2.94 
9 7 0.63 3.45 
Average 0.63 3.51 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SA.1: Results of Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum Simulation Runs 
I. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
75.78 2.0 75.19 2.0 76.34 2.0 75.60 2.0 
Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1 71.88 2.9 77.65 2.3 77.96 2.5 78.41 2.6 
1 76.21 2.5 71.78 3.0 74.52 2.7 77.29 2.3 
1 76.43 2.5 75.73 2.5 72.71 2.7 76.4 2.7 
1 74.83 2.6 71.79 2.6 76.11 2.5 78.69 2.2 
1 70.51 3.1 75.41 2.6 78.95 2.2 79.11 2.4 
1 73.07 2.9 75.94 2.8 77.31 2.2 72.57 2.6 
1 75.33 2.5 74.22 2.3 . 78.14 2.7 76.68 2.5 
l 80.49 2.4 76.63 2.3 78.94 2.2 75.52 2.4 
1 73.19 2.7 70.61 2.7 81.24 2.0 80.16 2.1 
1 74.95 2.6 76.2 2.4 75.17 2.6 70.99 2.7 
1 77.39 2.6 74.95 2.5 75.52 2.1 73.58 2.6 
1 76.19 2.8 76.02 2.8 75.53 2.6 79.72 2.0 
1 76.72 2.4 76.37 2.4 74.32 2.8 77.27 2.2 
1 79.74 2.2 73.53 2.7 75.81 2.6 77.11 2.2 
1 76.86 2.3 78.01 2.3 73.62 2.9 78.81 2.5 
1 77.08 2.2 75.21 2.6 75.87 2.4 76.9 2.4 
1 73.12 2.4 77.91 2.3 75.79 2.6 74.22 2.5 
1 79.87 2.1 74.49 2.6 79.52 2.3 73.41 2.6 
1 75.24 2.5 ~5.4 2.4 75.76 2.6 79.09 2.1 
1 74.58 2.5 74.42 2.5 76.26 2.4 74.65 2.7 
1.00 75.68 2.5 75.11 2.5 76.45 2.5 76.53 2.4 
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Foregr. K Probability Average 
Set Rank 
5 2 0.53 4.56 
5 3 0.55 3.94 
6 2 0.49 5.32 
6 3 0.59 4.71 
6 4 0.6 4.28 
7 2 0.57 4.95 
7 3 0.63 4.08 
7 4 0.69 1.29 
7 5 0.65 4.36 
8 2 0.65 4.24 
8 3 0.64 3.29 
8 4 0.57 4.57 
8 5 0.61 3.41 
8 6 0.56 5.42 
9 2 0.48 4.65 
9 3 0.64 3.96 
9 4 0.59 4.67 
9 5 0.61 4.09 
9 6 0.64 3.39 
9 7 0.59 4.17 
Average I 0.59 4.17 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SA.2: Results of Minranksum + Minranksum Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
75.42 2.0 76.39 2.0 76.15 2.0 75.08 2.0 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Set Size 
1.4 71.28 2.6 75.42 2.3 71 2.4 70.72 2.6 
1.22 80.58 2.3 76.88 2.0 71.39 2.8 71.45 2.6 
1.4 72.09 2.5 69.12 2.8 72.09 2.8 74.82 2.1 
1.28 74.4 2.4 75.99 2.3 74.96 2.6 72.86 2.5 
1.27 73.16 2.7 75.09 2.5 74.35 2.6 78.34 2.3 
1.34 73.28 2.8 79.62 2.1 79.73 2.3 69.04 2.7 
1.19 75.3 2.6 74.85 2.2 • 70.77 2.4 78.06 2.0 
3.84 74.54 2.6 78.61 2.2 71.77 2.4 74.48 2.4 
1.15 77.01 2.2 72.37 2.8 73.3 2.6 78.92 2.4 
1.19 74.87 2.4 79.06 2.4 79.9 2.3 73.59 2.9 
1.25 76.44 2.3 77.52 1.9 73.54 2.7 72.23 2.1 
1.24 75.05 2.4 72.91 2.6 74.81 2.5 72.95 2.6 
1.23 68.37 2.6 79.51 2.2 72.83 2.5 77.4 2.1 
1.3 73.04 2.5 69.76 2.9 75.92 2.5 76.35 2.4 
1.11 71.87 2.8 76.75 2.6 77.56 2.6 77.28 2.7 
1.19 74.67 2.5 72.37 2.6 81 2.1 75.54 2.4 
1.18 73.13 2.6 78.82 2.3 73.57 2.5 71.64 2.5 
1.2 75.38 2.4 74.69 2.2 74.63 2.6 74.62 2.4 
1.24 75.71 2.1 77.88 2.0 76.92 2.1 76 2.3 
1.15 75.32 2.4 75.61 2.4 76.46 2.5 74.75 2.4 
1.37 74.27 2.5 75.64 2.4 74.83 2.5 74.55 2.4 
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Foregr. K Probablllty Average 
Set Rank 
5 2 0.42 3.29 
5 3 0.47 2.43 
6 2 0.5 2.36 
6 3 0.41 2.57 
6 4 0.42 2.55 
7 2 0.46 2.46 
7 3 0.53 2.37 
7 4 0.51 2.41 
7 5 0.41 3.16 
8 2 0.5 2.34 
8 3 0.5 2.62 
8 4 0.43 2.72 
8 5 0.48 2.69 
8 6 0.52 2.76 
9 2 0.53 2.61 
9 3 0.46 2.77 
9 4 0.49 2.33 
9 5 0.47 2.61 
9 6 0.44 3.06 
9 7 0.45 3.24 
Average 0.47 2.67 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SA.3: Results of Max/Min+ Max/Min Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups* and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
76.47 2.0 75.37 2.0 76.55 2.0 75.81 2.0 
Soln. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups* and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1 73.55 2.0 68.74 2.4 75.08 2.0 72.5 2.0 
1 72.47 2.1 74.96 1.8 72.1 2.0 72.06 2.0 
1 73.47 1.8 73.74 2.0 73.24 1.6 70.25 2.1 
1 71.62 1.7 72.14 1.8 70.7 1.8 69.61 2.1 
1 71.66 2.0 71.52 2.0 73.66 1.8 72.82 2.0 
1 68.85 1.9 69.36 1.8 72.45 1.9 73.5 1.8 
1 73.21 1.8 73.68 1.8 • 71.45 1.9 71.46 2.0 
1 72.82 1.9 70.99 1.8 73.69 1.8 72.55 1.8 
1 72.43 1.8 69.32 1.9 70.65 1.8 66.2 2.2 
1 73.98 2.0 72.66 1.8 75.24 1.8 70.69 1.8 
1 69.3 1.8 71.66 1.9 72.34 1.7 72.24 1.7 
1 71.37 1.7 70.41 1.7 70.14 1.6 69.69 1.8 
1 69.45 1.8 71.83 1.8 71.03 1.9 69.27 1.8 
1 74.25 2.0 72.31 1.8 71.5 1.8 71.95 1.8 
1 73.2 1.9 71.15 2.0 74.16 1.6 70.42 1.9 
1 70.48 2.0 69.41 1.6 71.63 1.7 69.47 1.9 
1 73.65 1.7 71.74 1.8 72.63 1.9 70.92 1.7 
1 70.31 1.8 71.94 1.9 73.29 2.0 71.02 2.0 
1 69.63 1.8 70.01 1.9 70.24 1.7 65.73 1.9 
1 72.62 1.9 71.42 1.9 69.15 1.7 69.59 1.8 
1.00 71.92 1.9 71.45 1.9 72.22 1.8 70.60 1.9 
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5 2 0.67 5.72 
5 3 0.68 6.51 
6 2 0.69 S.58 
6 3 0.81 4.85 
7 2 0.59 5.53 
7 3 0.69 4.93 
8 3 0.69 5.97 
8 4 0.7 5.88 
9 3 0.66 5.86 
9 4 O.M 6:'4 
Average 0.68 5.66 
• randomly generated 
--------
TABLE SA.4: Results of ELECTRE I+ ELECTRE I Simulation Runs 
1. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Nash Solution 
76.01 2.0 76.11 2.0 76.02 1.9 76.1 2.0 
Soln. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
218 72.95 2.1 68.12 1.99 70.89 2.05 71.8 2.11 
2.04 73.5 2.1 68.12 2.52 71.54 2.14 75.97 1.82 
1.87 77.39 2.0 71.45 2.31 71.28 2.29 74.96 2.12 
1.95 72.85 2.0 70.79 2.09 73.43 2.01 77.68 1.64 
1.72 74.21 2.4 67.91 2.72 76.15 2.02 71.92 2.33 
1.78 78.68 2.0 73.28 2.12 71.08 2.28 74.44 2.34 
1.88 70.17 2.4 75.36 2.32 71.81 2.31 75.02 2.26 
1.8 72.38 2.2 77.19 2.17 66.64 2.59 73.37 2.21 
1.54 66.61 2.8 79.38 2.24 77.19 2.24 78.27 2.15 
U7 6'1.99 2.!I '7t.i7 2.!6 16.6! ~.14 "~·'' 2.~3 
1.86 72.87 2.3 72.29 2.3 72.66 2.2 74.70 2.1 
------------- --- ------
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APPENDIX SB: THE DETAILED RESULTS OF THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
CONDUCTED ON THE VARIOUS MCDM APPROACHES FOR THE SECOND 
DATA SET 
This appendix contains the tables of results for the sensitivity analysis conducted on the various 
MCDM approaches. The shortened column headings of these tables are explained in appendix 4A 
at the end of chapter 4, whilst the symbols a (alpha) and o (sigma) are explained in section 4.1 of 
chapter 4. 
The tables are listed on the following 3 pages. 
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rn Probability Average Rank 
2 3 0.61 3.73 
5 3 0.5 4.25 
10 3 0.53 3.78 
2 4 0.64 4.17 
5 4 0.63 3.56 
10 4 0.51 4.61 
• randomly generated 
~ Probability Average Rank 
2 3 0.59 5.15 
5 3 0.6 4.15 
10 3 0.59 4.34 
2 4 0.53 4.29 
5 4 0.63 3.31 
10 4 0.47 5.60 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SB.I: Results of Maxscoresum(u) + Maxscoresum(u) Simulation Runs 
Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Set Size 
; 
1 74.92 2.6 74.45 2.5 76.41 2.2 74.78 2.5 
1 74.21 2.5 75.46 2.4 75.47 2.5 71.84 2.8 
1 74.8 2.6 73.67 2.6 71.67 2.4 75.91 2.4 
1 73.19 2.7 74.83 2.4 73.33 2.3 73.9 2.8 
1 74.55 2.6 75.99 2.5 75.41 2.5 74.45 2.6 
1 73.59 2.6 72 2.6 77.02 2.4 69.37 2.9 
TABLE SB.2: Results of Minranksum(u) + Minranksum(u) Simulation Runs 
Soln. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1.27 69.58 2.9 71.21 2.9 74.83 2.3 77.97 2.0 
1.21 75.67 2.4 73.94 2.3 76.22 2.1 74.75 2.6 
1.2 68.43 2.9 77.33 2.3 71.9 2.3 76.41 2.0 
1.2 69.53 2.6 76.19 2.2 74.94 2.5 73.62 2.5 
1.29 75.12 2.2 72.51 2.5 72.44 2.2 74.3 2.3 
1.22 71.73 2.5 68.86 2.3 74.65 2.3 71.92 2.6 
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rn Probability Average Rank 
2 3 0.43 2.47 
5 3 0.41 2.73 
10 3 0.4 2.73 
2 4 0.33 2.94 
5 4 0.36 2.85 
10 4 0.35 3.28 
• randomly generated 
u c Probability Average 
Rank 
2 2 0.68 5.93 
5 2 0.66 5.85 
10 2 0.6 6.01 
2 3 0.68 6.47 
s 3 0.71 5.31 
10 3 0.63 6.08 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SB.3: Results of Max/Min(u) + Max/Min(u) Simulation Runs 
Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Set Size 
1 72.14 1.6 70.61 1.8 68.47 1.9 72.59 1.7 
1 68.69 1.7 69.71 1.6 69.04 1.9 69.01 1.9 
1 69.54 2.0 72.07 2.0 67.51 2.0 72.44 1.8 
1 67.48 1.7 68.95 1.6 67.68 1.8 69.58 1.7 
1 67.57 1.6 68.83 1.6 67.87 1.8 69.52 1.6 
1 66.06 1.8 67.31 1.8 71.42 1.8 68.84 1.8 
TABLE SB.4: Results of ELECTRE l(o") + ELECTRE l(u) Simulation Runs 
Soln. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1.8 69.43 2.2 71.12 2.4 70.5 2.1 73.29 2.3 
1.81 69.1 2.5 71.11 2.3 73.87 2.3 74.03 2.2 
1.79 74.93 2.2 68.41 2.6 73.27 2.4 72.37 2.3 
1.9 72.41 2.3 69.49 2.6 72.06 2.3 73.43 2.3 
1.68 71.51 2.2 72.01 2.3 72.2 2.4 77.02 2.2 
1.79 73.23 2.2 67.79 2.4 69.49 2.4 73.61 2.1 
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rn Probablllty 
0.05 2 0.68 
0.15 2 0.7 
0.25 2 0.6 
0.40 2 0.64 
0.05 3 0.7 
0.15 3 0.7 
0.2.5 3 0.7 
0.40 3 0.71 
• randomly generated 
I a I u le I Prob. 
0.4 10 2 0.51 
0.4 10 3 0.67 
• randomly generated 
TABLE 5B.5: Results of ELECTRE l(a) + ELECTRE l(a) Simulation Runs 
Average Soln. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associate~ Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
6.82 2.47 73.02 1.8 62.28 2.2 74.76 1.9 69.68 2.1 
6.98 2.36 72.81 1.9 61.03 2.1 76.31 1.8 66.24 2.2 
6.75 2.44 61.66 2.1 67.94 1.8 83.44 1.6 63.81 1.9 
6.48 2.42 69.75 2.1 72.54 2.0 66.28 2.1 69.15 2.1 
6.88 2.49 68.06 2.3 71.25 1.8 72.12 1.9 66.77 2.2 
6.88 2.49 68.06 2.3 71.25 1.8 • 72.12 1.9 66.77 2.2 
5.77 2.3 69.38 2.2 72.65 2.1 75.64 2.1 71.06 2.2 
5.90 2.43 75.55 2.0 69.63 2.0 67.1 2.0 76.3 2.0 
TABLE 5B.6: Results of ELECTRE l(a)(u) + ELECTRE l(a)(u) Simulation Runs 
Average Soln. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Rank Set Size 
7.85 2.27 65.27 2.0 63.99 2.1 77.77 1.8 67.98 2.1 
6.39 2.2 67.43 2.2 80 1.6 68.12 2.0 69.08 2.3 
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APPENDIX SC: THE DETAILED RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS THAT EXTERNAL 
FACTORS HA VE ON THE VARIO US MCDM APPROACHES FOR THE SECOND 
DATA SET 
This appendix provides the tabulated results of the effects that the three external factors have on the 
solution produced by the four MCDM approaches. The shortened column headings of these tables 
are explained in appendix 4A at the end of chapter 4, with the exception of the following: 
Pol. El's.: The number of policy elements (m). 
Der. Atts.: The number of derived attributes (n). 
Int.: The number of interest groups (p ). 
The tables of results for the investigation of the effects of these external factors are provided on the 
next 6 pages. 
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TABLE SC.I: Results of Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum Simulation Runs 
[ill Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Rank Set Size . 
4 3 0.61 3.2 1 75.33 2.5 74.22 2.3 78.14 2.7 76.68 2.5 
5 3 0.62 3.58 1 72.28 2.1 71.36 2.1 76.89 2.2 72.26 2.0 
6 3 0.5 5.68 1.01 79.2 2.1 75.68 2.4 74.5 2.5 75.36 2.7 
4 4 0.65 2.61 1 80.49 2.4 76.63 2.3 78.94 2.2 75.52 2.4 
5 4 0.6 4.75 1 74.18 2.3 75.77 2.2 73.19 2.3 74.52 2.1 
6 4 0.68 4.08 1 79.56 2.2 77.65 2.4 80.25 2.0 77.89 2.2 
• randomly generated 
TABLE 5C.2: Results of Minranksum + Minranksum Simulation Runs 
[ill Probability Average Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Rank Set Size . 
4 3 0.63 4.08 1.19 75.3 2.6 74.85 2.2 70.77 2.4 78.06 2.0 
5 3 0.56 5.03 1.25 74.34 2.3 73.79 2.2 71.06 1.9 70.92 2.3 
6 3 0.49 6.16 1.3 77.84 2.0 76.44 2.7 75.27 2.5 73.85 2.5 
4 4 0.69 1.29 3.84 74.54 2.6 78.61 2.2 71.77 2.4 74.48 2.4 
5 4 0.52 4.75 1.29 70.22 2.3 73.65 2.3 69.26 2.1 76.76 1.9 
6 4 0.53 6.84 1.23 80.24 2.0 76.4 2.4 73.87 2.2 72.47 2.7 
• randomly generated 
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~ Probability Average Rank . 
4 3 0.53 2.37 
5 3 0.54 2.43 
6 3 0.49 2.97 
4 4 0.51 2.41 
5 4 0.49 2.65 
6 4 0.41 3.69 
• randomly generated 
~ Probablllty Average Rank . 
4 2 0.59 5.53 
5 2 0.61 6.85 
6 2 0.56 9.63 
4 3 0.69 4.93 
5 3 0.57 6.93 
6 3 0.6 9.58 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SC.3: Results of Max/Min+ Max/Min Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associate~ Standard Devladons: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1 73.21 1.8 73.68 1.8 71.45 1.9 71.46 2.0 
1 71.11 1.7 71.57 1.7 74.51 1.6 71.42 1.4 
1.07 75.38 1.6 72.78 1.9 76.51 1.8 74.26 1.8 
1 72.82 1.9 70.99 1.8 73.69 1.8 72.55 1.8 
1 70.11 1.6 71.26 1.5 70.77 1.7 71.92 1.6 
. 
1 73.14 1.9 72.97 1.9 72.61 1.8 76.77 1.6 
TABLE SC.4: Results of ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utlllty Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1.72 74.21 2.4 67.91 2.7 76.15 2.0 71.92 2.3 
1.87 73.44 2.1 70.25 2.3 71.86 2.0 70.58 2.2 
1.84 74.27 2.1 71.69 2.4 75.39 2.1 71.11 2.2 
1.78 78.68 2.0 73.28 2.1 71.08 2.3 74.44 2.3 
2.01 71.02 2.0 72.17 2.2 69.89 2.3 69.79 2.1 
1.92 75.11 2.1 73.05 2.2 78.52 1.7 70.96 2.4 
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~ Probability Average Rank . 
4 3 0.61 3.2 
5 3 0.64 2.37 
6 3 0.61 3.54 
4 4 0.65 2.61 
s 4 0.68 2.85 
6 4 0.67 2.74 
• randomly generated 
I ~:~: I K I Probability Average Rank 
4 3 0.63 4.08 
5 3 0.53 3.47 
6 3 0.68 3.76 
4 4 0.69 1.29 
5 4 0.56 4.31 
6 4 0.64 3.3 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SC.S Results of Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associate~ Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1 75.33 2.5 74.22 2.3 78.14 2.7 76.68 2.5 
1 79.44 2.2 76.55 2.3 72.77 2.4 72.91 2.3 
1 79.2 2.2 76.17 2.5 72.96 2.6 74.98 2.6 
1 80.49 2.4 76.63 2.3 78.94 2.2 75.52 2.4 
1 77.99 1.9 75.42 2.6 74.59 2.3 74.17 2.5 
. 
1 72.85 2.6 78.14 2.2 77.51 2.3 78.79 2.0 
TABLE SC.6: Results of Minranksum + Minranksum Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1.19 75.3 2.6 74.85 2.2 70.77 2.4 78.06 2.0 
1.19 72.31 2.3 73.59 2.5 76.41 2.3 73.86 2.4 
1.3 76.72 2.1 74.73 2.5 74.64 2.3 77.06 2.5 
3.84 74.54 2.6 78.61 2.2 71.77 2.4 74.48 2.4 
l.19 77.93 2.3 71.12 2.3 75.48 2.4 69.53 2.4 
1.3 75.3 2.3 78.64 2.1 76.24 2.5 76.33 2.3 
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~ Prohablllty Average Rank . 
4 3 0.53 2.37 
5 3 0.4 2.87 
6 3 0.49 2.44 
4 4 0.51 2.41 
$ 4 ()..46 z.ISS 
6 4 0.56 2.03 
• randomly generated 
~ Probablllty Average ts. Rank 
4 2 0.59 5.53 
s 2 0.67 5.65 
6 2 0.63 6.03 
4 3 0.69 4.93 
5 3 0.68 6.08 
6 3 0.74 5.02 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SC.7: Results of Max/Min+ Max/Min Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utlllty Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Devladons: Combination or Methods Set Size l 
1 73.21 1.8 73.68 1.8 71.45 1.9 71.46 2.0 
1 69.41 1.8 72.5 1.8 69.79 1.8 69.82 1.9 
1 72.15 2.0 74.51 1.8 73.46 2.0 73.55 1.8 
1 72.82 1.9 70.99 1.8 73.69 1.8 72.55 1.8 
l ?ll.71 1.11 ?:Z.14 u 70."'4 l.7 72.0t 1.1 
1 73.17 1.9 74.45 2.0 72.94 1.9 74.02 1.7 
TABLE SC.8: Results of ELECTRE I + ELECTRE I Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean UtUlty Values ror the (4) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Devladons: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1.72 74.21 2.4 67.91 2.7 76.15 2.0 71.92 2.3 
1.85 71.72 2.2 71.25 2.1 73.56 2.2 70.65 2.2 
1.75 68.73 2.5 73.71 2.3 75.06 2.4 75.23 2.3 
1.78 78.68 2.0 73.28 2.1 71.08 2.3 74.44 2.3 
1.88 71.19 2.1 68.97 2.5 70.41 2.4 76.32 2.1 
1.68 71.96 2.2 72.25 2.2 76.72 1.8 70.54 2.3 
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Prob. Average 
Rank 
4 3 0.61 3.2 
5 3 0.6 5 
6 3 0.51 5.76 
4 4 0.65 2.61 
' 
4 o.,e 4.17 
6 4 0.57 4.82 
• randomly generated 
Int. K Prob. Average Rank 
4 3 0.63 4.08 
5 3 0.51 5.46 
6 3 0.56 5.52 
4 4 0.69 1.29 
5 4 0.48 5.98 
6 4 0.41 6.79 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SC.9: Results of Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4/5/6) Interest Groups• and their associate~ Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1 75.33 2.5 74.22 2.3 78.14 2.7 76.68 2.5 
1 70.4 2.9 73.37 2.7 73.24 2.6 73.48 2.4 75.88 2.3 
1 70.14 3.0 72.81 2.5 74.19 2.8 69.6 2.8 72.16 2.7 74.94 2.6 
1 80.49 2.4 76.63 2.3 78.94 2.2 75.52 2.4 
l 73.111 a.1 68,74 a.9 71.41 a.11 71.78 a.a 78.111 a.4 
1 70.8 2.9 71.83 2.6 73.04 2.8 73.25 2.3 74.02 2.5 70.29 2.9 
TABLE SC.10: Results of Minranksum + Minranksum Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values ror the (4/5/6) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination or Methods Set Size 
1.19 75.3 2.6 74.85 2.2 70.77 2.4 78.06 2.0 
1.18 72.91 2.7 74.75 2.5 68.55 2.7 68.51 2.9 74.4 2.4 
1.3 68.51 2.4 68.96 2.6 74.83 2.4 68.44 2.6 69.36 2.6 72.69 2.2 
3.84 74.54 2.6 78.61 2.2 71.77 2.4 74.48 2.4 
1.26 71.21 2.9 77.44 2.4 71.18 2.6 69.3 2.5 71.51 2.6 
1.21 68.91 2.8 68.2 2.8 69.61 2.9 72.69 2.6 70.94 2.9 70.01 2.9 
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rn Prob. Average Rank 
4 3 0.53 2.37 
5 3 0.43 2.55 
6 3 0.42 2.75 
4 4 0.51 2.41 
5 4 0.33 2.75 
6 4 0.31 2.96 
• randomly generated 
rn Prob. Average Rank 
4 2 0.59 5.53 
s 2 0.72 6.24 
6 2 0.61 8.48 
4 3 0.69 4.93 
5 3 0.86 6.43 
6 3 0.73 8.02 
• randomly generated 
TABLE SC.11: Results of Max/Min+ Max/Min Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4/5/6) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Set Size 
' 
1 73.21 1.8 73.68 1.8 71.45 1.9 71.46 2.0 
1 68.86 1.7 70.15 1.9 69.67 1.7 70.18 1.8 68.26 1.7 
1 65.76 2.0 66.07 1.9 67.46 1.7 69.45 2.0 68.37 2.0 63.51 1.9 
1 72.82 1.9 70.99 1.8 73.69 1.8 72.55 1.8 
1 68.21 1.9 67.18 1.9 69.53 1.6 67.32 2.0 66.7 1.8 
1 66.35 1.5 66.58 1.9 66.38 1.8 
0 64.22 1.8 67.31 1.6 68.5 1.6 
TABLE SC.12: Results of ELECTRE I+ ELECTRE I Simulation Runs 
Solo. 2. Mean Utility Values for the (4/5/6) Interest Groups• and their associated Standard Deviations: Combination of Methods Set Size 
1.72 74.21 2.4 67.91 2.7 76.15 2.0 71.92 2.3 
2.31 73.47 2.0 72.14 2.2 67.34 2.2 72.Sl 2.0 72.01 2.1 
2.57 66.21 2.2 67.18 2.1 60.92 2.3 71.79 2.1 66.47 2.1 68.73 2.3 
1.78 78.68 2.0 73.28 2.1 71.08 2.3 74.44 2.3 
2.78 69.69 1.9 72.63 1.6 67.95 1.8 68.02 2.0 72.32 1.8 
2.57 65.53 2.0 67.8 2.2 70.26 2.2 67.15 2.2 67.58 2.2 68.97 2.1 
l.O 
N 
M 
u 
l.f) 
>< :a 
5 
~ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
We have previously stated that the literature does not deal explicitly with the two areas of focus, 
fonning part of figure 2.1, on which this paper concentrated. The MCDM and related methodologies 
were therefore analyzed with a view of finding suitable methods, perhaps requiring a degree of 
adaptation, that could be implemented in order to: 
(1) filter a large set of alternatives (analogous to our Background Set) to fonn a smaller and 
more manageable Foreground Set (on which direct value judgements could be made), and 
(2) further refine and ultimately reduce the Foreground Set to a solution set of alternatives. 
A main criterion that was required of the MCDM and related methods was that they be both 
interactive and iterative. The first criterion would ensure that the DMs were not only aware of the 
workings of the method (i.e. avoiding a "black box" type of approach), but that they would 
participate in and provide input on a continual basis. Furthermore, the ability to revise a particular 
outcome produced by the method was also a criterion that was placed on the particular MCDM 
approach, and this would therefore require the MCDM method to be iterative in nature. 
The MCDM and related approaches were also rated on the quality of the solutions they produced. 
This was achieved by observing the proximity of the solution produced by the MCDM method to 
that of the Nash optimum solution, which we used as a benchmark in our study. We were also 
interested to see how consistent and reliable the solutions were that were produced by the various 
combinations of MCDM methods. 
As far as the analysis of the methods is concerned, we reported the results obtained from the 
simulation studies in chapters 4 and 5. Our overall conclusions, based on the outcomes of these 
simulation studies as well as the criteria we have mentioned in the previous paragraph, are provided 
in the two sections of this chapter befow, 
6.1 Specific to the Simulation Study 
Based on the outcomes of the MCDM approaches we have implemented in the simulation studies, 
as reported in chapters 4 and 5, the following conclusions may be drawn: 
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(1) For the analysis conducted on the first data set in chapter 4, we tended to favour the 
Max/Min+ Max/Min and the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum MCDM approaches. This was 
considered from an overall point of view, wherein we looked at both the quality and 
robustness of the solution set produced. We did feel that the reason why the Maxscoresum 
+ Maxscoresum approach failed to be rooust for large forms of precision error being made 
on the thermometer scores needed further investigation. 
(2) For the analysis conducted on the second data set in chapter 5, we again tended to favour 
the Max/Min + Max/Min and Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum approaches. We again 
considered both the quality and robustness of the solution produced. For this data set, we 
recommended that both the Max/Min + Max/Min and Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum 
approaches be further investigated, since the latter failed to be robust to precision errors 
being made on the thermometer scores, whilst the first mentioned has a low probability of 
selecting the Nash optimum as the compromise solution. 
(3) The analysis on the second data set also looked at the effects that external factors (viz. the 
number of policy elements, the number of derived attributes and the number of interest 
groups) have on the solution set produced. We found that for the Max/Min + Max/Min 
MCDM approach, the number of policy elements did not greatly affect the results produced 
by this combination of methods. For the Maxscoresum + Maxscoresum approach, the 
number of derived attributes did not affect the results produced by this combination of 
/ 
MCDM methods. 
( 4) Overall, we could therefore conclude that the .Max/Min + Max/Min and the Maxscoresum 
+ Maxscoresum MCDM approaches seem to be the two methods that provided us with the 
most reliable solutions. Both these combinations of methods tend to produce single best 
policy scenarios as their solutions. They also produce a complete rank ordering of the 
remaining alternatives in the (revised) Foreground Set. This allows the DMs the freedom 
of choice as to decide whether they will settle for a single best alternative or include a 
(subjective) number of the next best ranked alternatives to consider for further investigation. 
This flexibility therefore adds to the attractive nature of these two combinations of methods. 
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6.2 o,·erall Value to Multicriteria Policy Planning 
Based on the literature we have surveyed, the following overall conclusions may be drawn: 
.. 
(1) It would most certainly be advantageous to apply screening policies in order to reduce the 
number of alternatives under consideration, before attempting to reduce the Background Set 
to a more manageable smaller set. 
(2) The utility based approach in which alternatives are directly compared in terms of each 
criterion, was found to be of particular value when a small number of alternatives, such as 
in the Foreground Set, were being considered. Implementation, however, becomes tedious 
when a large number of alternatives is being considered. The approach does provide 
considerable insight into the planning procedure for the various DMs and this is particularly 
the case when value functions are used in an interactive sense. 
Value functions in interactive mode allow DMs to be involved in the process on a continual 
basis. The approach of Korhonen, Wallenius and Zionts (1984), which we used in the 
simulation study to revise the Foreground Set, was found to be well suited for this purpose. 
When compared to conventional MAUT, value functions in interactive mode also allow for 
a reduced amount of comparisons to be made between various alternatives. In this regard 
they therefore lend themselves well to the task of reducing the large Background Set to a 
smaller Foreground Set of alternatives. 
(3) Interactive (multiple) goal programming ap~roaches are well suited to the process of 
reducing the Background Set of alternatives. The Wierzbicki (1980) scalarizing function was 
used in the simulation study as part of the Steuer/Wierzbicki method to perform this task. 
We found that it worked well and provided us with a reasonable spread (i.e. including the 
extreme and in-between attribute values on which these alternatives are formulated) of 
scenarios to form our Foreground Set. 
(4) The VISA approach of Belton and Vickers (1989) seems to be well suited to aiding group 
decision support. The presentation of information (i.e. how conflicting interest groups may 
rate or score various alternatives) becomes important and the "thermometer" type scales 
(also available in VISA) certainly provides a good visual representation for scoring the 
various alternatives. It is particularly effective when the number of alternatives is relatively 
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small, for instance when analysing the Foreground Set. Stewart et al. (1993) report that 
"people from a wide variety of backgrounds" were not only capable but also confident when 
they compared alternatives in a Foreground Set environment on the basis of various criteria 
by using "thermometer scales". 
(5) Overall, the appropriate MCDM and related approaches we have reviewed and implemented 
in the simulation studies, still need further refining and some degree of adaptation for use 
in an interactive DSS. This is perhaps the case since most of these methods have in this 
study been implemented in a (hypothetical) environment, that not only requires direct value 
judgements to be made on various societal interests, but also requires judgements to be 
made of a less tangible nature. These judgements will impact on the benefits to society as 
a whole and it is not always possible to express or formulate them in a quantifiable manner. 
However, the MCDM methods we have reviewed all require that these judgements be 
expressed in a quantifiable manner, so that they can be used when the alternative policy 
outcomes are being evaluated. We therefore have to accommodate this difference where the 
expression of these judgements is concerned and incorporate this into the overall scenario 
based planning procedure. 
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